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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court stated in 2001, in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,1
that a core Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
concern is the "ERISA command," that ERISA fiduciaries make
payments to the beneficiary who is "designated by a participant or
by the terms of [the] plan." Thus, the Supreme Court held that
ERISA preempted a state law which attempted to revoke an
ERISA plan participant's designation of his spouse upon his
divorce. The Supreme Court ruled in 1997, in Boggs v. Boggs,2
that ERISA preempts a state law which attempts to give a
participant's spouse the right to dispose of part of the pension
benefits of the participant upon the spouse's death. In both
Egelhoff and Boggs, the Supreme Court held that the claimants
were not entitled to the benefits either directly from the ERISA
plans or indirectly from the beneficiary designee. The Supreme
Court held that the claimants were not even entitled to obtain
payments from any funds that the beneficiary had in addition to
the benefit payments, because such entitlements would "render
the award of title [to the benefits] meaningless."
ERISA plans must include two beneficiary designations.!
Both statutory designations are limited to pension plans.' The
first designation provides a participant's spouse with survivor
benefits, which may only be waived with the spouse's written
consent.6 The second one provides a participant's spouse, former
spouse, children, or other dependents with survivor benefits and/or
other plan benefits by means of those domestic relations orders
that meet the
requirements of qualified domestic relations orders
("QDROs").7 This Article discusses these two benefit designations.
Despite the clear ERISA mandate that plan beneficiary
designations determine who gets and may keep ERISA plan
benefits, 8 many state and federal courts have held to the contrary
in spite of Boggs and Egelhoff.9

1. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001).
2. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 853 (1997).
3. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 853 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669
(1962), a unanimous Supreme Court decision that preempted a state law and
thereby upheld a savings bond designation).
4. ERISA §§ 205(a), 206(d)(3)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a), 1056(d)(3)(A) (2000).
5. Both are contained within Part 2 of Subtitle B of Title I of ERISA,
which is limited to pension plans. ERISA § 201; 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000).
6. ERISA § 205(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (2000).
7. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2000).
8. We are not considering claims based upon beneficiary designations that
are ambiguous on their face. Such claims are resolved by resorting to the plan
terms to determine who is the designated beneficiary.
9. Prior to Boggs and Egelhoff, courts and commentators raised serious
questions about the significance of the benefits mandate. See George A.
Norwood, Who Is Entitled to Receive a Deceased Participant's ERISA
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This Article argues in favor of three propositions. First,
agreements by participants to make or retain beneficiary
designations, whether or not part of state court orders, do not give
non-designees the right to obtain plan benefits described in those
agreements either directly from the ERISA plan or indirectly from
the plan designee."° The Supreme Court so held, in 1981 in
Ridgway v.Ridgway," which was cited in Boggs," with respect to a
beneficiary designation under the (non-ERISA) life insurance
made available to members of the United States military. Second,
"waivers" by spouses of interests to ERISA plans, which are part of
marital dissolution agreements, whether or not part of state court
orders, do not give anyone other than the designee the right to
obtain plan benefits either directly from the plan or indirectly from
the plan designee. Such waivers are voided by both the ERISA
beneficiary designation mandate and the ERISA prohibition on the
alienation of ERISA pension benefits. Third, designees who kill
participants do not thereby give anyone other than the designee
the right to obtain plan benefits either directly from the plan or
.
indirectly from the plan designee."
There is no convincing statutory or common law basis for the
contrary propositions. 4 Many of the arguments in favor of the
contrary propositions are policy arguments rather than arguments
based on the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. These

Retirement Plan Benefits - an Ex-Spouse or Current Spouse? The Federal
Circuits Have an Irreconcilable Conflict, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 61 (1997)
(discussing the law as understood by many courts prior to Boggs and Egelhoff);
see also Jayne E. Zanglein, When Worlds Collide: The Intersection of Property
Laws and ERISA Chapter 10.4-Beneficiary Designations, 58-2-10 NYU
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FED. TAX. § 10.04 (2000) (discussing the law as
understood by many courts prior to Egelhofi.
10. QDROs, as discussed infra, are benefit designations. Thus, they do not
require participants to make or retain any beneficiary designations.
11. 454 U.S. 46 (1981). Plans for military personnel are not ERISA plans,
infra.
12. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 853.
13. There are exceptions for (a) plans which have such terms, or (b) if a
generally applicable criminal law provides for such forfeiture.
14. See, e.g., Guardian Life v. Finch, 395 F.3d 23 (5th Cir. 2004) (defending
many of the stated holdings). See generally, Jeffrey Gorris, Comment, Waivers
of ERISA Plan Benefits: Preventing Judicial Interpretations of a Complex
Statute from Frustratingthe Statute's Simple Purpose, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 717
(Jan. 2007); accord Keron A. Wright, "Stuck on You": The Inability of an ExSpouse to Waive Rights Under an ERISA Pension Plan [McGowan v. NJR
Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005)], 45 WASHBuRN L.J. 687 (Spring
2006). Cf David S. Lebolt, "Making the Best of Egelhoff. Federal Common
Law for ERISA-Preempted Beneficiary Designations," 28 J. PEN. PLAN. AND
COMP. 29 (2002) (proposing a federal common law approach is proposed which
appeals to prevailing national standards, such as the various Restatements of
law, rather than the diverse and preempted state laws).
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arguments, as the Supreme Court indicated in Ridgway5 and
Boggs, 6 are best directed at Congress, which has the authority to
add or modify statutory beneficiary designations.

II. ERISA's PURPOSE, COVERAGE, PROTECTION AND PREEMPTION
ERISA Section 2: Congressional Findings and Declaration of
Policy states:
(a) The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers
of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and
substantial;.., that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by
those plans; that they are affected with a national public interest;
that they have become an important factor affecting the stability of
employment and the successful development of industrial relations;
that owing to the lack of employee information and adequate
safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general
welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and
safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation
and administrationof such plans....
A.

ERISA Purposeand Coverage

ERISA was a response to the protests on behalf of many
employees and their beneficiaries who had been deprived of
anticipated pension and welfare benefits. Under the pre-ERISA
rules, many participants and beneficiaries who qualified for
pension or welfare benefits were not paid their promised benefits
because: 8
(a) participants and beneficiaries were not generally entitled to the
disclosure of plan terms and conditions, their benefits, or the
financial condition of their plans;
(b) no general federal standards required persons operating such
plans to pay promised benefits or to avoid transactions which would
dissipate plan assets; and
(c) participants and beneficiaries had no federal right to appeal
benefit denials either within the plan or to the courts unless they
participated in certain collectively bargained plans.' 9

15. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 62-63.
16. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854.
17. ERISA § 2(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
18. See, e.g., Employee Benefits Law, Introduction to the First Edition
(2000) XCIV-XCV.
19. Benefit denials by collectively bargained plans administered jointly by
representatives of the union and the employer or employers could be
challenged as violations of Section 302 of the National Labor Relations Act, 20
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ERISA, which was signed into law on Labor Day of 1974,
protects both plan participants and their beneficiaries.
Participants generally include 0 any employee or former employee
of an employer who is or may become eligible to receive an ERISA
plan benefit, such as a lifetime pension benefit, or whose
beneficiaries may be eligible to receive an ERISA plan benefit,
such as survivor benefits from either a pension plan or a life
insurance plan. A beneficiary is defined as "a person designated
by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who
is or may be entitled to a benefit thereunder."
ERISA does not cover all employers. Governmental plans are
not subject to ERISA.21 Church plans are not subject to ERISA
unless the plans elect to be covered.22 Moreover, ERISA does not
cover employee benefit plans whose only participants are the
owners and the spouses of the owners of the trade or business
sponsoring the plan. 3 It is irrelevant whether the plan sponsor is
a corporation, a partnership, or an incorporated entity.24
ERISA applies to (1) pension plans,n a category that includes
profit-sharing and 401(k) plans,and (2) welfare plans,26 including

U.S.C. § 186. This Section permits the establishment and operation ofjointly
administered employee benefit plans. Beneficiaries, however, had to show the
determination was arbitrary and capricious. There was also no protection
against employer retaliation. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 108-11 (1989).
20. ERISA § 3(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2000).
21. ERISA § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2000).
22. ERISA § 4(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2000).
23. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-3(b) and (c). If there are other participants, then
the owner and the owner's spouse are provided with the ERISA protections,
such as the protection of the pension plan assets of a bankrupt participant.
Yates M.D., P.C. Profit-Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004).
24. Id.
25. See ERISA § 3(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (2000) (defining pension plans as
plans which provide retirement income to employees or result in the deferral
of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered
employment, although under certain circumstances severance plans
arrangements are treated as welfare plans rather than as pension plans).
Employees may but need not be able to obtain distributions from pension
plans before the termination of employment. Profit-sharing plans often permit
such in-service distributions, although 401(k) plans may only permit the inservice distribution of employee contributions. Id. However, certain unfunded
pension plans known as excess benefit plans are excluded from ERISA
coverage. ERISA § 4(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5) (2000).
26. ERISA § 3(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000) (defining welfare plans as
plans which provide participants or their beneficiaries with medical, surgical,
or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds or prepaid
legal services). These plans do not include payroll practices, such as sick pay,
holiday pay, jury pay or overtime. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-lb(3) (2001); see also
Mass. v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989) (drawing a distinction between the
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For
medical, disability, life insurance, and severance plans.
simplicity, all such plans by covered employers will be herein
denoted as ERISA plans.
ERISA does not require employers to establish any ERISA
plans, but it does impose minimum standards on the
establishment and operation of any covered employee benefit plans
that employers choose to adopt.27
Defined contribution pension plans ("DC Plans")28 are pension
plans in which each participant has an individual account.' DC
plans include money purchase pension plans," profit-sharing
plans,3 ' and 401(k) plans.3 ' A participant's benefits in a DC plan
are expressed in the form of a lump sum equal to the value of the
participant's account at the time at issue. The plan terms may,
however, permit benefits to be paid in a form other than a lump
sum, such as a life annuity beginning either at once or at some
future time.

ERISA coverage of welfare benefit plans and the customary unfunded vacation
benefit plans, which are not covered by ERISA).
27. See, e.g., Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 172 (2d Cir. 2000).
These standards do not, however, apply to unfunded plans which are
maintained primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a
select group of management or highly compensated employees. ERISA
§ 201(2), 401(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1101(a)(1). Those plans are often
called top-hat plans. See, e.g., In re IT Group, Inc., 448 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 2006)
(discussing the characteristics of such plans, particularly their unfunded
nature). Such plans are often called non-qualified because they do not qualify
for the favorable tax treatment that is generally provided to ERISA deferred
compensation plans. Id.
28. ERISA § 3(34); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2001). A participant's benefits in
such plans are based solely upon the sum of (1) the amounts contributed to the
participant's account and any income, expenses, gains, and losses, and (2) any
forfeiture of other participants' accounts allocated to such participant's
account. All investment risk is placed on the participant, who benefits from
investment gains and suffers from investment losses. Thus, a participant's
accrued benefits, namely the participant's account balance, may either
increase or decrease in the course of a year. Benefits may be and are usually
made available on a participant's termination of employment. Distributions
may be also permitted prior to the termination of such employment. See
generally id.
29. It is also possible for welfare plans to provide participants with
individual accounts such as flexible spending arrangements or cafeteria plans
which permit participants to allocate fixed amounts among a set of welfare
benefits.
30. A plan in which the annual contributions are fixed by a plan formula.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(I) (2005).
31. A plan in which the annual contributions are not fixed by a plan
formula but need not be based on profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(I) and
IRC § 401(a)(27) (2005).
32. A plan in which employees may make pre-tax contributions to the plan
pursuant to the terms of IRC § 401(k) and the regulations thereunder.
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Defined benefit pension plans ("DB Plans")' are pension
plans in which participants do not have individual accounts.' A
participant's benefits in DB plans are expressed in the form of a
life annuity beginning at the participant's normal retirement age."
The annuity is called the participant's normal retirement benefit
and is derived from a formula that usually includes the
participant's compensation and years of service." The plan terms
may, however, permit benefits to be paid in a form other than a
life annuity, such as a lump sum payment.
B. General ERISA Protections
ERISA requires that each employee benefit plan be37
established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.
The Supreme Court characterized this mandate as:
[One of] ERISA's core functional requirements [is], that "every
employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant

33. ERISA § 3(35); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2000).
34. But see Erika Lunder, CRS Report for Congress, Cash Balance Pension
Plans-Selected Legal Issues (Updated July 29, 2005); Patrick J. Purcell, CRS
Report for Congress, Pension Issues: Cash Balance Plans, (Updated August 7,

2003) (providing a discussion of hybrid plans in which a participant's benefit
in a DB plan may appear to be an individual account). Under Section 701 of
the Pension Protection Act of 20076, Pub. L. No. 109-80, 120 Stat. 780 (2006)
(the "PPA of 2006"), a wider range of such plans are permitted.
35. See generally ERISA § 3(24); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (2000) (providing the
definition of a participant's normal retirement age. See also Laurent v.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 448 F. Supp. 2d 537, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y 2006)
(providing an extensive discussion of the significance of the phrase, "normal
retirement age").
36. The plan need not permit lump sum payments of plan benefits.
However, many plans permit lump sum payments of the value of the annuities
as of the date of the payment, which may be as of the participant's normal
retirement age or as of another date. A participant's accrued benefits, namely
the annuity beginning as of the participant's normal retirement age, may not
decrease in a year. For example, a participant who has accrued a $1,000
annual lifetime annuity beginning as of the participant's normal retirement
age may not find that such benefit will decrease at any later time. All
investment risk is placed on the employer, who benefits from investment gains
and suffers from investment losses. Benefits may be but are often not made
available when a participant terminates employment for a reason other than
death, although distributions are not generally permitted prior to such
employment termination. See also Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)-(1)(b)(1)(iv)
and 1.401(a)-3 (2005) (setting down conditions under which participants may
receive plan distributions prior to a termination of employment, but during a
phased retirement); Section 905 of the PPA of 2006 (permitting phased
retirements under certain conditions).
37. ERISA § 402(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000). These standards do
not, however, apply to unfunded plans which are maintained primarily for the
purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management
or highly compensated employees. ERISA § 401(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1)

(2000).
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to a written instrument." 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (emphasis added). In
the words of the key congressional report, "[a] written plan is to be
required in order that every employee may, on examining the plan
documents, determine exactly what his rights and obligations are
under the plan.""9

The written instrument must "specify the basis on which
payments are made to and from the plan."39 In particular, the plan
must specify both the plan benefits and who is entitled to those
benefits. Thus, the Supreme Court in Egelhoff" described the
ERISA requirement that plan benefits be determined by the plan
terms as a core ERISA mandate (the "Plan Terms Benefit
Mandate"). No other document may generally be considered in
such determinations unless the plan references the other
document.4' Moreover, ERISA requires that plans include certain
provisions, such as the pension benefit protections, infra, and the
statutory claims procedure,42 which must be followed whether or
not the plan expressly includes them.
ERISA has more specific protections for pension benefits than
welfare benefits,' as is suggested by the inclusion of the term
"retirement" in the name of the ERISA statute." These additional

38. Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995). It sufficed
therein for a plan amendment procedure to be described as being performed by
the company. The underlying issue was whether the plan sponsor retained
the right to amend post-retirement benefits.
39. ERISA § 402(b)(4); 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4) (2000).
40. 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001).
Health care benefit plans often explicitly permit
41. Id. at 148.
participants and beneficiaries to use specified agreements to assign their
benefits to health care providers. Some pension plans permit participants to
designate the beneficiary of their survivor benefits with a reference to a will or
trust agreement. In such a case, the referenced agreement must be considered
to determine participant's designee or designees. Id. Participants may also
rely on summary plan descriptions to establish plan rights that are
inconsistent with the plan terms, under certain conditions. See e.g., Burker v.
Kodak, 336 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the conditions unmarried
couples had to satisfy in order to qualify for plan benefits).
42. ERISA § 503; 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000).
43. Plans may provide both pension benefits and welfare benefits, such as
"pension plans" which provide disability benefits to participants during the
participant's disability rather than for life. Those disability benefits are thus
welfare benefits rather than pension benefits). The pension plan protective
provisions apply only to the pension benefits but not to the welfare benefits,
whether provided by a pension plan or a welfare plan. See, e.g., McBarron v. S
& T Indus., Inc., 771 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1985) and Rombach v. Nestle USA,
Inc., 211 F.3d 190, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2000).
44. The protective provisions are set forth in Parts 2 and 3 of Subtitle B of
Title I of ERISA and Title IV of ERISA. See also Albert Feuer, When Are
Releases of Claims for ERISA Plan Benefits Effective?, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV.

773, 811-18 (Spring 2005) (providing a more extensive discussion of these
protections). These parts do not apply to welfare plans. ERISA §§ 201(1),
301(1), 4021; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1081(1), 1321 (2000). Nor do they apply to
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protections are designed to assure that pension benefits will be
available to pay the retirement expenses of the participant and his
or her beneficiaries.45 Moreover, a federal government agency, the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the "PBGC"), insures DB
plans.' Thus, such benefits will not be place at risk if, for any
reason, an insured pension plan lacks sufficient assets to pay all of
the plan's guaranteed benefits. 4 By contrast, benefits from DC
plans or welfare plans are not federally insured.
ERISA imposes four significant plan design and operating
restrictions on pension plans that are inapplicable to welfare
plans:
(A) After being employed for at least a short statutory period,
employees must start to accrue pension benefits.4 A significant
portion of pension benefits must accrue in the early years of
employment. 49 Thus, the benefits may not be endangered by an
employee's termination of employment prior to reaching the plan's
retirement age.

(B) After being employed for at least a short statutory period, the
employee's pension benefits may not be forfeited.r °

Thus, the

benefits may not be endangered by a sponsor's plan provision or an
administrator's plan practice.
(C)

Pension

plans

must

meet

minimum

advance

funding

requirements. 5' Thus, the benefits may not be endangered by the

employer's failure to put aside sufficient funds to satisfy the plan's
expected obligations.
(D) Pension assets may only be assigned under very limited
circumstances.52 Thus, the benefits may not be endangered by a
participant or beneficiary assuming an obligation voluntarily or
involuntarily. This is the only protection that affects parties other
top-hat plans. See supra note 32. They also do not apply to plans confined to
the owner-employee and his or her spouse, which are exempt from ERISA.
The latter, if tax-qualified are often protected by state creditor law protections
such as NY CPLR §§ 5205(c)(2), (d)(1) (2007).
45. Nachman v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980). The Court held that (1)
ERISA protected pension benefits are not limited to pension plan assets, and
(2) the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the "PBGC"), which guarantees
certain benefits, may recover from a pension benefit plan sponsor any
difference between the benefits the corporation guarantees and the plan assets
available to pay plan benefits. Id. For plans terminating in 2007 (2008), the
PBGC guarantees a single life monthly annuity of $4,125 ($4,132.50)
beginning at age 65. ERISA Reg. § 4011.11.
46. ERISA §§ 4001-4402; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (2000).
47. See supra note 45.
48. ERISA § 202; 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
49. ERISA § 204; 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2000).
50. ERISA § 203; 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2000).
51. ERISA §§ 301-308; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (2000).
52. ERISA § 203; 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2000).
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than participants, beneficiaries or pension plans. Those parties may
not collect debts of participants or beneficiaries from their pension
plan benefits, whether or not the participants or beneficiaries have
tried to assign such benefits.
Welfare plans may be designed and operated in a manner
that violates one or more of those requirements because they are
not subject to these requirements. For example, medical plans
may provide that (1) benefit entitlements are forfeited if claims are
not made within a certain number of days after the claim arises, or
(2) assignments of medical claims to medical care providers are
permitted. On the other hand, medical plans, like all ERISA
plans, must follow the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate. Thus, they
must provide the benefits in accord with the plan terms.53
There are two important protections that apply to both
pension plans and welfare plans in addition to the written plan
requirement and the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate. 4 First, plan
Thus, the benefits may not be
assets must be held in trust.'
endangered by a sponsor's weak financial position, which could
otherwise permit a sponsor's creditor to obtain plan assets.
Second, ERISA imposes stringent standards' on persons acting as
ERISA fiduciaries. A person is a fiduciary for an ERISA plan to
the extent:
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control regarding management or disposition of its assets,
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any authority to do so, or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or
responsibility in the administration of such plan.

discretionary

Such term includes any person designated under Section 405(c)(1)
[fiduciary authority may be delegated in the plan governing
53. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000) (specifying
that operations will be restrained by the requirement that fiduciaries follow
the written plan terms).
54. Plans that are not subject to the written plan requirement or the Plan
Terms Benefit Mandate, such as top-hat plans, are also not subject to the
fiduciary or the trust requirements. As a result these plans may be designed
and operated without complying with either of those requirements.
55. ERISA § 403; 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2000). This provision also permits the
assets to be held in insurance contracts, custodial accounts, or IRAs under
certain circumstances. However, an issue may arise with self-insured plans,
such as certain medical reimbursement plans, in which the trust requirement
is inapplicable because there may be no plan assets until claims are paid.
56. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272, n.8 (2d Cir. 1982) (opining
that a fiduciary"s duties under ERISA are "the highest known to law").

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:919

instrument] .

Titles do not determine fiduciary status. However, persons
with plan titles, such as a plan administrator or plan trustee, often
have the authority, control or responsibility to be treated as
engaged in fiduciary acts. Furthermore, a person may be a
fiduciary whether or not he has any plan title.58
The Supreme Court described the fiduciary duties of plan
administrators:
[T]he fiduciary obligations of plan administrators are to serve the

interest of participants and beneficiaries and, specifically, to provide
them with the benefits authorized by the plan.'9

Administrators thus have a fiduciary obligation to adhere to
the ERISA Plan Terms Benefit Mandate, which the Supreme
Court described in Egelhoff,6° as "a central matter of plan
administration."
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), 6 1 governs the
manner by which an ERISA fiduciary must fulfill its ERISA
obligations. The fiduciary must:
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
57. ERISA § 3(21); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2000).
58. Persons performing ministerial functions within a framework of
policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by other
persons are not thereby engaged in fiduciary acts. By contrast, the persons
establishing and maintaining the framework are engaged in fiduciary acts. 29
C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2, D-3 (2005). See, e.g., Christensen v. Quest Pension
Plan, 462 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the plan fiduciaries had
fulfilled their fiduciary responsibilities in supervising a party who provided an
excessive benefit estimate to a participant prior to the employee's retirement).
Therefore, the fiduciaries incurred no liability as a result of such faulty
estimate. Id.
59. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1985)
(emphasis added). In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that the
"panoply of remedial devices" ERISA places at the disposal of a participant
who did not receive her promised benefits did not include a cause of action for
extra-contractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of
benefit claims. Id. This holding, but not the statement describing and
administrator's fiduciary obligations, was criticized severely by John
Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003).
60. 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001).
61. These rules were designed to take into account the special nature and
purpose of employee benefits plans, whose beneficiaries required more
protection than the beneficiaries of other trusts. H.R. Rep. No. 1280, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, at 5083. ERISA's
enhancements of existing trust law include the imposition of duties upon a
broader class of fiduciaries, ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2000); broad
disclosure and reporting requirements, id. at § 1021-31 and the prohibition of
exculpatory clauses; id. at § 1104(a)(1)(D) and 1110(a). See generally H.R.
REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 464951.
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the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of: i) providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C)by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the
risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent
with the provisions of this title [entitled "Protection of Employee
Benefit Rights"] and title IV [entitled "Plan Termination Insurance"]
The final paragraph requires fiduciaries to follow ERISA
mandates, whether or not those mandates are explicitly set forth
in the plan.2
C. ERISA Preemptions and the Establishmentof Uniform
National Benefit Entitlements for Participantsand Beneficiaries
The United States Constitution's Supremacy
Clause'
provides that federal law supersedes any conflicting state law
("Conflict Preemption")..'
Under Conflict Preemption, ERISA
would supersede a state law which contradicts the ERISA
minimum participation standards for pension plans,6 5 or the
ERISA minimum vesting standards for pension plans.'
In
particular, Conflict Preemption would supersede a state statute
permitting pension benefits to be forfeited if a participant is
credited with less than ten years because ERISA only requires six

62. Michael Gordon, one of the staff members who helped draft ERISA
wrote that this paragraph "may be ERISA's single most important fiduciary
provision." Employee Benefits Law, Introduction to the First Edition (2000)
XCV.
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (aNew York law giving
exclusive privileges to operate steamboats in New York waters was voided
because it conflicted with Congressional statutes licensing those engaged in
coastal trade). But see Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504 (1981)
(Supreme Court holding that a New Jersey law prohibiting pension benefit
offsets for New Jersey workers compensation awards was preempted because
ERISA permitted such offsets but also discussed the Court's reluctance to
apply the federal supremacy clause).
65. ERISA § 202; 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
66. ERISA § 203; 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2000).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:919

67
years. However, Conflict Preemption has no effect on state laws
which pertain to but do not contradict those ERISA standards. In
particular, Conflict Preemption would not supersede a statute
setting more stringent minimum participant or vesting standards
than ERISA sets for pension plans or even one setting minimum
participation or vesting standards for welfare plans.6
There is also an implicit preemption for federal statutes,
called field preemption ("Field Preemption"), which the Supreme

Court described as follows in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.:

Congress legislated here in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress. Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to

supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the
character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.
Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the
objective of the federal statute. It is often a perplexing question
whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice of
selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the States
undisturbed except as the state and federal regulationscollide.

69

This "perplexing question" often leads to considerable
disagreement about whether a state law is superseded by ERISA
under Field Preemption. For example, does field preemption apply
to state laws imposing minimum participation standards for
welfare plans?" On the other hand, any state law which conflicts
with ERISA is subject to Field Preemption, because the conflict
shows Congress had a clear and manifest purpose to supersede
such state law.
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (the "ERISA Explicit
Preemption") is not limited to Conflict Preemption and Field
Preemption. The ERISA Explicit Preemption generally provides
67. ERISA § 203(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (2000).
68. We are disregarding the limited state regulation of insured plans,
including welfare plans, which ERISA permits and will be discussed, infra.
69. 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (emphasis added; citations omitted)
(deciding that the United States Warehouse Act superseded state regulation of
only those matters that the act expressly regulated).
70. See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA
Will the Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 951 (Feb. 2000) (arguing that because ERISA does not substantively

regulate welfare plans ERISA should not apply field preemption to state
regulation of welfare plans). Professor Bogan therein also disagrees with
much of the preemption analysis of ERISA set forth in this Article. Id.
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that ERISA "supersedes any and all state laws insofar as they may
relate to" any ERISA plan. Field Preemption, which includes
Conflict Preemption, is part of the Explicit ERISA Preemption
because any state law which Congress had a clear and manifest
purpose to supersede with ERISA, must relate to ERISA. The
term "state law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or
other state action having the effect of law of any state.7' State
laws are often enforced with state court orders. Thus, such orders
are preempted under the same standards as explicit state laws.
There is an obvious exception to the Explicit ERISA
Preemption for any state laws to which plan terms refer. For
example, the terms of a life insurance plan may provide if a
participant has made no effective designation, the proceeds shall
be distributed in accord with the law of intestacy of a specified
state. On the other hand, a plan may not incorporate state laws
that violate any ERISA mandates; thus a provision that an ERISA
plan be interpreted by the laws of a certain state only applies to
the extent such laws are consistent with ERISA.
There are two major general state law exclusions from the
Explicit ERISA Preemption.
These exclusions also apply to
Conflict Preemption and Field Preemption, which are both
included within the Explicit ERISA Preemption. First, there is an
exclusion for state laws regulating insurance.72 This exclusion
does not pertain to the state laws determining the rights of
designees of insured plans. 73 There is also an exclusion from
preemption for generally applicable criminal laws of the states.74
This exclusion applies to general criminal laws, such as larceny
and embezzlement laws. It may not be used to regulate employee
benefit plans by criminalizing employee benefit requirements,
such as criminalizing the failure of corporate officers to insure that

71. ERISA § 514(c)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (2000).
72. ERISA § 514(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (2000). This section also
includes exclusion for state laws regulating banking or securities. See
Matthew G. Vansuch, Note, Not Just Old Wine in New Bottles: Kentucky Ass'n
of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller Bottles a New Test for State Regulation of
Insurance, 38 AKRON L. REV. 253 (2005) (providing a more extensive
discussion of the insurance exemption); see also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA:
State Regulation of Insured Plans After Davila, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 69
(2005) (explaining the same).
73. The Supreme Court unanimously decided that a state law deemed to be
a "law ... which regulates insurance" must: (1) be directed specifically
directed toward entities engaged in insurance, and (2) substantially affect the
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured. Ky. Ass'n of
Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003). Thus, the exemption does
not affect the focus of this Article, the rights of beneficiary designees. See, e.g.,
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001), in which a state law pertaining to the designee
of a life insurance plan was held to be preempted.
74. ERISA § 514(b)(4); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (2000).
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prompt employer plan contributions are made.75 There is no
general exclusion for domestic relations laws, although there is a
limited exclusion for orders obtained under such a law (including a
community property law)" which pertain to either (1) pension
plans and meet specified conditions for a QDRO " or (2) medical
benefit plans that meet specified conditions and are known as
qualified medical care support orders.7'
The "relate to" preemption allows courts to overcome their
traditional reluctance to find state laws are subject to Field
Preemption79 or Conflict Preemption.' For example, any state law
that refers to ERISA plans relates to ERISA plans and is generally
preempted, such as one that explicitly requires ERISA welfare
plans to provide specified benefits, if, arguendo, the insurance
exclusion from the Explicit ERISA Preemption is inapplicable.8
On the other hand, the Explicit ERISA Preemption does not
preempt a state law with "only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral
connection with covered plans." 2
The minimum contours of the Explicit ERISA Exemption are
established by the areas in which ERISA standards exist, and
thereby establish Conflict Preemption. The Explicit ERISA
Preemption does not limit preemption to Conflict Preemption, that
is, cases in which the state statutes that relate to ERISA plans
conflict with ERISA. This is a consequence of the fundamental
canon of statutory interpretation set forth by the Supreme Court
that statutes be interpreted using the "ordinary, contemporary,

75. See, e.g., Sforza v. Kenco Constructional Contracting Co. 674 F. Supp.
1493 (Conn. 1986) (criminal law exclusion rejected); Blackburn v. Iversen, 925
F. Supp. 118 (Conn. 1996) (statute imposing personal liability on officers
preempted because it relates to ERISA plans but alter ego claim against
officers permitted to go forward under ERISA).
76. ERISA § 514(b)(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (2000).
77. ERISA § 206(d)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (2000). These are discussed
in detail, infra.
78. ERISA § 609; 29 U.S.C. § 1169 (2000). This exclusion will not be
discussed extensively because it does not pertain to survivor benefits, the
primary focus of the Article, but to the rights of children to medical care
benefits following a marital dissolution. Id.
79. As defined, supra.
80. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (Supreme
Court discussing its reluctance to apply the federal supremacy clause). But
see Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152-53 (2001) (Scalia, J. and Ginsberg, J. concurring)
(asserting that the Explicit ERISA Preemption is limited to the conflict
preemption and field preemption of ERISA).
81. Shaw v. Delta Airways, 463 U.S. 85, 95-97 (1983).
82. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 661, 664 (1995) (state law imposing surcharges on plans
other than Blue Cross was not preempted because the surcharges do not
require medical care benefit plans to deal only with one insurer or to insure
against an entire illness they may choose to omit).
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common meaning" of words.'
For example, the presence of
participation and vesting standards for ERISA pension plans,
which are employee benefit plans, implies that such standards
relate to ERISA plans, whether or not they are pension plans.
Consequently, under the Explicit ERISA Preemption, a state law
containing explicit participation and vesting standards for welfare
plans, which does not exclude ERISA welfare plans, would relate
to ERISA plans and thus be preempted if, arguendo, the insurance
exclusion is inapplicable, as is the case for beneficiary
designations 4 In particular, a state law that required that
pension and welfare benefits always be vested would be preempted
with respect to both ERISA pension and welfare plans. On the
other hand, the Explicit ERISA Exemption does not prevent plans
from adopting provisions consistent with ERISA's requirements,
such as vesting rules for retiree medical benefits.
Preventing the state regulation of ERISA plans with respect
to issues that Congress decided to regulate only in part or with no
specific mandates is consistent with both the statutory language
and the Congressional intent. Such broad intent is shown by the
fact that, as discussed, infra, one of the earlier versions of ERISA
limited preemption to "subject matters regulated by this Act
[ERISA]." Congress reserved regulation of employee benefit plans
to the federal courts-not to the states, either individually or
collectively, with the narrow exclusions described above. However,
Congress was quite concerned about the deleterious effects of such
possible inconsistencies as well as conflicts with ERISA.
One of the key sponsors of ERISA, Representative John Dent,
described the ERISA Explicit Preemption as follows:
Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority
the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans. With

the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded
participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent
85
State and local regulation.

Similarly, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and another key
ERISA sponsor emphasized the protective features of the ERISA
Explicit Preemption when he declared:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in
the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference
substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federalregulations,

83. Bedroc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004) (quoting

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
84. See id. at n.729.
85. 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974) (emphasis added).
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thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
6
local regulationof employee benefit plans.8

In Shaw v. Delta Airways, 7 the Supreme Court pointed to the
administrative advantage for participants of having uniform rules
throughout the United States when it held that Explicit ERISA
Preemption preempted a New York law that required ERISA
disability plans8 to provide maternity benefits because ERISA
contained no such mandate at such time.89 The unanimous court
observed that if such statutes were not preempted, plan
participants could be forced to shoulder the increased
administrative burden of complying with multiple state
requirements because employers may reduce plan benefits to pay
for such burdens.'" Moreover, the Court stated:
An employer with employees in several States would find its plan
subject to a different jurisdictional pattern of regulation in each
State [if the preemption provision were disregarded], depending on
what benefits the State mandated under disability, workmen's
compensation, and unemployment compensation laws.
The
administrative impracticality of permitting mutually exclusive
pockets of federal and state jurisdiction within a plan is apparent. 9
The Court set the stage for this statement by observing' that
the breadth of the Explicit ERISA Preemption was shown by the
use of the words "relate to any employee benefit plan" in ERISA
§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), rather than the far more limited
words that had been present in earlier versions of ERISA bills.
Those bills limited preemption either to matters "[relating] to the
reporting
and
disclosure
responsibilities,
and
fiduciary
responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of any employee
benefit plan." or "[relating] to the subject matters regulated by this
Act." The Court had previously held that the ERISA preemption
section prevents the states from enhancing the ERISA protections
provided to plan participants and beneficiaries.9
86. Id. at 29933 (emphasis added).
87. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
88. Disability plans, which are maintained solely for the purpose of
complying with local disability rules are exempt from ERISA coverage. ERISA
§ 4(b)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2000). The Court remanded the case to

determine the applicability of this exemption. Id.
89. Such discrimination was prohibited as of April 29, 1979 by the federal
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The issue before the court was whether Delta
Airways was obligated to pay the locally mandated benefits accruing before
such date.
90. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105, n.25.
91. Id. at 107-78.
92. Id. at 99, n.18.

93. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (Supreme
Court holding that a New Jersey law prohibiting pension benefit offsets for
New Jersey workers compensation awards was preempted because ERISA
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The Supreme Court similarly stated in Fort Halifax Packing
Co., Inc. v. Coyne, that "Congress intended [ERISA] pre-emption to
afford employers the advantages of a uniform set of administrative
procedures governed by a single set of regulations."94 In Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff,s5 the Supreme Court observed that the ERISA Plan
Terms Benefit Mandate conflicted with a Washington law that
required ERISA pension plans and insurance plans treat a spouse
as having died at the time of divorce for purposes of applying their
beneficiary designation provisions.
The Egelhoff Court also
explained why such law was preempted:
One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers "to
establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of
standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement
of benefits." FortHalifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, (1987).
Uniformity is impossible, however, if plans are subject to different
legal obligations in different States....
But differing state regulations affecting an ERISA plan's "system for
processing claims and paying benefits" impose "precisely the burden
that ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid."9

On the other hand, the rarity of ERISA decisions by the US
Supreme Courts hinders the development of a uniform
administrative scheme because courts may not always issue
consistent decisions. It is possible for the eleven numbered circuit
courts of appeal and the D.C. Circuit to reach conflicting decisions
about benefit entitlements. The highest courts of the fifty state
courts and the District of Columbia also have the authority to
decide benefit claims.97 The local courts need not defer to any
federal circuit.98 Thus, like the circuits, each such court may take
permitted such offsets).
94. 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). In that case the Court held that ERISA did not
preempt the Maine requirement of a one-time severance payment on the
closing of a plant because the employer could comply with such requirement
without adopting any administrative scheme. Id. The lack of such a scheme
meant there was no ERISA plan and thus all ERISA provisions, including
preemption, were inapplicable, although four justices dissented because they
believed ERISA did not impose such a stringent requirement to constitute an
ERISA plan. Id.
95. 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.
1 (1987)).
96. Id. at 148-49.
97. ERISA § 502(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2000) gives state courts of
competent jurisdiction concurrent jurisdiction of such claims.
98. Justice Thomas, in a concurring Supreme Court opinion, stated that "a
state trial court's interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than
that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located."
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993). Divorce litigants often prefer
to have all divorce issues, including entitlements to ERISA plan benefits
decided by a single set of state courts rather than having to split the divorce
issues between the state and federal courts.
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its own approach to the same benefit issues, but also must defer to
the U. S. Supreme Court.'
III.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE ASSIGNMENT AND ALIENATION

OF ERISA PLAN BENEFITS
ERISA § 206 (d) Assignment or alienation of plan benefits
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated...

A. ERISA Prohibitsthe Assignment and Alienation of
PensionBenefits
One of the key ERISA pension benefit protections is the
prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits
(the "Anti-Alienation Prohibition"). 0 Protection is not limited to
participants. Plan beneficiaries are also protected against the
assignment or alienation of those benefits.'0 ' The Supreme Court
therefore concluded unanimously that the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition protects the pension benefits of participants. and
beneficiaries."
The Anti-Alienation Prohibition, which must be part of the
terms of all covered pension plans,' prevents an individual from
endangering his or her pension benefits in either of two distinct
manners.

99. Furthermore, a summary dismissal by the Supreme Court of an appeal
from a state court for want of a substantial federal question, when the federal
question is properly presented and within the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), operates as a decision on the merits.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
100. ERISA § 206(d)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000).
101. Treas. Reg § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (2005). Under Reorganization Plan
Number 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47, 713 (1978) and 29 C.F.R. § 2570.200a-2
(2005), the IRS has the responsibility for establishing the regulations with
respect to the prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits.
ERISA § 206(d); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000). Those regulations are associated
with the similar prohibition in I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B). Deference is given to
authoritative and reasonable interpretations of law by the implementing
agency. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
102. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). A general provision of the
Federal Bankruptcy Code did not supersede the Anti-Alienation Prohibition.
Thus, a bankruptcy trust could not claim the pension benefits from a bankrupt
participant. Id.
103. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 at 851, 862 (1997). The Anti-Alienation Prohibition
was held to preempt a spouse's community property rights under state law.
Id.
104. ERISA § 206(d)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000).
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First, pension benefits may not be involuntarily alienated
Thus, if an individual incurs
with a few very narrow exceptions."
a debt to another party, plan fiduciaries are prohibited from
permitting the attachment or garnishment of the benefits on
behalf of the creditor."° None of the benefits may be attached
regardless of the amount of the participant's debt. The ability of
creditors to obtain the distributed plan benefits indirectly, i.e.,
after their distribution is also severely curtailed as discussed,
infra.

Second, pension benefits may not be voluntarily alienated.

7

Thus, pension plan fiduciaries are prohibited from complying with
agreements by participants or beneficiaries to assign their plan
benefits."° No part of the benefits may be assigned regardless of
the amount of the consideration received by the participant in
exchange for the assignment. Moreover, pension plan fiduciaries
must disregard any explicit plan terms to the contrary, such as
provisions setting forth a procedure for the voluntary assignment
of pension benefits."° By contrast, health care plans, which are
ERISA welfare plans, may decide whether to (1) include voluntary
assignment provisions, such as those that permit health care
providers to be paid directly by a health care plan, often under

limited conditions, or (2) prohibit assignments.

°

105. There are exceptions for (1) amounts a participant agrees or is ordered
to pay to the plan because he has violated the ERISA fiduciary requirements,
ERISA § 206(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4) (2000); (2) the enforcement of tax
levies pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6331 and judgments resulting from unpaid tax
assessments, Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(2); (3) the withholding of federal,
state or local taxes from plan benefit payments, Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)13(c)(2)(ii); (4) the recovery by the plan of benefit overpayments, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)-13(c)(2)(iii), and (4) the recovery by the PBGC on behalf of the plan
of certain non-annuity payments that were made prior to a plan termination
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2)(i).
106. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (2005).
107. This Article is focused on agreements and court orders that may be
enforced against the plan and/or the participant or beneficiary. Thus, we will
disregard the exception for voluntary but revocable assignments of up to 10
percent of a benefit payment. ERISA § 206(d)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2)
(2000).
108. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000).
109. Id.
110. See generally Physicians Multispecialty Group v. The Health Care Plan
of Horton Homes, Inc. 371 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2004). The estate of a
deceased patient assigned medical claims to a treating physician group. The
issue was the patient's eligibility for defendant coverage. The court held that
the group lacked standing because "an assignment is ineffectual if the plan
contains an unambiguous anti-assignment provision." Id. at 1295. However,
if there is no such provision, courts have generally permitted medical benefit
claim assignments. See, e.g., HCA Health Services of Ga., Inc. v. Employers
Health Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 982, 991 (11th Cir. 2001) (assignment to out-ofnetwork provider permitted); Misic v. Building Service Employees Health &
Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1986) (permitting a dentist to pursue
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Four major kinds of pension plans are not subject to the AntiAlienation Prohibition: (a) top-hat plans, which are primarily for
the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group
of management or highly compensated employees; 1 (b) plans
maintained solely to provide pension benefits for certain
employees in excess of the contribution and benefit limits that the
Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") imposes for tax qualification
purposes;"' (c) simplified employee pension plans and simple
retirement account plans, which place assets for participants'
benefits in individual retirement accounts,"' and (d) 401(k) plans
to the extent they
have designated that benefits may be deposited
4
in Roth IRAs."
B. ERISA ProhibitsCreditorsfrom Obtaininga Participant's
Benefits Under a Pension Plan
The Supreme Court has decided two cases in which a
participant's creditor sought to obtain the participant's benefits
from an ERISA pension plan. Unlike the beneficiary disputes that
are the focus of this Article, the claims were completely unrelated
to the individual's plan interest and arose under federal laws.
ERISA does not preempt other federal statutes. Rather, ERISA
provides that none of its provisions "alter, amend, modify,
invalidate or supersede" any other federal statute."' Yet, in each
case the Court unanimously decided that the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition precluded the creditor's claim without discussing the
relevance of the ERISA Plan Terms Benefit Mandate.
In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers National Pension Fund"6 that the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition prevented a union from using a federal labor law to
impose a constructive trust against an ERISA pension plan"' so
that the plan would be prevented from paying benefits to an8
individual who had embezzled substantial funds from the union.1
unreimbursed claims assigned to him by his patients).
111. ERISA § 201(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) (2000); see also Boulet v. Flour

Corp., No. H-05-0105, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29973 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2005)
(holding that survivor benefit requirements are not applicable to top-hat
plans). See generally Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832 (11th Cir.

2006).
112. ERISA §§ 3(36), 201(7); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(36), 1051(7) (2000).
113. ERISA § 201(6); 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6) (2000); I.R.C. §§ 408(k), 408(p).
114. I.R.C. §402A(b)(2).
115. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (2000).
116. 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
117. The plan was a result of collective bargaining by the victimized union.
118. The Tenth Circuit, however, found that (1) the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition did not apply to the pension plan benefits after their distribution,
and (2) state law prohibited the union from obtaining those distributed
benefits. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Worker Local Unions, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir.

2000).
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In 1992, a unanimous court held in Patterson v. Shumate,119 that
the Anti-Alienation Prohibition prevented a participant's federal
bankruptcy trustee from obtaining the participant's pension
benefits.
In Guidry, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
Anti-Alienation Prohibition prevented the imposition of a
constructive trust on a participant's undistributed plan benefits
under which trust the pension plan benefits would be paid to the
union from whom the participant embezzled funds. The Court
found no meaningful distinction between such a trust and a
prohibited garnishment of pension benefits. 20
The Court in Guidry also held that the specific ERISA
prohibition, the Anti-Alienation Prohibition, superseded the
general relief parts of the labor statute. The federal labor statute
at issue in Guidry was Section 501(b) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 501,
which provides that a union may "recover damages or secure an
accounting or other appropriate relief' from an officer who has
embezzled funds from the union. The court below had found that
a permissible constructive trust had been established because (a)
the embezzlement of the union funds injured the union members,
who were also the plan participants, and thus the plan was
injured, and (b) the "other appropriate relief' authorized for
violations of the LMRDA overrode the ERISA prohibition on the
assignment or alienation of pension benefits. 2 '
The Supreme Court unanimously held that (a) the plan was
distinct from the union; (b) an injury to the union was not
equivalent to an injury to the plan; and thus (c) the plan would not
be the beneficiary of the constructive trust. Thus, such a trust was
impermissible because the specific Anti-Alienation Prohibition
superseded the general relief provision of the LMRDA."
The
Court distinguished the kind of judgment that may be obtained
under the LMRDA from the manner by which the judgment could
be collected. 22
Moreover, eight of the justices' unequivocally
declared:

119. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
120. 493 U.S. 365, 372 (1990).
121. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 369-70.
122. Id. at 374-76. The Court noted that the priority between ERISA and
the LMRDA was not resolved by either statute's savings clause for other
federal statutes. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (2000) and 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2000),
respectively. Id. at 375.
123. Id. at 376. By contrast, in Mackey, which Guidry cited, only the
dissenting opinion of four justices made such a distinction. Mackey, 486 U.S.
at 833-35, 843-46.
124. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Thurgood Marshall did not join in this
part of the opinion.
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Nor do we think it appropriate to approve any generalized equitable
exception-either for employee malfeasance or for criminal
misconduct-to ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation
of pension benefits. Section 206(d) reflects a considered
congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of
income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and
perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents
others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to
this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task.
As a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equitable
exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are
unqualified by the statutory text. The creation of such exceptions, in
our view, would be especially problematic in the context of an antigarnishment provision. Such a provision acts, by definition, to
hinder the collection of a lawful debt. A restriction on garnishment
therefore can be defended only on the view that the effectuation of
certain broad social policies sometimes takes precedence over the
desire to do equity between particularparties. It makes little sense
to adopt such a policy and then to refuse enforcement whenever
enforcement appears inequitable. A court attempting to carve out
an exception that would not swallow the rule would be forced to
determine whether application of the rule in particular
circumstances
would
be
"especially" inequitable.
The
impracticability of defining such a standard reinforces our
conclusion that the identification of any exception should be left to
Congress.125
In Shumate the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
Anti-Alienation Prohibition prevented pension benefits from being
alienated under another federal law, the Federal Bankruptcy
Code."' In particular, the Court held that the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition, which must be part of the terms of an ERISA pension
plan constituted "an enforceable transfer restriction" for purposes
of the Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2)'s exclusion of property from the
bankruptcy estate. The Court 1 7 described its unanimous decision
as extending its holding in Guidry, as follows:
We previously have declined to recognize any exceptions to ERISA's
antialienation provision outside the bankruptcy context. See Guidry
v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990)
(labor union may not impose constructive trust on pension benefits
of union official who breached fiduciary duties and embezzled
funds). Declining to recognize any exceptions to that provision
within the bankruptcy context minimizes the possibility that,

125. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376-77 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
126. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
127. At this time Justice Clarence Thomas had replaced Justice Thurgood
Marshall on the court, and unlike his predecessor, Justice Thomas joined this
part of the opinion which declined to recognize any exceptions to the AntiAlienation Prohibition.
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creditors will engage in strategic manipulation of the bankruptcy
128
laws in order to gain access to otherwise inaccessible funds.
The Court then repeated the previously quoted language from
Guidry about how ERISA § 206(d) reflects a considered
congressional policy choice.
Moreover, the Court took the
opportunity to state:
Finally, our holding furthers another important policy underlying
ERISA: uniform national treatment of pension benefits. See Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). Construing
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include federal law ensures that
the security of a debtor's pension benefits will be governed by
ERISA, not left to the vagaries of state spendthrift trust law. 12
C. The Supreme CourtAllows Creditorsto GarnishParticipants'
Welfare Benefits Using a QuestionableInterpretationof the
ERISA Explicit Preemption
In 1988 the Supreme Court in Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency 13° considered the ability of an individual's creditor to
garnish' the individual's benefits from the ERISA vacation plan
which was providing those benefits. The Supreme Court first
unanimously agreed that ERISA preempted the following Georgia
prohibition on the garnishment of funds:'
Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan
or program subject to the provisions of the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, shall not be
subject to the process of garnishment ...unless such garnishment

is based upon a judgment for alimony or for child support.

3

The Court cited the statement in its unanimous opinion,
Shaw v. Delta Airlines,' 4 that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan." 3' By referring
directly to ERISA plans the state law related to ERISA and was
thus preempted with respect to all ERISA plans.'
The Court did
not discuss whether the statute would be preempted if the words
128. Id. at 764.
129. Id. at 765.
130. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
131. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (5th ed. 1979) (defining garnishment
as a statutory proceeding whereby a person's property, money, or credits in
possession or under control of or owing another are applied to payment of the
person's debt to a third person by proper statutory process against debtor and
garnishee).
132. 486 U.S. 825, 828, n.2 (1988).
133. Id.
134. 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
135. Id.
136. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829-30.
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"subject to the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, as amended," were omitted. 37 In
such case, Conflict Preemption would appear to apply to the
statute to the extent it applied to ERISA pension plans covered by
the Anti-Alienation Prohibition. The ERISA Explicit Preemption
would also appear to preempt such a statute with respect to all
ERISA plans, even those that are not subject to the AntiAlienation Prohibition, such as welfare plans, 138 because by
determining which assignments of non-pension benefits are
permissible it addresses an issue which ERISA addresses (and
reaches different conclusions about) and thus relates to ERISA
plans as discussed in the preemption section, supra.
The Court decided by a 5-4 vote that ERISA did not preempt
the application to welfare plan participants of the general
garnishment procedure of Georgia for "run-of-the-mill" state law
claims, such as for unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, tort
damages by an ERISA plan, or the unspecified one before the
court.139 Unlike in the earlier unanimous part of the decision, the
majority did not apply the Shaw analysis to the issue of whether
garnishments of participant accounts had a connection with
ERISA plans. Rather, the majority asserted that if a state law
applying to plans is not preempted when applied to the plans it
could not "relate to any [ERISA] employee benefit plan," and thus
was not subject to the Explicit ERISA Exemption. Thus, the
ERISA Explicit Exemption could not prevent the application of the
same law applying to participants and their plan accounts. 4 ' The
majority then observed that ERISA permits state judgments
against plans."' The majority then concluded that ERISA must
permit such judgments to be enforced by garnishment of plan
14 2
assets in possession of a third party, such as an ERISA plan.
Therefore, the majority asserted there was no basis for concluding
that plan benefits are exempt from garnishments under the
preemption statute. 14

137. In such case it would be similar but not identical to the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition, which is limited to pension plans. The statutory exception for
family support obligations would not apply to all QDROs which also may apply
to property settlements associated with marital dissolutions. Moreover,
QDROs are not treated as garnishments but benefit designations as discussed,
infra.
138. See ERISA § 201(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1). Thus, as discussed, supra,
welfare plans may decide whether or not to accept assignments, and if so, the
conditions under which assignments are accepted. See n.118 and

accompanying text.
139. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 832-33.

140. Id. at 835-36.
141. Id. at 833-34.
142. Id. at 833-34.
143. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836.
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The four dissenting judges argued that Georgia's general
garnishment procedure was preempted because otherwise ERISA
plans could "face the repetitious and costly burden of monitoring
controversies involving hundreds of beneficiaries and participants
in various States" if garnishments were permitted. 144 The
14
dissenters referenced the Court's unanimous decision in Shaw, 1
which had prevented New York from providing ERISA
participants with pregnancy protections not available under
ERISA or any other federal law because of the burden of having to
administer an ERISA plan under various state mandates.1 46 Thus,
the Shaw decision emphasized how the administrative burdens of
complying with a variety of garnishment procedures, and "relate
to" employee benefit plans in the same manner as the preempted
variety of disability benefits mandates. Therefore, the1 47dissent
asserted state garnishments must be similarly preempted.
The dissenters also asserted that under this administrative
burden analysis garnishment of plan assets may remain
permissible. A third party with the plan's property would bear the
burden of garnishments relating to the plan's obligations.1 48 By
contrast, the ERISA plan would be the party bearing the burden of
garnishments relating to the plan benefits of a participant or
beneficiary, such as notifying the participant of the garnishment
so the participant may challenge the garnishment. Thus, the
ERISA goal of using preemption to prevent undue administrative
plan burdens 49 would be achieved by applying preemption to
garnishments
against participant
accounts but not to
garnishments of plan assets.
Subsequent unanimous Supreme Court decisions favor the
dissenting four justices."'0 The Court twice unanimously rejected

144. Id. at 842, 844.
145. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
146. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 842-43. Reference was made to Shaw v. Delta
Airways in which the Court unanimously used such an argument to justify the
preemption of the New York State disability benefits mandate. Id. at 105,
n.25.
147. Id. at 841-42.
148. Id.
149. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148-49 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).
150. But see N.Y State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514
U.S. 645, 662 (1995). The Court's unanimous decision described Mackey as
having disregarded the argument about the administrative burden state law
garnishments would impose on ERISA plans, but did not clearly describe the
impermissible burden the Court found in later decisions described,infra.
However, the administrative burden at issue with respect to the Explicit
ERISA Preemption is not whether a specific state law is difficult to comply
with but whether allowing different states to adopt different such laws would
impose on employee benefit plans the administrative burden of complying with
what could be numerous rules on a matter relating to the plan. For example,
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the premise of the majority opinion when it distinguished between
the kind of judgment that may be obtained with respect to plan
participants and the manner by which the judgment may be
collected under ERISA from such participants. Two years after
Mackey, the Court permitted judgments against a pension plan
participant but not their enforcement by means of a constructive
trust against the participant's plan account."' The Court more
recently permitted overpayment judgments by a welfare plan
against a participant but limited the manner in which it may be
collected.5 2
The majority also asserted that Congress knew how to exempt
plan participants from garnishment, as it did for pension plan
participants with the Anti-Alienation Prohibition, which applies
only to pension plans.1u However, the majority confused the
Explicit ERISA Preemption with Conflict Preemption. The lack of
conflict between the garnishment of welfare benefits and the AntiAlienation Prohibition shows that Conflict Preemption is
inapplicable. However, as discussed, supra, the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition shows that limitations on the alienation of employee
benefits, pension or welfare benefits, relate to employee benefit
plans. Thus, the Explicit ERISA Exemption preempts such state
laws.
The majority further asserted that interpreting the ERISA
preemption statute to prohibit all garnishments,
would render § 206(d)(1) substantially redundant with § 514(a) as
they [the participant] concede. As our cases have noted in the past,
we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional
enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same
law.M

The dissent responded that a "partial overlap" is not a
superfluity but a necessary part of the Explicit ERISA
Preemption."'
Explicit ERISA standards are not rendered
redundant by the Explicit ERISA Exemption, but help determine
a state law requiring that all pension benefits vest immediately would lessen
the administrative burden on most plans which must otherwise comply with
more complicated vesting schedules. Yet such a state law would be preempted
because among other reasons, permitting states to impose different vesting
schedules would impose a tremendous administrative burden on the sponsor of
a pension plan. Id.
151. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365
(1990).
152. Sereboff v. Mid-Atl. Med. Services, 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006); accord
Great-West Life v. Knudsen, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
153. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836-37.
154. Id. at 837 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 846-47. There was also an argument about the significance of
REACT amendments to the ERISA Explicit Preemption which is discussed,
infra.
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the contours of the Exemption as discussed, supra. If a state law
conflicts with a specific ERISA mandate, by definition it must
relate to an ERISA plan and thus be preempted by both the
ERISA Explicit Preemption and Conflict Preemption."'
Neither the majority nor the dissent discussed the
significance of the core ERISA mandate that ERISA fiduciaries
follow plan terms (the ERISA Plan Terms Benefit Mandate)'57
which arguably requires plan fiduciaries to pay participants in
accord with plan terms regardless of any attempted garnishment
on ERISA participant accounts. A seven-justice majority of the
Supreme Court in Egelhoff5 later cited the ERISA Plan Terms
Benefit Mandate and the distinct administrative burden argument
when the Court used the Explicit ERISA Preemption to prevent
claimants from relying on state law 59 to deprive designees of their
survivor benefits from either a pension plan or a welfare plan.
Thus, the Egelhoff majority also thereby disavowed the part of the
Mackey decision that the Explicit ERISA Preemption does not
apply to individual entitlements by participants and beneficiaries.
IV. ERISA STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR THE SPOUSES, FORMER
SPOUSES, CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS OF PARTICIPANTS

ERISA protects the spouses, former spouses, children and
dependents of participants with two benefit designation mandates
that further an important policy underlying ERISA: the uniform
national treatment of ERISA plan benefits. The Retirement
Equity Act ("REACT") enacted these mandates in 1984.26
Congress designed REACT:
to improve the delivery of retirement benefits and provide for
greater equity under private pension plans for workers and their
spouses and dependents by taking into account changes in work
patterns, the status of marriage as an economic partnership, and
the substantial contribution to that partnership of spouses who
work both in and outside the home, and for other purposes.161
Before REACT, only one ERISA provision explicitly referred
to the rights of spouses, former spouses, children and dependents
of participants. ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055, which was part of
ERISA as originally enacted in 1974 required those pension plans
that provided annuity benefits to provide joint and survivor
annuity benefits (with the spouse having survivor rights) as the
156. Id.
157. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D); 29 U,S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000).
158. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
159. Unlike the Mackey claims, the issue in Egelhoff not only related to the
plan interests of the participant and the beneficiary, but was who had a
superior claim to those plan interests.
160. Pub. L. No. 98-397; 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
161. Id. at 1426, Preface.
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default annuity benefit at retirement and during the period for
which early retirement is permitted.16 However, such protection
was quite limited because a participant could deprive the spouse of
those pre-REACT survivor benefits without his or her spouse's
consent 1 3 Furthermore, no pre-REACT provision required that
spouses be entitled to any survivor benefits for plans that provided
no annuity benefits. Thus, DC plans, such as many profit-sharing
or money purchase pension plans, which provided only lump sum
payments, were not required to provide spouses with any survivor
benefits.
REACT enhanced the protection of spouses of participants
during their marriage by strengthening and extending the
coverage of the original pension beneficiary designation mandate
of ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055.
There were three
enhancements: (1) more pension plans were covered, (2) covered
pension plans were required to designate spouses as beneficiaries
of specified survivor benefits, and (3) any change in such statutory
designations requires the written consent of the participant's
spouse. On the other hand, REACT provided that spouses in
community property states would have no greater rights to
survivor benefits during a marriage than spouses in other states.
REACT reversed several court holdings, including one by which
the Supreme Court apparently held that community property may
provide spouses with interests in a participant's pension during
the marriage prior to any marital dissolution, and thus arguably
provided spouses with survivor benefits based on such interest."
162, This requirement was further curtailed by the IRS amendment to
Treasury Regulation § 1.401(a)-11(b)(1) in response to BBS Associates v.
C.LR., 74 T.C. 118 (1990), affd, 661 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1981). That amendment
permitted plans whose normal retirement benefit was not an annuity but
offered annuities, such as some DC plans whose normal retirement benefit
was a lump sum, to refuse to make the joint and survivor benefit the normal
default benefit.
163. See, e.g., Cobb v. Cent. States, Southwest and Southeast Pension Fund,
No. 05-30906, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21476 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (holding
that there was no subject matter jurisdiction for spouse claiming pre-REACT
survivor benefits); Lerra v. Monsanto Co., 521 F. Supp. 1257, 1263 (spouse not
entitled to pre-REACT survivor benefits when participant chose life annuity).
But see Sladek v. Bell Sys. Mgmt. Pension Plan, 880 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1989)
(allowing a spousal survivor benefit claim when based on allegation that
participant suffered from Alzheimer's disease and lacked capacity to deprive
her of pre-REACT spousal benefits).
164. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 850 (1997) (finding no rights to
community property in a participant's pension plan passed upon the death of
the participant's spouse to the beneficiaries of the spouse's estate). Therein,
the Supreme Court disavowed the apparent implications of its pre-REACT
denial of an appeal based on want of a federal question. In re Marriage of
Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). Such denial
had been interpreted to hold that pension claims based on community
property do not conflict with the Anti-Alienation Prohibition or the ERISA
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ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055, however, does not give a
participant's spouse any protection after the dissolution of their
marriage, which includes the entry of a separation order."5
Prior to the enactment of REACT, no ERISA section explicitly
referred to the interaction between ERISA and the domestic
relations orders issued by state courts. Thus, Congress could not
simply enhance an existing section as it had done for spousal
survivor benefits. Congress instead modified the two sections that
had been used to challenge such orders to clarify when such orders
were to be followed and when to be disregarded. One of the
Committee reports contains the following statement
that was
16 6
quoted by the Supreme Court majority in Mackey:
'The courts are divided on the question of whether [ERISA's] anti
assignment clause applies to State domestic relations orders and
also on the question of whether the pre-emption clause
[§ 514(a)]
1 67
refers to State domestic relations laws and court orders.'

The three Congressional reports that accompanied REACT,6
however, describe little division because there was little division to
report. Domestic relations orders relating to child support or
alimony consistently survived attacks that they were preempted
by ERISA or that they violated the ERISA Anti-Alienation
Prohibition as described in American Telephone and Telegraph v.
Merry.69
The Supreme Court had suggested in an early
preemption case that the order in Merry may have been a state
law which was not preempted because it affected employee benefit
plans in "too tenuous, remote and peripheral a manner." 70 After

Explicit Preemption because they are based on the claim that the spouse
acquired an ownership interest in the pension upon its creation, rather than
upon a subsequent transfer of the participant's interest. See generally Grant
Summers, Comment, ERISA Preemption of "Direct"and "Indirect"Community
Property Interests in Pension Plans upon the Non-participant Spouse's Death,
55 LA. L. REV. 409, 438-40 (Nov. 1994); Julie McDaniel Dallison, Comment,
Disappearing Interests: ERISA Impliedly Preempts the Predeceasing
Nonemployee Spouse's Community Property Interest in the Employee's
Retirement, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 477 (Spring 1997).
165. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20 Q&A-27 (2005), discussed infra.
166. 486 U.S. 825, 838 (1988).
167. H.R. REP. No. 98-655, pt. 1, p. 30 (1984).
168. H.R. REP. No. 98-655, pt. 1 (1984); H.R. REP. 98-655, pt. 2 (1984); S.
REP. No. 98-575, 98th Cong. 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2565. The first contains no citations of decisions upholding or
rejecting any domestic relations orders.
169. 592 F.2d 118, 122-25 (2d Cir. 1979). The court summarized the caselaw in the course of upholding an order requiring a pension plan to satisfy
child support and alimony arrearage. Id. But see, Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Townsend (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding the Anti-Alienation Prohibition
preempted an order based on community property rights to a pension plan).
That case was cited by Merry, but not by any of the Committee reports.
170. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 100, n.21 (1983).
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referring to four cases upholding orders for family support
obligations, including Merry, Congress included a footnoted
reference in two of the Congressional reports to a divergence of
opinion regarding whether ERISA preempts community property
rights to pension benefits:' 7'
There is a divergence of opinion among the courts as to whether
ERISA preempts State community property laws insofar as they
relate to the rights of a married couple to benefits under a pension,
etc. plan. FN.
Footnote number twenty-four in both reports refers to the
same two conflicting decisions. The first is a 1978 district court
decision, Francisv. United Technology,17 described as holding that
"ERISA's preemption provision prevents the application of State
community property law permitting attachment of plan benefits
for family support purposes." However, Francis never mentioned
family support. Rather, it held that the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition and the ERISA Explicit Preemption prevented a
participant's spouse from using community property to obtain an
interest in the participant's pension interest in the course of a
marital dissolution. 7 ' The second decision, Stone v. Stone,74 was
issued two years later by the Ninth Circuit, which contains the
Francis district court, and thus eliminated the conflict within that
Circuit. The court stated:
As our decision in Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632
F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980), demonstrates, the Supreme Court's
summary dismissal of the appeal in In re Marriage of Campa.binds
district and circuit courts to the view that ERISA does not preempt
state-court orders requiring a pension plan to pay a community
property share of a plan participant's
monthly benefit payments
175
directly to his or her ex-spouse.
Thus, there seemed to be little reason in 1984 to question
whether state community property laws, or alimony or family

171. H.R. REP. No. 98-655, pt. 2, p. 18 (1984); S. REP. No. 98-575, 98th Cong.
2d. Sess., reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2565.
172. 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
173. See also Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (finding
that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider spousal claim to participant's
retirement benefits because marital dissolution order recognizing spousal
community rights in pension did not result in the spouse being an ERISA
participant or beneficiary). REACT resolved such issue by treating QDROs as
beneficiary designations which gave claimants access to federal courts to
enforce their benefit entitlements.
174. 633 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980). The Report does not mention that the
Francisfederal district had reached the opposite conclusion in the same year
that original decision was issued in Stone v.'Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal.

1978).
175. Stone, 633 F.2d at 742 (citations omitted).
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176
support laws established enforceable rights to pension benefits.
There was, however, an issue about the extent, if any, by which
those orders could provide rights to benefits that the participant
had not yet requested. The discussion in both Congressional
reports concludes 77 with a reference to an IRS ruling 178 that the
anti-alienation prohibition in the qualification requirements will
not be violated if a pension plan complies with an order to meet
the participant's family support obligations when the participant
is receiving benefits, but may be violated if the participant is not
then receiving such pension benefits. The reports also observe
that the IRS took no position about whether the anti-alienation
prohibition would be violated if a state court requires pension
payments when the participant is not receiving benefits.'79 On the
other hand, the reports make no mention by the Seventh Circuit
that there is no ERISA violation in such a state order if the
participant could have elected, but did not elect, to begin receiving
pension benefits."' Congress in REACT provided that under very
limited conditions a state court may require a pension plan to pay
benefits when the participant is not receiving benefits. 8'
Nevertheless, Congress did not simply add a third state law
exclusion for domestic relations law (including community
property law) from the ERISA Explicit Preemption in addition to

176. See Louis Everett Graham, Kentucky Survey-Domestic Relations, 73
KY. L. J. 379, 380-83 (1984) for a discussion of the pre-REACT law with
respect to the applicability of the Anti-Alienation Prohibition to domestic
relations orders.
177. H.R. REP. No. 98-655, pt. 2, p. 18 (1984); S. Rep. No. 98-575, 98th Cong.
2d. Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2565; see also H.R. REP. No. 98655, pt. 1, p.3 0 (1984) (observing that the Department of Labor had taken a
position similar to that of the IRS).
178. IRS Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85 (withdrawn as obsolete by Revenue
Ruling 91-8, 1991-1 C.B. 281 because of the enactment of REACT).
179. Id. However, in the final sentence of the Ruling the IRS stated that
benefits could not be so attached "since the participant has no present right to
such benefits." Id; see Monsanto Co. v. Ford, 534 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
(holding a distribution before the participant began to receive his pension
benefits would violate the Anti-Alienation Prohibition and citing the IRS
ruling). The court also explicitly expressed no objection to an agreement
between the participant and his spouse to share the participant's benefit
payments. Id.
180. Savings and Profit-Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d
1038, 1045 (7th Cir. 1983). The decision also referred to the question of
whether a state court may order a pension plan to make benefits payments in
violation of the plan terms, which appeared in the jurisdictional statement in
In re Marriage of Campa, 444 U.S 1028 (1980). This was one of the questions
that the Supreme Court decided did not raise a substantial federal question
when the Court refused to grant certiorari.
181. The QDRO Provisions permit QDROs to obtain benefits when the
participant is not receiving benefits if the participant could obtain such
benefits and is still working. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E); 2 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)
(2000).
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those for laws regulating insurance, banking or securities and for
generally applicable criminal laws. Nor did it add a second
exclusion from the Anti-Alienation Prohibition in addition to those
for voluntary assignments.
Nor did it even do so for laws
pertaining to only to the orders for family support, 8 ' these orders
did not appear to be in dispute as described in the Committee
Reports discussed earlier. Rather, it made far more substantial
changes to ERISA.
First, a second ERISA beneficiary designation mandate was
added, namely ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).18 This
section requires pension plans to designate spouses, former
spouses, children and dependents of participants as beneficiaries" 8
pursuant to those state domestic relations orders which meet the
QDRO standards."u
Among these standards were the
requirements that the orders be domestic relations orders,1" which
(a) clearly specified the plan, the beneficiaries, and the designated
benefits,'8 7 (b) were consistent with the pension plan's terms,1" and
(c) did not increase the plan's actuarial costs.9 However, QDROs
may provide the following two benefits that may not otherwise be
consistent with the plan's terms: (a) separate interests in certain
circumstances, so that payments may be made even if the
participant is not collecting pension benefits, 9 ' and (b) former
spouses may be treated as spouses for purposes of spousal survivor
benefits in certain circumstances.'
Unlike the designees of the
other statutory designation for spousal survivor benefits, the
designees of QDROs have no right to give up their entitlements to
such benefits, other than the issue of a new QDRO which may only

182. See Stone v. Stone & Seafarers Pension Plan, 450 F. Supp. 919, 927-31
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (providing a good discussion of why making such a distinction
is quite problematic). The court held that an ex-spouse could enforce a right to
pension benefits against an ERISA plan where her right was based upon a
marital dissolution order recognizing her community property interest in the
pension. Id.
183. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2000).
184. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(J); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(J) (2000). This beneficiary
status provides the spouses, former spouses, children and dependents of
participants with standing to claim their plan benefits directly from the plan
under (a) ERISA 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000) for a nonterminated plan; (b); ERISA § 4070(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1370(a) for a terminated
single-employer plan, of (c) ERISA § 4301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1451 (a) for a
terminated multi-employer plan.
185. The specifications for such orders are set forth in ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B);
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (2000).
186. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
187. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C) (2000).
188. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i) (2000).
189. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii) (2000).
190. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E) (2000).
191. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(F); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(F) (2000).
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192

be effective prospectively.
Second, REACT furthered the uniform national treatment of
ERISA plan benefits by specifying that the only domestic relations
orders that ERISA plans were required and permitted to follow
were QDROs. Thus, any DRO that is not a QDRO is preempted by
Conflict Preemption using the Anti-Assignment Prohibition. 93
REACT also added an explicit exclusion of QDROs from the
ERISA Explicit Preemption.194 The ERISA Explicit Preemption is
thus not needed to preempt such domestic relations orders because
their violation of the Anti-Alienation Prohibition causes them to be
preempted by Conflict Preemption.9 ' Nor is the QDRO exclusion
needed to protect QDROs from preemption. ERISA requires that
pension plans provide that QDROs are beneficiary designations."
Thus, the QDRO exclusion from the ERISA Explicit Exemption
appears to have only one purpose: to emphasize that state court
orders that purport to assign or create rights to non-pension
benefits (welfare benefits, such as garnishment orders or domestic
relations orders pertaining to life insurance benefits) are

192. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(iii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(iii) (2000). There is
one exception. A former spouse may become entitled under such order to the
spousal survivor benefits set forth in ERISA § 205; 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000). In
such a case, the participant may change such benefit with the consent of the
former spouse as discussed, supra.
193. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2000).
194. ERISA § 514(b)(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (2000). There seems little
significance in the fact that the preemption section unlike the anti-assignment
prohibition section only mentions the QDRO exclusion, but not the treatment
of other domestic relations orders. The initial inclusion is so broad that there
is little reason to doubt its breadth. The anti-alienation provisions contain the
substantive terms of the statutory beneficiary designation, so it was a more
natural place than the preemption section to state that a domestic relations
order that is not a QDRO is ineffective with respect to pension benefit
designation. Such treatment is also consistent with the Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The fundamental Supreme Court preemption cases, such as
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504 (1981) and Shaw v. Delta
Airways, 463 U.S. 85 (1983), which described the broad reach of the
preemption section, preceded the enactment of REACT. As a result, there
seemed little need to be explicit about the broad reach of the Explicit ERISA
Preemption. By contrast, the fundamental Supreme Court Anti-Alienation
cases describing the broad reach of the Anti-Alienation Prohibition, such as
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990) and
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), followed the enactment of REACT,
so there may have seemed to be more need to be explicit about the reach of the
Anti-Alienation Prohibition. Thus, the REACT Congress may have had less
confidence that the Court would accept the breadth of Anti-Alienation
prohibition in ERISA § 206(d)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000).
195. The Anti-Alienation Prohibition provides that domestic relations orders
determining pension benefit entitlements that are not QDROs are void to such
extent. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2000).
196. Id.
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preempted contrary to Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency. 97
'
Congress recognized that the new REACT rules preempted
domestic relations orders that were previously treated as
effective.198 Thus, REACT contained two grandfather provisions.
First, those domestic relations orders which did not meet the
QDRO requirements, but that had been accepted by pension plans
prior to the effective date of REACT, remained valid. Second,
pension plans could choose to honor domestic relations orders
obtained before the effective date of REACT, which did not meet
the QDRO requirements. "
REACT, as the presence of the term retirement in its title and
preface suggests, focused primarily on pension benefits. Survivor
entitlements under welfare plans, such as life insurance plans, are
affected only by the addition of a QDRO exemption to the general
preemption section, which as discussed, clarifies that domestic
relations orders may not affect such welfare plan rights."' It is
irrelevant whether the claimants to such benefits are spouses,
former spouses, children or other dependents of participants.
However, subsequent legislation, protected the rights of children
to health care benefits under specified domestic relations orders
(called qualified medical care support orders ("QMSCOs"), but
provided no similar protection for former spouses.20 ' In particular,
a state court order may not entitle a former spouse of a participant
to any medical benefits from a participant's ERISA medical care
benefit plan. While such benefits are not generally survivor
benefits, the additional specific preemption exclusion further
confirms that the QDRO preemption exclusion implies that state
orders attempting to determine entitlements to ERISA benefits
that are neither QDROs nor QMSCOs are preempted.
By contrast, Congress took a simpler approach
with respect to
the rights of former spouses to other federally regulated pension
plans that had anti-alienation provisions after the Supreme Court
held that federal law preempted domestic relations orders based
on community property rights for such benefits. The Supreme

197. 486 U.S. 825 (1988). This preemption argument was made by the four
dissenting justices, but rejected by the majority. Compare id. at 842-43 with
id. at 839-40.
198 However, the majority in Mackey asserted, in
dicta, that Congress may have
intended to confirm that ERISA preempted no domestic relations orders. Id.
at 839.
199. Section 303(d), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426, 1453 (1984).
200. Id.
201. See ERISA § 609; 29 U.S.C. § 1169 (2000), (permitting a participant's
children to obtain beneficiary rights under ERISA health care plans pursuant
to child support orders, which meet certain specifications and are called
qualified medical child support orders). Pub. L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 371 (1993)

added this post-REACT section to ERISA.
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Court held in 1981202 that a spouse could not use a domestic
relations order based on community property rights to obtain
military pension benefits directly from the plan or indirectly from
the participant. °3 In 1982, prior to its enactment of REACT,
Congress provided that military retirement pay may be divided
when fixing the property rights or family support obligations
between the parties to a divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal
separation.2 ° Congress took a similar approach with respect to
pension benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act after the
Supreme Court held in 1979205 that a spouse could not use a
domestic relations order based on community property rights to
obtain such retirement benefits directly from such
plan or
indirectly from the participantY. Congress provided for payments
by the Railway Retirement Board of a portion of a participant's
pension in accord with "a court decree of divorce, annulment, or
legal separation or the terms of any court-approved property
settlement incident to any such court decree." 7 By contrast, there
are court-approved property settlements and retirement benefit
divisions that do not qualify as QDROs.
V. ERISA PENSION SURVIVOR BENEFICIARY
DESIGNATIONS FOR SPOUSES

ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055, (the "Spousal Survivor
Provisions") requires pension benefit plans to provide spouses with
specified survivor benefits.
Thus, such benefits and benefit
designations must be part of all covered ERISA pension plans. No
survivor benefits need be provided if the participant (a) has no
spouse, (b) has been married to the spouse for less than a year,0 9
202. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
203. Prior to the legislation, 10 U.S.C. § 3929, entitled the soldier and only
the soldier to retirement benefits, although 10 U.S.C. § 1434 permits the
soldier to choose whether to receive a smaller life annuity so that survivor
benefits may be paid to either his children or surviving spouse. Moreover, no
alienation or anticipation of the retirement benefits is permitted other than for
specified exclusions, one of which pertained to child support and alimony but
excluded payments based on community property. Pub. L. 95-30, § 501 (d), 91
Stat. 159, 42 U.S.C. § 662 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
204. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. 97-252, 96
Stat. 718, 730-31 (1982) which added 10 U.S.C. § 1408.
205. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
206. Prior to the legislation, 45 U.S.C. § 231m(a), prevented any alienation
or anticipation of the retirement benefits other than specified exclusions, one
of which pertained to child support and alimony and explicitly excluded
payments pertaining to community property.
207. Pub. L. 98-76, tit. IV, § 419(a)(3), 97 Stat. 938 (1983).
208. ERISA § 205(c)(2)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(B) (2000). There may be a
question whether a participant is married, such as where a common law
marriage is claimed. See, e.g., Blessing v. Deere Pension Plan, 985 F. Supp.
899 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
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(c) is separated from or has been abandoned by his or her spouse,"'
or (d) cannot locate his or her spouse. 11 Thus, if a participant does
not designate a spouse as the beneficiary of the participant's
survivor benefits but shows that one of the exceptions set forth
above is applicable, the plan must respect the participant's
designation."2
There may also be a question of who is the
participant's surviving spouse and is thus entitled to the surviving
spouse benefits."2
Welfare plans, such as life insurance plans or disability plans,
are not subject to this requirement.2 1 4 Four major kinds of pension
plans need not provide spouses with survivor benefits: (a) top-hat
plans, which are primarily for the purpose of providing deferred
compensation for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees,"' (b) plans maintained solely to provide
pension benefits for certain employees in excess of the contribution
and benefit limits that the Code imposes for tax qualification
209. ERISA § 205 (f); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(f) permits, but does not require plans
to limit the spousal survivor rights to spouses who have been married at least
a year and describes the computation of the one-year period.
210. Pursuant to ERISA § 205(c)(2)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(B) (2000), the
Treasury has set forth in regulations additional circumstances under which
spousal survivor benefits need not be provided. Those circumstances include
either a separation or abandonment. However, in both those cases a court
order is required to terminate the spouse's survivor rights. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)-20 Q&A-27 (2005); see also Bd. of Trustees of the Equity-League
Pension Trust Fund v. Royce, 238 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2001) (providing that
spousal survivor rights are not terminated by a marital separation but only by
an order confirming the separation); Mendez v. TIAA/CREF, 982 F.2d 783 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that spousal survivor rights are not terminated by an
abandonment but only by an order confirming the abandonment).
211. ERISA § 205(c)(2)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(B) (2000). This is an
explicit statutory exception.
It contains no reference to a court order
confirming the participant's inability to locate the participant's spouse. By
contrast, the abandonment exception set forth in the regulations requires such
an order, supra.
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20 Q&A-27 (2005).
213. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Benefits Plans v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th
Cir. 2006) in which the court had to decide whether a participant's spouse, was
the "wife" who left him at the latest in 1982 after bearing two children, or the
"wife" whom he married in 1985 and with whom he also had two children and
was living in 2003 when he died. The Court used common law principles of
conflict of laws to choose Ohio law, which favored the first spouse, rather than
Michigan law, which was specified in the plan and favored the second spouse.
The majority and the dissent differed about the applicability of the ERISA
policy of uniformity. The Plan Terms Benefit Mandate that plan benefits are
determined by plan terms was not discussed by either the majority or the
dissent. However, the dissent made a similar argument that the court should
adhere to the terms "negotiated by the parties" that constituted the ERISA
benefits contract, i.e., the pension plan. The relevant plan term would have
appeared to be the Michigan choice of laws provision, which the court rejected.
214. ERISA § 201(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (2000).
215. ERISA § 201(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) (2000); see also n.119.
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purposes,"' (c) simplified employee pension plans and simple
retirement account plans, which place assets for participants'
benefits in individual retirement accounts,217 and (d) 401(k) plans
to the extent they have designated that benefits may be deposited
in Roth IRAs." 8
The Spousal Survivor Provisions require pension plans that
are DB Plans and not otherwise exempt to provide spouses with
survivor benefits both at and before retirement. DB plans must
designate the participant's spouse as the beneficiary of a qualified
joint and survivor benefit ("QJSA") 2 9 payable beginning at the
participant's retirement. A QJSA is a joint and survivor annuity
for which the spouse is entitled to a survivor portion that is
between fifty percent and one-hundred percent of the amount
payable during the joint lives of the participant and the
DB plans must also designate the
participant's spouse.2
participant's spouse as the beneficiary of a qualified preretirement survivor benefit ("QPSA")."2 A QPSA for a DB plan is
payable to the spouse if the participant does not survive until the
date he or she has requested that the payment of plan benefits
begin.222 A QPSA is paid as an annuity to the spouse in an amount
which is at least equal to the amount the spouse would have
received under the plan's QJSA if the participant (a) had
separated from service at the date of his death, and (b) survived
until his earliest retirement age.2 22 However, if the present value
of the QPSA is less than $5,000, the amount may be but need not
be distributed as a lump sum without the consent of the surviving
224

spouse.

The retirement and pre-retirement benefit designation rules
for survivor benefits for spouses also apply to those DC plans (a)
which are subject to the minimum funding rules, such as money
216. ERISA §§ 3(36) and 201(7); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(36), 1051(7) (2000).
217. ERISA § 201(6); 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6)(2000); I.R.C. §§ 408(k), 408(p).
218. I.R.C. § 402A(b)(2).
219. ERISA § 205(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(1) (2000).
220. ERISA § 205(d); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d) (2000). Under Section 1040 of PPA
of 2006, effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2007, plans
subject to these rules must also offer a qualified optional survivor annuity,
which provides a survivor annuity of seventy-five percent of the joint annuity
if the QJSA provides a survivor annuity less than seventy-five percent of the
joint annuity and a survivor annuity of fifty percent of the joint and survivor
annuity otherwise.
221. ERISA § 205(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(2) (2000).
222. If the participant dies before making such a request, the spouse also
becomes entitled to a QPSA on the participant's death if the participant had
any non-forfeitable benefits at the time of his death.
223. ERISA § 205(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)(1) (2000).
224. ERISA § 205(g)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(g)(1) (2000). Lump sum payments
of the actuarial equivalent value of QJSAs otherwise require the consent of the
surviving spouse and the participant, if living at such time.
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purchase pension plans, but not profit-sharing plans or 401(k)
plans,222 (b) to the extent the plan has been the recipient of benefits
from a money purchase pension plan or a DB plan,"' or (c) to the
extent the participant chooses to receive his or her benefit in the
form of an annuity."7 The QPSA is generally paid by default as an
annuity to the spouse that has an actuarial equivalent at least
equal to fifty percent of the account balance of the participant as of
the date of death, 22 8 although many spouses often choose a lump
sum payment. 229 Thus, many such DC plans permit participants to
choose a non-spouse as the recipient of the fifty percent of the
account balance to which the spouse has no statutory entitlement.
The Spousal Survivor Provisions require DC plans not subject
to the QJSA and QPSA rules, described in the prior paragraph,
such as many profit-sharing plans and 401(k) plans, to provide the
The spouse must be
spouse with limited survivor benefits.
designated as the beneficiary for the participant's account balance
if the participant dies before starting to receive his or her pension
benefits.no However, spouses need not be provided with any
retirement benefits. Moreover, for these DC plans, the participant
may withdraw or borrow2 ' all or part of his or her benefits without
the consent of his or her spouse.
A. Any Change in the ERISA Marital Survivor Beneficiary
DesignationRequires Spousal Consent
ERISA permits a participant to change the pension plan
default designation of his or her spouse as the beneficiary of the
plan's survivor benefits (the "ERISA Marital Survivor Beneficiary
Designation"). 2
The participant's designation of a different
beneficiary and/or different form of payment, however, may only
become effective if the spouse consents in writing to such
designation, which designation is described as a waiver by the
The spouse's consent is distinct from the
participant."'
225. ERISA § 206(b)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(b)(1)(B) (2000).
226. ERISA § 206(b)(1)(C)(iii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(b)(1)(C)(iii) (2000).
227. ERISA § 206(b)(1)(C)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2000).
228. ERISA § 205(e)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)(2) (2000).
229. See David A. Pratt, The Futureof Employee Benefits, 35 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 565, 608 (2002) (arguing that it appears that one to three percent of
participants choose annuities, but the author does not mention whether
beneficiaries make similar choices).
230. ERISA § 205(b)(1)(C)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(C)(I) (2000).
231. By contrast, decisions to withdraw or borrow against plan benefits that
are subject to the survivor annuity rules are subject to the same consent
requirement by spouses as a decision to waive survivor benefits, ERISA
§ 205(c)(4); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(4). Otherwise, the participant could deprive the
spouse of the survivor benefits in the same manner had waived such benefits.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q&A-24 (2005).
232. ERISA § 205(c); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c) (2000).
233. ERISA § 205(c)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2) (2000).
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participant's designation, and thus does not change the statutory
designation in of itself."4 The consent may either limit the
participant's choices of beneficiaries and payments or permit the
participant to choose any beneficiary and/or form of payment (such
as a general consent). 3 ' However, a spouse must acknowledge in a
general consent that he or she may limit his or her consent to a
specific beneficiary and a specific form of payment (where
applicable) and that the spouse elects to relinquish both of these
rights. 36 More generally the spouse must "acknowledge the effect
of the consent."23 The acknowledgment of the consent must be
witnessed by a plan representative or a notary public.238 The latter
requirement may be expected to insure that the spouse executed
the waiver without obvious coercion, although it does not show
that the spouse understands the consent or received any
information about the benefit options.
There is no explicit requirement that the spouse receive any
specific information about her or his rights at any time before or
after the execution of the consent to give up his or her survivor
benefits.239 By contrast, ERISA requires the plan to give the

234. See also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (holding that divorce does not
terminate an explicit spousal survivor benefit designation of the former spouse
even though following a divorce the participant does not need the former
spouse's consent to change the beneficiary); Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778,
781 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a spouse may not be ordered to comply with
prenuptial and waive pension interest after death of participant); Nat'l Auto.
Dealers and Associates Ret. Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 1996)
(finding that a prenuptial agreement does not establish a constructive trust in
the survivor benefits paid to the participant's widow by a pension plan). But
cf GreenbaumDoll & McDonald PLLC v. Sandler, No. 3:05CV-754-H, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78236 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 24, 2006) (rejecting a challenge to a
surviving spouse's survivor benefits under Section 205, but in dicta pointing to
the lack of a claim that the spouse breached a pre-nuptial agreement to
execute a plan consent to a new beneficiary designation); Callahan v. Hutsell,
Callahan & Buchino P.S.C Revised Profit Sharing Plan, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 34005 (6th Cir.) (remanding to determine if spouse breached a prenuptial agreement to execute a plan consent to a new beneficiary designation).
Neither court simply declared that if the participant did not execute a new
beneficiary designation the existence of consent was irrelevant because
consents are not beneficiary designations.
235. ERISA § 205(c)(2)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A) (2000).
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-20, Q&A-31 (c) (2005).
237. ERISA § 205(c)(2)(iii); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(iii) (2000).
238. Id.; see also Alfieri v. Guild Times Pension Plan, No. CV 03-5717, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54228 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2006) (noting that a consent which
was signed but not acknowledged by the spouse before a notary public was
held to be ineffective); Lasche v. Lasche Basic Profit-Sharing Plan, 111 F.3d
863 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding a consent which lacked the signature of a notary
or a plan witness in the space for a witness was not effective even though the
plan administrator signed the form in a different place in his capacity as plan
administrator).
239. But see Neidich v. Estate of Neidich, 222 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y.
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participant during a specified period of time a written and
extensive explanation of the financial implications of the available
benefit options,24 ° including providing the spouse with no survivor
benefits.241 However, pursuant to Congressional instructions,24' the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has provided sample language
for "spousal consents that meet the statutory requirements,"
which suggests that there is an implicit spousal disclosure
obligation. 4' The sample language is more understandable than
the explanation required for notice to the participant who may
The IRS
elect a benefit option with the consent of the spouse.'
may be expected to modify such sample language to take into
account the qualified optional survivor annuity introduced by the
PPA of 2006.'" Because neither the sample spousal language nor
its content is mandatory, the spouse may not be provided with the
implications of consenting to give up his or
tools to understand the
246
her survivor interest.
2002) (denying summary judgment to plan when spouse claimed the
participant-fiduciary had concealed facts about the consent and exercised
undue influence). Providing disclosure only to the participant may be a
vestige of the pre-REACT ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055. Under that
provision, the participant did not require spousal consent to elect to waive the
spousal survivor benefit, and thus, there was little need to provide the spouse
with any information about plan benefit options. Id.
The requirement for such
240. Treas. Reg. § 1.417(a)(3)-1 (2005).
explanation of the financial impact of different options is similar to the
disclosure required for all pension plan participants who have distribution
options. ERISA § 203(e); 29 U.S.C. § 1053(e); I.R.C. § 411(a)(11); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.411(a)-11 (2005). Plans are also not required to provide similar notices to
beneficiaries who have several distribution options, such as a lump sum
versus a life annuity. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(5) (2005).
241. ERISA § 205(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(3) (2000), I.R.C. § 417 and Treas.
Reg. § 1.417(a)(3)-1 (2005); see also Vilas v. Lyons, 702 F. Supp. 555 (D. Md.
1988) (noting that the law only required that an explanation be provided to
the participant; the court nevertheless reviewed and found that the disclosure
of the plan benefit options on the consent form was adequate).
242. Section 1457 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1775 (1996).
243. I.R.S. Notice 97-10, 1997-1 CB 370.
244. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.417(a)(3)-1 (2005).
245. Section 1004 of PPA of 2006 provides that such benefits must be made
available for plan years beginning after December 31, 2007.
246. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hopkins, 574 N.E.2d 230 (1991) (holding that a
general release in a prenuptial agreement was a consent that satisfied the
terms of ERISA § 205(c)(2)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A) (2000)). The court
found it irrelevant that the individual could not have understood the survivor
rights she was giving up because those rights were not created until REACT
was enacted after the execution of the agreement. Id. Understanding the
implications of the consent would, however, appear to be a basic requirement
for a valid release of a person's claim to an entitlement to ERISA plan
benefits. See Albert Feuer, When Are Releases of Claims for ERISA Plan
Benefits Effective? 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 773, 796-802, 807-808 (Spring
2005) (providing a discussion of fiduciary releases and general releases).
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An effective consent to the participant's waiver of spousal
benefits may not be part of a prenuptial agreement, but must be
executed while the spouse in question is married to the
participant.247 The QDRO provisions that may give former spouses
rights to a participant's pension benefits contain no-spousalconsent or waiver provisions because ERISA does not give spouses
any pension rights during or after a marital dissolution or
separation, when ERISA no longer requires that plans provide
them with survivor benefits.2" Thus, there are no ERISA consent
provisions applicable to prenuptial waivers of claims to a
participant's pension benefits in such a dissolution or separation
(when the entitlement to spousal survivor benefits terminates);
state law determines the effectiveness of such spousal waiver. .249
If the spouse ceases being a spouse, whether by reason of
death or marital dissolution, 2 ° and there is no contrary QDRO
which establishes a new statutory benefit designation, as
247. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20 Q & A-28 (2005); see also Hagwood v.
Bellsouth Savings. Plan, 282 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that Section
205 consents must be executed while the individual is a spouse); Nat'l Auto.
Dealers and Assoc. Ret. Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496, 501 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that pre-nuptial waivers do not affect widow's rights and spouse may
not be ordered to waive or treated as holding property in constructive trust for
others); accord Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1992). But see In re
Estate of Hopkins, 574 N.E.2d 230 (1991) (finding that a widow waived
survivor rights in prenuptial agreement-Treasury Regulation dismissed as
being interpretative and thus deserving little respect without any
consideration of the deference required to be given to interpretative
regulations by Chevron USA v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
248. Edmonds v. Edmonds, 710 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768-69 (2000). In that case, a
woman was defending her pension benefits against a claim by her ex-husband.
249. See, e.g., Savage-Keough v. Keough, 861 A.2d 131, 373 (2004); Sabad v.
Sabad, 825 A.2d 682 (2003); Critchell v. Critchell, 746 A.2d 282, (2000);
Stewart v. Stewart, 541 S.E.2d 209, (2000); In re the Marriage of DiFatta, 306
714 N.E.2d 1092 (1999); Moor-Jankowski v. Moor-Jankowski, 222 A..2d 422,
(1995); In re the Marriage of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463 (1995). However, a contrary
decision was reached in Richards v. Richards, 640 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1995), affd,
232 A 2d 303, 648 (1996) in which a court found that ERISA preempted a
prenuptial agreement which included a waiver for any claim to participant's
"present or future" pension rights and the future spouse had agreed to execute
a consent to spousal rights. The participant sought an order compelling the
spouse to execute a consent to a waiver for any claim to participant's "present
or future" pension rights and the future spouse had agreed to execute a
consent to spousal rights. The participant sought an order compelling the
spouse to execute a consent to a waiver of her spousal survivor benefits during
the divorce action, and almost no attention was directed to the applicability of
the waiver to the marital dissolution and there was no mention of any of those
decisions.
Moreover, unlike the other decisions, the agreement did not
explicitly mention a waiver of pension rights upon the dissolution of the
marriage.
250. A marital separation is treated as a marital dissolution as discussed,
supra.
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discussed within this Article, the participant may but need not
disregard any limitations in the spouse's consent. 5' The Supreme
Court has ruled that ERISA does not cause any explicit
designation of a spouse to be cancelled upon the dissolution of a
marriage between such spouse and the participant.2 2 However, it
would appear that any implicit statutory designation of a spouse
as the beneficiary of the participant's survivor benefits vanishes on
the dissolution of their marriage.2
B. ERISA Plan Liabilitiesand Spousal EntitlementsAssociated
with ERISA MaritalSurvivor Beneficiary Designations
The Spousal Survivor Provisions permit a plan to be
discharged of its obligation "to the extent of its payments" if its
fiduciaries acted "in accordance with part of this subtitle [the
fiduciary responsibility sections of ERISA] in relying" on the
consent described above or in making the determination that the
participant has no spouse or cannot locate his or her spouse.2 4 In
such circumstances a plan will not be required to pay plan benefits
twice or to seek restitution from the wrongful recipient. A similar
relief provision pertains to the other statutory beneficiary
designation, QDROs, discussed infra.255 These relief provisions are
unique to statutory beneficiary designations. If a plan otherwise
pays the benefits of a participant or a beneficiary to a person not
entitled to plan benefits, ERISA makes no provision for plan relief
from a double benefit payment obligation, regardless of whether

251. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20 Q& A-25(b) (2005). The courts have rejected
the claim that if the participant slays his or her spouse, the spouse's estate
retains the spousal survivor benefits when the participant designated nonspousal beneficiaries without the consent of the slain spouse. Caterpillar v.
Estate of Velton Lacefield-Cole, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 71931 (N.D. Ill.); Woolbert v.
Kimble Glass, Inc. , 54 F. Supp. 2d 539 (W.D.N.C. 1999). In both cases, the
participant killed himself after slaying his spouse, and the courts refused to
apply the slayer principles which prevent an individual from benefitting from
a slaying. The slayer principles, however, are not part or ERISA and thus not
applicable to such plans, as discussed, infra.
252. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
253. Such an issue would arise if a participant makes a beneficiary
designation before marrying a person other than the designee, but does not
change the explicit designation during the marriage and subsequent divorce.
After the first year of marriage, there will be an implicit Statutory Survivor
Benefit Designation of the current spouse. This implicit designation would
appear to terminate upon a divorce, and the original designation may again
become effective if the divorce creates no new statutory benefit designation.
But cf. New Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. DeRocha, 779 F. Supp. 845 (E.D.
La. 1991) (holding that the original designation was terminated by the killing
of the participant by the designee).
254. ERISA § 205(c)(6); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(6) (2000).
255. ERISA § 206(d)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3), discussed, infra.
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plan fiduciaries fulfilled their responsibilities when they had paid
the benefits to the wrong person.256
Thus, if (a) the plan fiduciaries presumed a participant's
spouse didn't exist or consented to the designation of another
beneficiary, and (b) the fiduciaries complied with its fiduciary
obligations to behave prudently in making such a presumption the
spouse may not look to the plan for any of the benefit payments
previously made by the plan, even if the spouse shows that the
presumption was wrong after the plan paid some or all the
survivor benefits to another person. However, this fiduciary relief
provision gives no relief if the participant died before receiving any
plan benefits and the plan decided as a result of a presumption of
the lack of a spouse to pay no survivor benefits. The lack of any
prior plan payments implies the plan and its fiduciaries need no
relief.
There are several approaches by which the plan may pay a
surviving spouse the lifetime annuity payments to which he or she
is entitled, while the pension plan is relieved from a double benefit
payment obligation after having made excessive payments to a
In Hearn v. Western Conference of Teamsters
participant.257
Pension Trust Fund," the Ninth Circuit did not discuss any
alternatives when confronted with a pension plan that had
incorrectly but reasonably presumed that a participant had no
spouse, and paid the spouse a single life annuity until his death.
Two months after the participant's death, the spouse appeared
and requested survivor benefits of $78/month during her life from
the plan. The participant had received nine monthly payments of
$344.00 rather than the $155.88 to which he was entitled under
the statutorily required QJSA designation. The Court held that
(a) the participant had been overpaid by a total of $1,696.50259 and
(b) the plan was entitled to defer the start of the spouse's
payments for almost twenty-two months, at which point the
The court also
overpayments would have been fully offset.
stated 260 that this solution "reconcil[es] the Trust Fund's interests

256. See, e.g., Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 610 (D.N.C.
2005) (inquiring whether the participant's estate, which it held was otherwise
entitled to the survivor benefits, had waived or was estopped from making a
benefits claim after the plan had paid a party the court held was not entitled
to such survivor benefits).
257. No alternative approaches need be considered if survivor benefits are
payable in a lump sum or in a fixed number of installment payments. If the
entire value of survivor benefits was paid before the spouse appears, the
spouse may not obtain anything from the plan. If part of the value was paid,
the spouse would be entitled to the unpaid portion.
258. 68 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1995).
259. The product of nine and $188.50, the amount of the excess monthly
payments.
260. Hearn v. W. Conf. of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 68 F.3d 301, 305
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with Mrs. Hearn's in a way that doesn't make either bear the full
brunt of Mr. Hearn's perfidy."
This statement reasonably
presumes that the "perfidious" participant who received a small
pension had no assets from which Mrs. Hearn could have
recovered the overpayments.26 The court did not discuss whether
there were more equitable payment options. For example, the
surviving spouse could have been provided with an immediate but
a reduced annuity; the reduction would continue until the excess
was fully credited.26 Under such alternative, the spouse and the
plan would share the risk that the spouse would pass away before
the participant's overpayments were credited rather than having
the spouse bear such risk alone.
A spouse whom the participant incorrectly asserted (a) did not
exist, (b) had executed the consent to a beneficiary change, or (c)
had voluntarily consented to the participant receiving all the
benefits," may still have recourse against the recipient of his or
her benefits even if he or she may not obtain the benefits from the
plan because its fiduciaries complied with ERISA's fiduciary
requirements before paying those benefits to another person. The
fiduciary relief statute26 does not change the ERISA Marital
Survivor Beneficiary Designation but merely prevents the spouse
collecting those benefits from the plan and thereby removes any
incentive from the plan to seek to recover the payments it had
made to the wrongful recipient. 62

(9th Cir. 1995).
261. Otherwise she would have not borne any brunt of the perfidy because
she would have been able to recover the wrongful pension payments.
262. But see Tynan v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 04-cv-335-SM, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19646 (D.N.H. Sept. 9, 2005), where such an approach was taken
with respect to a participant whose future pension payments were reduced to
reimburse the plan for what the participant knew were excessive payments.
The court placed considerable emphasis on the participant's lack of clean
hands when it approved that approach. By contrast, in Hearn, the spouse had
no apparent responsibility for the overpayments to the participant, but bore
the risk of not receiving any of the payments she is owed.
263. The other party or parties may be (1) the participant who received an
unauthorized lump sum (See, e.g., Akrom v. Polley, BP Ret. Accumulation
Plan, No. 06-705, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83954 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2006); Rice
v. Rochester Laborers' Annuity Fund, 888 F. Supp. 494 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)), (2)
the participant who received the larger annual payments payable under a
single life annuity (See, e.g., Vilas v. Lyons, 702 F. Supp. 555 (D. Md. 1988);
Grodesky v. Lucent Tech., No. 01 C 5167, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1042 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 23, 2003)); or (3) other individuals who received survivor benefits
(Neidich v. Estate of Neidich, 222 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
264. ERISA § 205(c)(6); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(6) (2000).
265. As in Hearn, it is often likely that the wrongful recipient lacks the
resources to repay the benefit payments to either the plan or the surviving
spouse. This is why depriving the surviving spouse of access to plan funds
often means that he or she will not be able to obtain the benefits to which he
or she is entitled.
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It thus appears that the spouse retains the right under the
traditional benefit claim section, ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)," to recover all or part of a survivor interest to
which he is entitled under the plan terms from the participant, the
participant's estate or the unauthorized designee who received
those benefits without being entitled to those benefits. The court,
however, rejected such a claim in Kopec v. Kopec, when the plan
fiduciaries had breached their obligations, but the plan had been
terminated. The court, nevertheless, permitted the spouse to seek
recovery from the participant, who was acting as a fiduciary when
he permitted himself to withdraw plan assets without his spouse's
consent." 7 The court relied on a frequently quoted Second Circuit
holding that "in a recovery of benefits claim [under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)], only the plan and the
administrators and trustees of the plan in their capacity as such
may be held liable."268 However, that case and similar cases all
pertain to benefit claims against the plan. Such actions must be
brought against plans, administrators or trustees." 9 The court
was also concerned that the participant could obtain a double
recovery by suing both the plan and the participant in his
individual capacity.
By contrast, we are
assuming that a
statutory beneficiary is precluded from making a claim against the
plan and its fiduciaries27 ° but retains his or her plan benefit
entitlement, so there is no issue of a possible double recovery but
an issue of whether any recovery is possible. There seems little
equitable or statutory basis for precluding a surviving spouse from
seeking relief from the party or parties that wrongfully received
the benefits when the spouse may not obtain relief from the plan.
If the traditional benefit claim section, arguendo, does not
provide any relief, the spouse may be able to resort to the
equitable relief provided by ERISA § 502(a)(3) 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3). However that section may not permit the designee to
impose personal liability on the person who wrongfully obtained

266. Benefit claims under a terminated plan, however, would be sought
under (a) ERISA § 4070(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1370(a) for a single-employer plan, or
(b) ERISA § 4301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a) for a multi-employer plan.
267. 70 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
268. Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1198 (2d Cir. 1989).
269. See generally William F. Hanrahan & Lars C. Golumbic, ERISA
Benefits Litigation Who Can Be Sued?, 19 BENEFITS L. J. 20 (Summer 2006).
270. A similar question may be raised if the fiduciaries are exempt not
because they fulfilled their ERISA responsibilities but because a statute of
limitations has expired with respect to a fiduciary claim, as in Akrom, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83954 (W.D. Pa.). The statute of limitations against the
fiduciaries may have expired because such statutes only generally begin to
accrue at the time of the breach, ERISA § 413; 29 U.S.C. § 1113, whereas,
statutes pertaining to benefit claims do not begin to accrue until a participant
or a beneficiary has exhausted the plan's review procedures.
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the benefit because such relief may be considered legal relief
rather than equitable relief."' On the other hand, for plans which
contain an express agreement between the parties establishing an
equitable lien or constructive trust an available form of relief is
the imposition of a constructive trust.7 ' This raises the question of
whether a constructive trust is available when there is no such
agreement to restrict recoveries to such relief.272
Statutory
designated beneficiaries rarely have such agreements with the
person who wrongfully received the designee's benefits, although
the beneficiary may be able to base its claim on the plan's
agreement with the recipient, if there is such a provision.
Moreover, constructive trusts may only be available if a res may be
identified and traced for a designee to recover under that section.274
Furthermore, designees, unlike plans, may not, as a practical
matter, recoup improper payments by offsetting the improper
payment against future benefit payments to the payment, as plans
whose terms provide for such recoupment may do.275
271. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212-14
(2002); Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Med. Services 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006). Contra
Langbein, supra note 59. However, these cases and Professor Langbein all
considered the ability of a plan, rather than a beneficiary, to recover plan
benefits from a person who had received those benefits even though he was
not entitled to them. Id.
272. Id.; see also Brief for the U.S. Department of Labor as Amicus Curiae,
Green v. Exxon/MobilCorp. (No.06-1452) available at httpJ/www.dol.gov/
sol/media/briefs/ExxonMobile(A)-05-25-2006.htm
In these cases, the relief
sections preclude fiduciary liability. The Department asserted that personal
liability may be imposed on a fiduciary whose breach injured a specific
beneficiary, such as a fiduciary who failed to obtain life insurance from a third
party for a beneficiary, even when the fiduciary is not thereby unjustly
enriched, which is the traditional equitable justification for constructive
trusts. Id.
273. See, e.g., Popowski v. Parrot, 461 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 2006). Equitable
liens for constructive trust are permissible only when an agreement
establishes such right. For example for a plan in which the terms specified
reimbursement from funds received in a law suit, but not for other plan in
which the terms established the right to reimbursement without specifyinf the
source of funds.
274. No such relief was available to a spouse who could not identify a specific
res that was wrongfully received in Neidich v. Estate of Neidich, 222 F. Supp.
2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). But cf. Sereboff v. Mid-Atl. Med. Services, 126 S. Ct.
1869 (2006). The court held a constructive trust imposed using "the familiar
rule of equity that a contract to convey a specific object even before it is
acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title to the
thing," which arguably occurs with the wrongful recipients of the spouse's
benefits. However, there was no tracing of proceeds in that case, but rather a
decision by the parties to deposit the amount at dispute with the court. Id.;
see also David E. Morse, More Equitable Reflux Bright Line Needed for
Whether Fiduciary May Sue Participant, BENEFITS L. J. 1 (Autumn 2006)
(arguing that requirements for an identifiable res is not warranted).
275. Northcutt v. GM Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan, 467 F.3d 1031
(7th Cir. 2006).
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Finally, the spouse may also bring state law actions to recover
those benefits.276 It may, however, be argued that the collection of
plan benefits is at the core of ERISA and thus such state actions
are preempted by ERISA, in which case it is hard to preclude the
availability of some relief under ERISA.
The Treasury Regulations, which govern spousal consents,
pertain to the Code sections similar to ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1055,2 also govern those ERISA sections. However, those Code
sections278 and the accompanying regulations do not contain or
discuss the ERISA fiduciary duties, 79 nor do there appear to be
any pertinent advisory opinions by the United States Department
of Labor (the "DOL"), the agency usually responsible for rules
pertaining to fiduciary standards. ° Prudent fiduciaries must
balance two concerns. They must comply with two distinct ERISA
fiduciary mandates: (a) the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate, i.e.,
benefits must be paid in accord with the terms of the plan 8 ' and
(b) the expenses of administering the plan must be reasonable. 82
A plan remains liable for a spouse's survivor benefits, if its
fiduciaries act in accord with a beneficiary change without
receiving the spouse's consent in the required form. Such errors
are sufficiently common that the IRS recently modified its
Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System to permit plans
that wish to remain tax-qualified to correct such errors by giving
spouses the right to obtain the lump sum value of survivor annuity

276. See, e.g., Vilas v. Lyons, 702 F. Supp. 555 (D. Md. 1988). The court
suggested that although there was no relief under ERISA because the
fiduciaries behaved properly with respect to a waiver presented by a plan
participant, the spouse may be able to obtain relief from the participant's
estate or the recipients of the plan benefits under state law. However, the
basis for such claim was not pursuant to the plan terms but rather an
allegation that the participant had breached an agreement to pay the spouse
other assets in exchange for the consent. See generally, Akrom v. Polley, BP
Ret. Accumulation Plan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83954 (W.D. Pa.), dismissed,
Akrom v. Polley, BP Ret. Accumulation Plan, No. 06-705, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82176 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2006). The court held a spouse deprived of
spousal benefits, when her husband forged her signature and withdrew all his
plan benefits, had no claim to recover from her former husband, since there
was no diversity between the parties. However, the court did not consider the
existence of a federal claim against the participant under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). However, the Court, unlike the one
in Vilas, held that a specific state claim, one for forgery, should be considered
by a state court.
277. See Reorganization Plan Number 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978)
and 29 C.F.R. § 2570.200a-2 (2005).
278. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(11) and 417.
279. See Reorganization Plan Number 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978)
and 29 C.F.R. § 2570.200a-2.
280. Id.
281. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
282. ERISA § 403(c)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2000).
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benefits before the participant's death rather than having to wait
to begin receiving benefits until and only in the event that the
spouse becomes entitled to annuity benefits by surviving the
participant.m
However, it should be noted that the Spousal
Survivor Provisions apply whether or not the pension plan is taxqualified.
Pension plan fiduciaries would appear to have a relatively
simple obligation if a participant claims no consent is needed
because his or her spouse is dead or has abandoned him.2" It
seems advisable and relatively easy for the pension plan's
administrative staff to request and review the face of a death
certificate or an order of abandonment for the name and address of
the spouse. Exceptions may be made in the rare cases, such as the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. In such case, a
death certificate may not be readily available immediately after
the participant's death, although other reliable information may
be available.
Pension plan fiduciaries do not appear to have an obligation
to look beyond a statement of a participant sworn before a notary
that he is unmarried and thus no spousal consent is required,
unless they have reason to believe it may not be correct.
Conversely, as the court stated in Rice v. Rochester Laborers'
Annuity Fund,82 "the Plan's administrator cannot, however, ignore
obvious warning signs that suggest an obligation to inquire," such
as those described in that case. First, the standard plan form
which permitted the statutory spousal designation to be changed
by the participant was "ambiguous and contrary on its face.""'
283. Rev. Proc. 2006-27, 2006-22 I.R.B. 945, Appendix A 6.07(2). The IRS
operates this compliance program because pension plans must comply with
the consent requirement to qualify for favorable tax treatment. See generally
Kathryn Kennedy, EPCRS, 2006 Makeover: Are the Changes More Than
Cosmetic?, TAX MGMT. COM. PLANNING J. 1 (Aug. 4, 2006).
284. A spouse who has abandoned a spouse who passes away, like a spouse
who predeceases such spouse , has no right to an elective share of the deceased
spouse's estate. See, e.g., N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 5-1-2(a)(5). Similarly in states,
which base divorce on fault, a spouse who has been abandoned has a right to
divorce. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. art. 12.
285. 888 F. Supp. 494, 498 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
286. A similar but related breach of fiduciary responsibility claim would be
that the consent form was so poorly designed that a forgery of a spouse's
signature was facilitated. See, e.g., Akrom v. Polley, BP Ret. Accumulation
Plan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83954 (W.D. Pa. 2006), dismissed, Akrom v.

Polley, BP Ret. Accumulation Plan, No. 06-705, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82176
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2006). The spouse claimed that the benefit election form
was poorly designed and facilitated participant's forgery of her signature. The
participant was thus able to withdraw entire account balance without her
consent. The former spouse initially made a fiduciary breach claim, which the

court held was time-barred. The court did not permit the spouse to change the
claim to a benefit claim. If it had, the court could have discussed the form
design argument.
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The participant stated that he was unmarried and submitted a
consent which he claimed has been executed by his spouse.
Second, the spouse's attorney had sent a letter warning of the
possibility that the participant may submit a forged consent. The
court found it irrelevant that the notice was sent to the welfare
fund rather than the pension fund, because the funds shared the
287
same offices, telephone number and administrative manager.
The latter point suggests that there may be an obligation by the
plan administrator, particularly of a single employer plan, where
the pension plan administrator is often closely related to the
employer, to ask whether a participant's employment records are
consistent with a claim that a participant has no spouse. 218
Pension plan fiduciaries do not appear to have an obligation
to look into the circumstances of the execution of consent to give
up survivor benefits, unless they are put on notice that the consent
may not have been executed voluntarily. 88 In Vilas v. Lyons,29 ° the
court stated:
The intent of Congress as described in the very words of the Act is to
insulate plans under the act from liability if the spousal waiver that
is relied on conforms to the requirements of § 1055(c)(2). In the
absence of actual knowledge of fraud or coercion in the inducement
or actual knowledge of invalidity, the plan administrator may rely

on a waiver that conforms on its face, and he will not, by doing so,
expose himself or the plan to liability for relying on it. This is so
even if the waiver turns out in fact to be invalid. Congress intended
with good reason to permit plans and their administrators to rely on
such waivers much as a holder in due course may rely on a note duly
negotiated to him.n1

In that case, unlike Rice v. Rochester Laborers'Annuity Fund,
there were no allegations of such knowledge by the plan
fiduciaries. Thus, the court held that the spouse had no recourse
against the plan, which had distributed to the participant the
287. However, in this case the distinction may have been moot because the
pension plan administrator admitted receiving the attorney's notice in his
capacity as pension plan administrator.
288. The court's discussion of the reasons for its decision mentioned the close
ties between two plans but not the admission that the pension plan
administrator actually received the notice.
289. Plan fiduciaries may reduce this obligation by refusing to have their
representatives witness the execution of the consent so they have no
information about the circumstances of the execution unless someone takes
the initiative and puts the fiduciaries on notice that those circumstances need
to be reviewed. In such case, the fiduciary would have an obligation to look
into the circumstances. However, if a question is not raised until after a plan
fiduciary is paying the participant an annuity, the plan and its fiduciaries
would only have a prospective concern, assuming they had previously fulfilled
their fiduciary duties with respect to the consent.
290. 702 F. Supp. 555, 559 (D. Md. 1988).
291. Id. (emphasis added).
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balance of the participant's account, on the basis of what appeared
to spousal consent to the distribution. Plans have a duty to
investigate claims of a fraudulent signature.2" Similarly, a plan
could not base a decision to disregard a spouse's claim of a forged
consent on the spouse's failure to obtain a court order finding that
there was such a forgery. 3 On the other hand, a court upheld the
denial of a spouse's claim for survivor benefits that rested solely
upon an unsupported assertion that the consent was forged.294
Finally, a court denied summary judgment in a case in which a
widow claimed that the participant and plan fiduciary had (a)
exercised undue influence on the widow, and (b) concealed parts of
the consent from her.29
Pension plan fiduciaries appear to have an obligation to look
beyond a statement that no spousal consent is required because
the participant cannot locate his spouse. The court held in Lester
v.
Reagan Equipment CO. Profit-Sharing Plan that plan
fiduciaries did not fulfill their responsibilities by concluding that a
spouse could not be located by simply looking at a notarized
statement by the participant which also gave an address and
phone number that the participant had used to contact her. 96 The
court distinguished Vilas,297 which held that the fiduciaries
satisfied their duty if a consent were valid on its face, unless they
have knowledge to the contrary because in such case the issue was
whether the spouse has executed the consent. By contrast, the
issue in Lester was the validity of the participant's statement that
he could not locate his spouse. Thus, at a minimum the plan was
required to question the participant about his attempts to locate
his spouse, and perhaps should have tried to contact the spouse.298
There is more ambiguity about a plan fiduciary's
responsibility if the participant claims he or she needs no spousal
consent to complete a beneficiary designation because of the
existence of an order of a separation or marital dissolution. First,
292. Lombardo v. United Technologies, Inc., No. 3:95CV02353 (WWE), 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7651 (D. Conn. May 7, 1997).
293. Grodesky v. Lucent Technologies, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1042 (N.D. Ill.
2003). The court stated that such an order would require a court to review the
consent, which was the initial responsibility of the plan under the exhaustion
doctrine applicable to benefit claims. Id.
294. Shields v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 331 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2003).
295. Neidich v. Estate of Neidich, 222 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
296. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12872, No. 91-2946 § N (E.D. La. Aug. 19., 1992).
The plan distributed more than a $110,000 from a pension plan to the
participant after receiving such statement. Id.
297. 702 F. Supp. 555 (D. Md. 1988).
298. See Cobb, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21476. The Court observed that, prior
to the enactment of REACT, plans had no duty to treat spouses of participants
as beneficiaries. Under those conditions, plan fiduciaries seemed to have had

no duty to ask for anything more than the sworn statement provided by the
participant that there was no spouse. Id.
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such orders, which often deal with multiple issues, require far
more review than consents, death certificates, orders of
abandonment or statements of inability to locate a spouse, which
usually deal with only a single issue. Second, unlike those
documents, such orders may, but need not, also serve as statutory
beneficiary designations known as QDROs, infra. Third, ERISA
places the responsibility for the presentation, defense and
amendment of QDROs orders on the intended designees rather
than the participant, infra. However, the participant is generally
the one informing the plan of the divorce or separation when he or
she claims the ERISA Marital Survivor Beneficiary Designation is
inapplicable without presenting a spousal consent. Finally, there
appears to be no case law on this issue.
It appears that the fiduciaries' obligations are at least as
extensive as those applicable to a participant claiming he or she
has no spouse because of death or abandonment. As with a death
certificate or order of abandonment, it does not suffice to get a
statement of the existence of a domestic relations order from the
It seems advisable and
participant sworn before a notary.
relatively easy for the pension plan's administrative staff to
request the participant to provide a certification from the court of
entry of such order and the continued viability of such order. The
plan staff may review the face of the certificate to verify the
parties, date of entry and the description of the order. If those are
satisfactory, it would appear reasonable for the fiduciaries to
determine that the statutory beneficiary right for the spouse has
been thereby extinguished.
It would appear that the plan fiduciaries do not generally
need to request the participant to provide the actual order because
they do not have a responsibility to review the order to determine
if the order is a QDRO (that is, a statutory beneficiary designation,
as discussed in this Article). Conducting such reviews as a matter
of course may cause the plan to incur significant costs because
domestic relations orders often do not satisfy the statutory
requirements, although the plan may be able to suggest how the
order may be able to be amended to become a QDRO. 99 Rather, it
299. But see, e.g., Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 428 F.3d 478 (3d Cir.
2005), cert. den'd, 126 S. Ct. 2304 (2006). The reported customary ExxonMobil
response to news of a participant's divorce is to prevent participants from
receiving plan benefits until the earlier of the (a) the date the divorce decree is
presented, or (b) eighteen months (this period is derived from the QDRO rules
regarding plan liability) have passed. The fact pattern was odd because the
news of the divorce was given by the participant, who expressed no interest in
changing a benefit designation and had not requested any plan benefits even
though he was retired. The former spouse's claim for survivor benefits, which
was based upon the domestic relations order rather than the Spousal Survivor
Designation, was so controversial that it was appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Id.
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seems advisable to let any person who claims such benefits to
initiate such review by presenting the plan fiduciaries with the
order with the expectation that such party is prepared to seek to
have the order amended if necessary.
There is a relatively low cost general policy that a plan
fiduciary may adopt if he or she believes that it is not prudent to
disregard the risk of a person coming forward to claim survivor
benefits after (1) a domestic relations order has been issued; (2) a
participant has revoked the statutory beneficiary designation in
favor of his spouse without the consent of his or her apparent
spouse; and (3) the plan has paid out those benefits to the
participant or another person. A letter of the following form could
be sent to a participant's spouse or former spouse.
We administer the ... Pension Plan. P (identify the participant}
has (1) stated that an order of separation for divorce) has been
issued to you and P; and (2) instructed us to remove you as the
beneficiary of the death benefits that the __ Pension Plan will pay
if P dies before you.
If we do not receive written notice from you within thirty (30) days
of the above date of this letter that (1) no order of separation (or
divorce) is in effect; or (2) the order that is in effect gives you the
right to survivor benefits under __ Pension Plan, we will assume
that P may now remove you as the beneficiary of P's death benefits
under the
Pension Plan.
The plan would suspend any benefit change and survivor
benefit payments until the expiration of the above thirty-day
period plus a reasonable period to resolve any challenge that may
arise as a result from the letter. Under this procedure the plan
fiduciaries would not have to review the terms of the underlying
separation or divorce order except in the unlikely event there was
a challenge, which prudent plan fiduciaries would prefer to be
raised and resolved as soon as possible. Moreover, the spouse or
former spouse would have the opportunity to show that the order
presented to the plan had not been issued or had been
superseded.3 0 The letter does not preclude the spouse or former
spouse from challenging the participant's designation after the
thirty days, but by notifying the spouse or former spouse of the
plan's intentions to follow the participant's benefit designation, the
fiduciaries may safeguard the plan from the risk of having to pay
survivor benefits to both the unauthorized designee and the
participant's spouse or former spouse.

300. While this may occur with an order of abandonment, it would appear to
be so unlikely that fiduciaries can probably disregard this possibility when a
participant claims to have been abandoned by his spouse. But see discussion
of Rice, supra, with respect to possible warning signs about such a submission.

2007]

Who Is Entitled to Survivor Benefits from ERISA Plans?

973

This proposed notice is far less extensive than the one
required by statute to be given by medical benefit plan
fiduciaries"' who wish to terminate coverage for a person when
such plan fiduciaries have been notified of an order of separation
On the other hand, many
or divorce issued to a participant."
plans may not provide the systematic notices described above
because their fiduciaries have decided that the costs of those
notices substantially exceed the costs that the plan may incur with
respect to what they estimate is the minuscule group of
participants who will improperly report an order of separation or
dissolution. The latter conclusion may be reasonable in view of
the apparent lack of reported litigation with respect to such
challenges.
C. ERISA MaritalSurvivor Beneficiary Designations,the
Anti-Alienation Prohibitionand TraditionalDomestic
Relations Principles
A consent by the spouse to waive his or her survivor rights
that complies with the statutory standards will permit the
participant to designate another person to be entitled to those
benefits.3 3 Thus, in concert with the participant's designation, it
forms a classical alienation of the spouse's statutory benefit
interest in the pension plan." 4 Nevertheless, those transactions
are effective even though not explicitly exempt from the AntiAlienation Prohibition. As the Supreme Court stated in Guidry, °5
when it held that the Anti-Alienation Prohibition superseded the
general remedy section of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959:
It is an elementary tenet of statutory construction that "where there
is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be

301. These fiduciaries may, but need not coincide with the fiduciaries of the
pension plan covering the same participant. However, even if they are the
same, a person acting as a fiduciary of one plan is required to act solely on
behalf of such plan under ERISA § 404(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), and thus
may have no obligation to inform the other plan of his knowledge of the
participant's divorce or separation.
302. More disclosure is needed in such case because the spouse usually has
to pay premiums to obtain continued coverage, known as COBRA coverage.
See generally ERISA §§ 601-09; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-69 (2000).
303. The consent may either permit the participant to name a specified party
or any party. ERISA § 205(c)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(A) (2000).
304. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) provides that an assignment or
alienation includes: "Any direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable or
irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a right
or interest enforceable against the plan in,or to, all or any part of a plan
benefit payment which is, or may become payable to the participant or
beneficiary." Id.
305. 493 U.S. 365, 377 (1990).
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controlled or nullified by a general one."3
The ERISA survivor benefit rights of a participant's spouse
resemble but may substantially differ from those that would
otherwise be available to a spouse under community property
state laws or other domestic relations laws. None of the REACT
congressional committee reports mention any of these similarities
or distinctions or why the QJSA requires a survivor annuity of at
least fifty percent of the annuity paid during the joint lives of the
participant and the spouse, rather than a smaller or larger
percentage.
Nor do any of the ERISA Congressional reports,
mention why the default joint and survivor annuity initially
required by ERISA allocated the spouse the same minimal fifty
percent interest. It may have been the simple common sense
notion that the surviving spouse will require at least half the
support that a married couple requires. Thus, it is reasonable to
require that the spouse be provided with an annuity of at least
half of the amount, which was paid to the spouse and participant
during their joint lives.
The Spousal Survivor Provision computation of a spouse's
survivor benefits is simplified by disregarding two customary
The
features of domestic relations laws and property laws.
survivor benefits are not affected by the portion of the pension
which accrued before rather than during the marriage as there is
no distinction between marital property and non-marital
property. 3°7 Nor are the spouse's survivor rights affected by the
value of the non-pension assets, if any, that the participant
otherwise gives the spouse; there is no attempt to make an
equitable distribution of the assets of the participant and the
spouse. 3°" These simplifying assumptions are consistent with the
Congressional goal that ERISA encourage the maintenance and
establishment of employee benefit plans by avoiding the
imposition of any unnecessary administration burdens on those
operating ERISA plans, such as would occur by requiring an
investigation of documents other than the plan documents or the
use of information not customarily part of the sponsor's
employment records.3°9
306. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974).
307. See, e.g., Heather Rose, Comment, Boggs v. Boggs: Creating Real-life
Cinderellas, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 271 (1999), which is quite critical of the
statutory allocation that she analogizes to the interests acquired by
Cinderella's step-mother.
308. But cf N.Y. EPTL § 5-1.1-A(b)(1)(G) which provides surviving spouses
with the right to elect to receive an equitable portion of the deceased spouse's
property and includes ERISA pension assets in this calculation. See generally
Donald Partland, Calculating the Value of Qualified-Plan Benefits in
Determining the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share, NYSBA TRUSTS AND
ESTATES LAW SECTION NEWSLETTER Fall 2005, 10 (Vol. 38 No. 3).
309. See, e.g., Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (noting that Congress
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Finally, REACT does not give spouses a devisable interest in
the participant's pension benefits if the spouse predeceases the
participant."' This treatment is consistent with the ERISA aim of
protecting retirement benefits, or lifetime benefits, of the
participant and the participant's beneficiaries. "
VI. ERISA PENSION BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS FOR SPOUSES,
FORMER SPOUSES, CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OF
PARTICIPANTS

ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3), (the "QDRO
Provisions") requires pension plans to recognize beneficiary
designations of spouses, former spouses, children 31 '2 and
dependents 31 3 of participants in accord with the terms of specified
state domestic relations orders, which are called qualified
domestic relations orders ("QDROs").'1 Such designees are called
Alternate payees are treated as plan
"alternate payees. 15
These extensive
beneficiaries for all ERISA purposes.316
beneficiary rights are not given to persons entitled to mere offsets
against the participant's benefits, such as with (a) a voluntary and
revocable assignment of a benefit payment, or (b) pursuant to a
court order pertaining to wrongdoing by the participant against
the plan." 7

wished to protect employee benefits without creating a system so complex that
administrative costs will discourage employers from offering employer benefit
plans).
310. See e.g., Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851-52 (Supreme Court rejecting children's
claim that their mother could devise a share of the participant's pension
benefits when the mother predeceased her husband, the participant).
311. See id.; ERISA § 2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
312. The children appear to be the participant's children rather than the
spouse's children unless those children have been adopted by the participant.
313. The dependents appear in most cases to be the children of the spouse or
former spouse of a participant. They need not have been adopted by the
participant although the participant supported or is supporting them. There
are no requirements that dependents need to be minors or children. See, e.g.,
Owens v. Auto. Machinists Pension Trust, No. C06-943Z, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7797 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2007) (holding that the participant's adult
companion qualified).
314. See generally, Joan Casilio Adams, Hot Tips: Retirement and Deferred
Benefits: Discovery, Agreements, Proof and QDROs, NYSBA FAMILY LAW
SECTION MEETING (January 27, 2007) [hereinafter QDROs & FAMILY LAW];
Gary Shulman, THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HANDBOOK ch. 5
(3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter QDRO HANDBOOK]; Jayne E. Zangelein & Susan J.
Stabile, ERISA LITIGATION 885-902 (2d. ed 2005 and 2006 Supp.).
315. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(K); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K) (2000).
316. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(J); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(J) (2000).
317. Both these offsets are set forth as exceptions from the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition, but not as beneficiary designations, in the same statute that
contains the prohibition. ERISA § 206(d)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (2000);
ERISA § 206(d)(4); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4) (2000).
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No regulations discuss the terms of permissible QDROs or the
manner by which plans must process QDROs. 18 An Internal
Revenue Service Notice ("IRS QDRO Guide"), however, discusses
and presents sample language for QDROs pursuant to a
congressional mandate, but disclaims any intention to interpret
the statutory requirements." 9 The DOL maintains an online
publication devoted to many of those statutory issues, which is
entitled "QDROs; the Division of Pensions Through Qualified
Domestics Relations Orders, and Errata"32 ° herein designated as
This publication is of uncertain
the "DOL QDRO Guide."
precedential value. The DOL QDRO Guide contains the IRS
QDRO Guide and many DOL Advisory Opinions for which only the
individual parties described in the opinion may rely.32"' Moreover,
the PBGC has also prepared a publication, which was last revised
in October 2006 and is entitled "Qualified Domestic Relations
Orders & PBGC," ("PBGC DOL Guide") presenting sample QDRO
language, which are also of uncertain precedential value.322 All the
publications observe that an alternate payee's interest may have
two distinct interests. First, there is an interest in retirement
benefits, which is associated with the participant's life interest.
This interest may differ from the payee's interest in the
participant's survivor benefits.
Welfare plans, including life insurance plans, and pension
plans2 that are exempt from the requirements of Part 2 of
Subtitle B of Title I of ERISA for survivor benefits for spouses are
also exempt for the same reason from this pension benefit
ERISA § 206(d)(3)(L), 29 U.S.C.
designation mandate. 24
§ 1056(d)(3)(L) confirms these exclusions by stating that the
QDRO Provisions "do [es] not apply to any plan to which paragraph

318. But see Interim Final Rule Relating to Time and Order of Issuance of
Domestic Relations Orders, 72 Fed. Reg. 10070 (March 7, 2007).
319. IRS Notice 97-11, 1997-1 C.B. 379 [hereinafter IRS QDRO GUIDE]. The
notice was released in response to the requirement of Section 1457(a)(2) of the
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, P.L. 104-188. The Notice reports
that the DOL advised the IRS that the discussion and language are consistent
with the DOL views.
320. U.S. DEP'T LABOR, PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., QDROS;
THE DIVISION OF PENSIONS THROUGH QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS

ORDERS (1997) [hereinafter D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE], available at http://www.
dol.gov/ebsa/publications/qdroerratasheet.html.
321. According to Section 10 of the ERISA Procedure 76-1, 41 F.R. 36281
(Aug. 27, 1976).
322. QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS & PBGC (2006) [hereinafter

PBGC DOL GUIDE]. The Sample Orders are similar to those in the IRS QDRO
Guide, but this publication emphasizes that a QDRO may not require the
PBGC to pay alternate payees more than the PBGC guaranteed benefits.
323. Top-hat plans, excess benefit plans, and retirement plans in which all
accounts are maintained as IRAs are thus exempt.
324. ERISA § 201; 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2000).
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[206(d)](1) does not apply." Paragraph 206(d)(1) is the general
anti-alienation prohibition, which, as described, only applies to the
ERISA pension plans not otherwise exempt. Subsection (d)(3)(L)
was enacted together with a similar addition to the corresponding
tax-qualification Code Section... as part of Section 1898 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986,326 which is entitled "Technical Corrections to
the Retirement Equity Act." The two provisions were intended to
"clarif[y] that the qualified domestic relations provisions do not
apply to any plan to wniich the assignment or alienation
restrictions do not apply." 27
A. Domestic Relations Orders That May Be Marital
DissolutionBenefit DesignationsCalled Qualified
Domestic Relations Orders ("QDROs")
Domestic relations orders ("DROs") for the purposes of the
QDRO Provisions are defined as328 (1) any judgment, decree, or
order (including approval of a property settlement agreement),
which (2) is made pursuant to a state domestic relations law
(including a community property law), and (3) relates to the
provision of child support, alimony payments or marital property
rights to a spouse, former spouse, children or other dependent of
the participant. A DRO does not have to arise from a marriage,
but may arise from a relationship that is treated like a marriage
under domestic relations, such as a couple living together for
thirty years who were not legally married in which the
participant's companion was a dependent of the participant.2
DROs are not restricted to those that are part of the process of
obtaining support, a marital dissolution or separation agreement,
but include any judgment, decree or order, which "relates to" such
matters, such as a judgment to collect unpaid alimony from a
participant's pension benefits." ° The DOL explained the "relates
325. I.R.C. § 4 14 (p)(9).
326. Section 1898(c)(4) of Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2948 (1986).
327. S.REP. NO. 99-313 (May 29, 1986). The final bill made no change to
this section other than changing the section number from 1897(c) to 1898(c).
Nor was any change made in the explanation. H.R. REP. No. 99-514, 99th
Cong. 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4941.
328. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2000).
329. Owens, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7797. Such a companion was found
entitled under a QDRO to fifty percent of the annuity benefits the participant
was receiving from an ERISA pension plan.
330. See In re Marriage of Thomas, 789 N.E.2d 821 (2003); Trustees of the
Dir. Guild of America v. Tise, 255 F.3d 66 (9th Cir. 2000); Hopkins v. AT&T
Global Info., 105 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 1997). In each case, QDROs were sought
when participant failed to pay support obligations under a divorce, even
though those payments were not originally due from pension plans. The first
decision describes several similar state holdings. But cf DeSantis v. DeSantis,
714 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (asserting that state law may not,
however, permit QDROs to be obtained in such circumstances). In Florida, an
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to" phrase and the reference to "a community property law" in the
DRO definition by stating that:
An order issued in a probate proceeding begun after the death of the
participant that purports to recognize an interest with respect to
pension benefits arising solely under state community property law,
but that doesn't relate to the dissolution of a marriage or recognition
of support obligations, is not a QDRO because the proceeding does
not relate to a legal separation, marital dissolution, or family
support obligation. 3 '
The DOL footnoted a reference in this section to Boggs in
which the Supreme Court had held that ERISA preempted a
probate order issued after the death of the former spouse
attempting to devise her community property interest in the
participant's pension interest. In such case, the order had nothing
to do with a marital dissolution, provision of support or alimonythe parties had been married at the time of the spouse's death."
The DOL principles were illustrated when the Fifth Circuit
held, before the issue of the DOL QDRO Guide, in Bailey v. Board
of Trustees of the New Orleans Steamship Ass'n/ ILA Pension
Trust Fund that a probate order giving a former spouse rights to
part of the deceased participant's survivor benefits based on her
community property rights could be both a DRO and a QDRO."3
The participant retired in 1988, passed away in 1990, and the
spouse sought her QDRO in 1995. The probate order stemmed
from the marital dissolution in 1972 prior to the enactment of
ERISA or REACT and presumably many years before the
participant was eligible to receive pension benefits. These two
reasons may explain why she did not seek to enforce her rights at
the time of the marital dissolution. The court, however, did not
discuss the extent to which the community property interests of
the former spouse were considered as part of the divorce and thus
the degree to which it related back to the divorce.3 4
enforcement action is treated as an inappropriate reopening of the divorce
decree. The only enforcement mechanisms available are those available to an
ordinary creditor, who does not have the right to obtain a DRO. Thus, a
former spouse may not access the pension assets of the participant-debtor in
such states under this interpretation. See generally, Comment Letter of N.Y.
City Bar Association 6 (May 7, 2007) (pertaining to Interim Rule Relating to
Time and Order of Issuance of Domestic Relations Orders, available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/Glover050707.pdf).
331. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 1-8, at 7-8; D.O.L. Advisory
Opinion, at 90-46A.
332. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
333. Bailey v. Bd. of Trustees of the New Orleans Steamship Ass'n/ILA
Pension Trust Fund, No. 95-2091, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231 (E.D. La. Jan. 9,
1996), affd, 100 F.3d 28 (5th Cir. 1996).
334. The Bailey decision rested on the district court decision Boggs, 849 F.
Supp. 462, 464 (E.D. La. 1994), that a spouse had a community property
interest in the participant's undistributed pension benefits. The Supreme
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The same circuit, however, later held in Rivers v. Central &
Southwest Corp., that when the pre-ERISA divorce settlement
agreement included no mention of the former spouse's community
property interest in a pension plan, the former spouse could not
obtain a QDRO which would give her a right to survivor benefits
which were then being paid to the participant's widow.33
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Branco v. UFCW Northern
California Employers Joint Pension Plan improperly held, after

the issue of the DOL QDRO Guide, that an order issued in a
probate proceeding in which the estate of the former spouse was
trying to collect a pension obligation relating to the marital
dissolution could not be a QDRO.336 Reference was made to the
same two Supreme Court cases that the DOL had referenced:
Egelhoff,337 which didn't consider whether an order was a QDRO,
and Boggs,3 which presumed without discussion that the order
issued in a probate proceeding after the death of the participant's
spouse was not a QDRO and held that ERISA preempted such a
non-QDRO. The court also referred to a prior Ninth Circuit
holding 339 that the "death of the spouse 'divests her of the title of
'spouse or other dependent,' thereby rendering her an unqualified
recipient under ERISA." That case was easily distinguishable.
The cited case was similar to DOL Advisory Opinion 90-46A,
which had been footnoted by the DOL in the excerpt discussed
above. In both those cases the estate of a spouse claimed a
community property interest in the participant's pension benefits,
but such claim did not relate to a marital dissolution or claim for
support or alimony. By contrast in Branco the estate claim was
based on an award of a percentage of the participant's pension
payments in a marital dissolution, which award had been made
before any pension benefits were available for distribution.340
Court overturned that finding when it presumed that the order was not a
QDRO. By contrast, in Bailey, the Court presumed the order at issue was a
QDRO. If so, the order may divide marital property if those rights arise from
community property. However, if the order is not a QDRO the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition preempts such order as discussed in Boggs.
335. 186 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1999). See also discussion of the survivor rights
of a participant's former and existing spouse, infra.
336. Branco v. UFCW N. Cal. Employers Joint Pension Plan, 279 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2002). The Court made no mention of the QDRO Guide.
337. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
338. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
339. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1991).
340. Branco, 279 F.3d at 1160 (dissenting opinion); cf. Eller v. Bolton, 895
A.2d 382 (Md. 2004) (holding that a DRO would become an effective QDRO if
the alternate payee were changed from the estate of former spouse to the
former spouse who is an eligible alternate payee); Divich v. Divich, 665
N.W.2d 109 (2003) (explaining the a QDRO could give the estate of the former
spouse her interest in participant's pension plans in event she didn't survive

him).
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B. Standardsfor a Domestic Relations Order ("DRO")
to Be a QDRO
A QDRO is a DRO that meets specified standards3 4 First, a
QDRO must create or recognize the existence of an alternate
payee's right to, or assign to, an alternate payee the right to
receive all or a portion of the benefits "payable with respect to a
participant under a plan."" 2 A QDRO becomes part of the pension
plan. 3 and makes the alternate payee a beneficiary under the
plan.344 Thus, the right to receive benefits in the definition must
refer to the right to receive benefits from the pension plan.
"Benefit payable with respect to a participant under a plan" is
broader than the phrase "benefits payable to a participant under a
plan." The former also includes benefits payable to a survivor.
Thus, a QDRO may determine the entitlement of benefits
otherwise payable to the participant or a participant's
beneficiaries.
A QDRO may not override the rights of an alternate payee
under a prior QDRO." 5 However, a QDRO may be amended to
increase or reduce the rights of the alternate payee or payees for
whom it was originally issued. 4 The rights of an alternate payee
pursuant to the QDRO may not otherwise be reduced. The AntiAlienation Prohibition would prevent any assignment of those
rights to any other person."'
General waivers in DROs of a participant's property or even
general pension rights may not be QDROs. The order, judgment
or decree must explicitly inform the participant and the court
issuing the QDRO of the pension benefits that the participant will
thereby surrender the right to receive or designate. In particular,
the plan and alternate payee or payees must be clearly identified,
the period or number of payments must be specified, and the
amount or percentage of benefits allocated to each alternate payee

341. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
342. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i)(II); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2000).
343. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2000).
344. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(J); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(J) (2000).
345. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(iii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(iii) (2000).
346. See Interim Final Rule Relating to Time and Order of Issuance of
Domestic Relations Orders, 72 FR 10070 (March 7, 2007) (issued pursuant to
Section 1001 of the PPA of 2006); see also D.O.L. Advisory Opinion 2004-02A.
A divorced spouse may agree to modify a QDRO under which he or she
received payments to reduce his or her payments. However, if the pension plan
does not segregate the amounts in question, while the determination of
whether the DRO is a QDRO is being made the plan has no obligation to make

retroactive payments to the participant and no authority to reduce future
payments to the former spouse to recover such amounts.
347. A former spouse who is designated as the beneficiary of the Spousal
Survivor Benefits, may, however, consent to an election by the participant to
designate another person to receive the participant's survivor benefits, infra.
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must be specified.348 A QDRO thus may specify that an alternate
payee is entitled to a fraction of or a dollar amount of the
participant's benefit payments or the survivor benefit payments,
which payments may also be limited in time or in number. These
requirements make it difficult for a plan to pay the wrong benefits
in good349faith to the wrong person when it has been given a
QDRO.
However, there is no explicit statutory requirement that the
pension plan make any disclosure to the participant's spouse, who
may be considering whether to prepare a QDRO. There is no
requirement similar to the extensive disclosure of the relative
values of various benefit options that must be made to a married
participant, who may elect with his or her spouse's consent to
choose a benefit option other than the QJSA35 ° or to any
participant who has a number of distribution options to choose
from.351 The plan may, however, have an obligation to provide a
spouse with such information on request. 512 Moreover, even if not
required the Plan may wish to provide such information so that
plan resources don't have to be expended on poorly prepared draft
QDROs.5 The participant's attorney and the court that issues the
DRO will presumably consider those benefit option values if they
are explicitly notified of the specific plan, potential beneficiaries
and allocated benefits when the order, judgment or decree is
drafted and reviewed.354
The QDRO Provisions prohibit QDROs from 55 "provid[ing]
any type or form of benefit, or option, not otherwise provided
under the plan." This is consistent with the statutory purpose for
the QDRO Provisions as stated by the Supreme Court:

348. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C) (2000).
349. See, e.g., Hawkins v. C.I.R., 86 F.3d 982, 991 (10th Cir. 1996); Metrop.
Life Ins. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 1994); Carland v. Metrop.
Life, 935 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991).
350. See id. at n.54.
351. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(2) (2005).
352. Spouses who are entitled to benefits under the Spousal Survivor
Provisions are already entitled to considerable plan information because they
are beneficiaries. See, e.g., ERISA §§ 101, 102, 104; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1022,
1024 (applying to both participants and beneficiaries).
353. Even if the person requesting plan data is not a spouse with beneficiary
rights but another potential alternate payee, such as a child, is seeking such
information, it is advisable for the plan to provide such information and
thereby make the process of obtaining a QDRO much more efficient if the
requester shows the request is being made in connection with a domestic
relations proceeding. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 2-1.
354. See Majauskas v. Majauskas, 463 N.E.2d 15 (1984) (providing an
example of the formula used in New York to allocate pension benefits). But
see QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 314 (arguing that attorneys and their
clients often incorrectly value benefits and benefit options).
355. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i) (2000).
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The QDRO provisions protect those persons who, often as a result of
divorce, might not receive the benefits they otherwise would have
had available during their retirement as a means of income.6
This prohibition prevents QDROs from providing either (a)
payment options not otherwise permitted under the terms of the
plan, such as lump sums under those traditional pension plans
which only provide lifetime annuity benefits, or (b) benefit
elections not otherwise permitted under the terms of the plan,
such as retroactive investment, beneficiary or benefit form
selections."'
This prohibition does not prevent correction payments such as
one by a plan which pays only single lump sum payments, but
whose fiduciaries subsequently learn that the original payment,
whether made under a QDRO or otherwise, was too small and
then become obligated to make a correction payment."u Nor does
it prevent a former spouse from retaining survivor spousal rights
after a marital dissolution." 9 Furthermore, if the plan's only
survivor benefit is provided under the Spousal Survivor
Provisions, only a former spouse or current spouse may obtain
such benefits under a QDRO.6 ° Thus, a QDRO may not entitle the
participant's children or other dependents to those survivor
356. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854 (emphasis added).
357. The effectiveness of QDROs issued on a nunc pro tunc basis to overcome
election timing issues is discussed, infra.
358. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 167 F.3d 880 (4th Cir. 1999).
359. Retaining spousal benefit rights after a marital dissolution may be
considered as within the terms "creates" or "recognizes" an alternate payee's
benefit rights that are part of a definition of a QDRO. See also Part I.E.; IRS
QDRO GUIDE, supra note 319, at Appendix A. In D.O.L. Advisory Opinion
2000-09A, the DOL held that a QDRO may give a former spouse an
entitlement to survivor benefits the plan limits to the participant's spouse,
minor or parents. The DOL relied on the provision that QDROs apply to
"benefits with respect to a participant" rather than merely "the benefits
payable to the participant." Moreover, the DOL observed the former spouse
was eligible to the benefit prior to the divorce; thus, the QDRO was merely
permitting the benefit to continue after the divorce.
360. See D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Appendix D, at 97; IRS
Notice 97-11, Appendix E, 1997-2 I.R.B. 49 (Jan. 13, 1997). Under the plan
terms the benefit is not available to a child or dependent of the participant.
See also Hamilton v. Washington State Plumbing & Pipefitting Nat'l Pension
Fund, 433 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006) cert denied, 127 S.Ct. 86 (Oct. 2, 2006).
Children may not be designated the beneficiaries of a participant's spousal
survivor benefits under the terms of a QDRO. Thus, if children are designated
as the default beneficiaries in the event there is no spouse, a new spouse will
become entitled to the spousal survivor benefits.
The court, however,
suggested in dicta that the former spouse could have been awarded the
survivor benefits under a QDRO and then "transferred" her benefits to her
children. However, the court did not consider whether the Spousal Survivor
Provisions would permit such a transfer, although of course she could have
paid the annuity benefits she received from the plan to her children in such
case. Id.
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benefits. On the other hand, if the pension plan provides survivor
benefits in addition to those required by the Spousal Survivor
Provisions, a child or dependent may be designated as a
beneficiary for those benefits under a QDRO.
C. The ERISA Marital DissolutionBeneficiary DesignationMay
Provide the Beneficiary with Either a Shared or a Separate
Interest in the Benefits Payable with Respect to a Participant

The DOL QDRO Guide, the IRS Guide and the PBGC Guide
provide that the benefits payable with respect to a participant may
be (1) shared with an alternate payee (or payees), so that the
payee obtains a fraction of the payments, which would otherwise
be made to the participant at the time the participant chooses to
have payments made, or (2) be split into separate interests so that
the alternate payee may independently decide the form and timing
of the payments." 1 If the alternate payee does not choose to
simply obtain all or a portion of the surviving spouse benefits, as
discussed, supra, survivor benefits, may have to be accounted for
separately in each case." 2
Thus, payments during the
participant's life may go entirely to the alternate payee, while the
survivor benefits go to another person, such as a later spouse.363
A separate interest other than those in survivor benefits
would appear to violate the prohibition on QDROs requiring "any
type or form of benefit, or option, not otherwise provided under the
plan."3" Pension benefit plans generally permit only participants
to make elections with respect to survivor benefits, and then only
with respect to distribution options and with spousal consent.
361. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 3-3, at 29-31; see also Part
I.C.3; IRS QDRO GUIDE, supra note 319, at Appendix A; PBGC DOL GUIDE,
supra note 322, at 4.
362. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 3-5; QDROs & FAMILY LAW,
supra note 314, at 12; QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 314, at 6-7. The right to
a survivor interest is distinct from the right to share payments with the
participant. If the participant chose the maximum payments during his or her
lifetime he or she would receive a single life annuity and there would be no
survivor interest. Questions about the right to the survivor interest may also
arise with a separate interest, if the participant dies before the alternate
payee has selected the form of the separate interest. In such case, there may
be a question whether there is any interest survives for which a benefit
election may be made.
363. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(I) (2000); see, e.g.,
Hopkins v. AT&T Global Info., 105 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 1997). All lifetime
payments were awarded to the alternate payee to fund child support and
alimony but the current spouse was entitled to the survivor benefits.
364. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(I) (2000). Shared
payment arrangements do not violate this requirement because in those cases
the pension plan is providing the benefits the participant requested. All
benefits provided under the plan, other than spousal benefits, may be made to
alternate payees. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I)
(2000).
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Separate interests in which alternate payees make elections with
respect to benefits other than survivor benefits thus raise
questions about whether the benefits are otherwise provided by
the plan." 5 The DOL has stated that separate pension interests
are generally obtained before a participant chooses the form and
timing of payments without discussing whether separate interests
may always be obtained in such circumstances.3 66
The QDRO Provisions explicitly exempt separate interests
under specified circumstances from the requirement that a QDRO
may not require a benefit, or option not otherwise provided under
the plan.367 In particular, an alternate payee may become entitled
to payments in any form in which such benefits may be paid to the
participant (other than in the form of a joint and survivor annuity
with respect to the alternate payee and the payee's subsequent
spouse) 36 if on the date as of which the payments begin the
participant (a) has not separated from service,369 (b) is treated as if
he or she retired on such date, 370 and c) on such date the
participant was either (1) was entitled to such payments without
separating from service, or (2) had attained age fifty and would
have been entitled to those payments if the participant had
separated from service. 311
The separate interest may be all or part of the benefit accrued
as of the date payments are to begin.373 However, those payments
may not incorporate any early retirement subsidies.373 If the
pension plan makes lump sum payments available while the
participant is employed, as is often the case with a defined
contribution (DC) plan, the alternate payee may use a QDRO to
obtain part or all of the participant's account balance while the
participant is employed whether or not the participant decides to

365. The two other statutory exceptions to the Anti-Alienation Provisions
provide only shared payments, otherwise known as offsets. ERISA § 206(d)(2);
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (2000) (providing a revocable offsets to a third party of
benefit payments are permitted); ERISA § 206(d)(4); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)
(offseting to compensate the plan for fiduciary violations by a participantfiduciary).
366. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 3-3, at 29-31.
367. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E) (2000).
368. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E)(i)(III); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(III) (2000).
This provision, however, permits an alternate payee to obtain a joint and
survivor annuity if the survivor benefits are not provided to the alternate
payee's spouse.
369. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E)(i)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(I) (2000).
370. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E)(i)(II); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(II) (2000).
371. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E) (2000).
372. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E)(i)(II); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(II) (2000).;
ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)B)(i)(I) (2000).
373. Id. There is no such prohibition on early retirement subsidies when the
alternate payee shares payments with the participant. See, e.g., D.O.L. QDRO
GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 3-7, at 37-39.
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take a plan distribution. No age requirement need be satisfied
because the participant is entitled to the distribution before
separating from service. If the pension plan provides only the
traditional pension benefits from a defined benefit (DB) plan
(lifetime annuity benefits plus the survivor benefits required
under the Spousal Survivor Provisions) the payee may obtain part
or all of those annuity payments beginning before the participant's
actual retirement but after the participant had attained age fifty
and would have been entitled to annuity payments if he had
separated from service on such date. The alternate payee's
annuity, would, however, be based on the payee's lifetime rather
than the participant's lifetime." 4
ERISA does not explicitly exempt any other separate interests
(i.e., give an alternate payee the right to receive plan benefits even
though the participant has not elected to begin receiving benefits)
from the requirement that the alternate payee's benefit be
otherwise available under the plan. Thus, it would appear an
alternate payee may not otherwise obtain a separate interest. If
there were an implicit exception there would have been no need for
the explicit exemption."' In particular, separate interests would
not seem to be permissible when a participant has separated from
service but has not begun to receive pension benefits even though
the participant has a right to begin receiving those benefits."'
The legislative history sheds no light on the significance of
the separate interest requirement that the participant be
employed and not receiving pension plan payments. Congress
seemed to focus exclusively on the concern that QDROs could be
rendered meaningless if a participant could prevent alternate
payees from receiving benefits other than survivor benefits by
never terminating his or her employment. Congress apparently
did not consider whether the same could be done by a participant
who left the employer but chose not to begin to receive plan
374. The younger the annuitant, the greater the annuitant's 1 and number of
expected payments. Thus, the annual payments must be smaller to have the
same present value as an annuity with fewer expected payments.
375. The explicit exception ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)
(2000), which permits an alternate payee to receive plan benefits even though
the participant has not elected to begin receiving plan benefits, references no
such implicit provision.
376. This often occurs when an individual who leaves with a vested benefit
wishes to keep his pension funds invested in his or her former employer's plan
even after the individual becomes eligible to receive pension benefits. In
addition to favorable investment experience, the participant may also gain
cost of living increases or the benefits of actuarial adjustments for starting
payments later. Section 1102 of the PPA of 2006 encourages participants, who
are entitled to plan distributions, to keep his or her pension funds invested in
the plan by requiring plans to provide notice to individuals qualifying for plan
distributions of the "consequences of failing to defer" receipt of the
distributions.
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distributions.3 7' Thus, it appears that a QDRO may not apportion
separate benefits between the alternate payee or payees and a
participant who has separated from service for benefits payable
before the date, if any, the participant decides to begin receiving
his pension payments.378 Of course, the QDRO may provide such
an alternate payee or payees with the right to receive survivor
benefits otherwise available under the plan because such benefits
are presumably available under the plan.
If the pension plan lets the participant choose a variety of
benefits (including, but not necessarily limited to, the timing),
then a designation of a separate interest gives the alternate payee
the right to designate a portion of the participant's pension plan
benefits other than the participant's survivor benefits. Thus, such
QDROs often include not only the words "a separate interest," but
some reference to the payee's right to exercise benefit options:.
However, the QDRO provisions require that a QDRO describe "the
amount or percentage of the participant's benefits" to be paid to an
alternate payee,"' but do not explicitly require a QDRO to
distinguish between shared payments and a separate interest or
between survivor benefits and retirement benefits.381 Thus, there
may be a dispute about the significance of a designation, such as
"fifty percent of the participant's pension" for a DB plan that
377. H.R. REP. No. 98-655 Part I, 40 (April 5, 1984) (providing that a payee
can collect "regardless of whether the participant continues to work past the
early retirement age"); H.R. REP. No. 98-655 Part II, 19 (May 17, 1984); S.
REP. No. 98-575, 20 (August 6, 1984) (providing that a payee can collect
'whether or not the participant actually retires on that date"). None of the
Committee Reports mentioned a case where the participant was alive but not
working on the date the alternate payees wished payments to begin.
378. But see Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 428 F.3d 478, cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2304 (3d Cir. 2005) (the issue was not considered as the court held
that such a separate interest QDRO was created after participant had
separated from service but had not asked that plan benefits begin); Thomas,
789 N.E.2d at 832 (holding that a QDRO may provide an alternate payee "all
or a portion" of pension benefits under ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2000)). In both cases, the alternate payee did not need to
wait for the participant to request pension payments to begin from his former
employer's plan. There is no discussion how this is a form of payment
otherwise provided by the plan since it would appear that the plan only
permits participants to decide on timing of the payment. The separate
interest rules were inapplicable because the participant was no longer
employed by the plan sponsor. Id.
379. Separate interests, which do not provide such benefit options often
describe the timing of the payments, such as an annuity for the life of an
alternate payee beginning immediately, or as of the attainment of a certain
age.
380. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii).
381. Proposed draft language for both shared payments and separate
interests may, however, be found in the IRS QDRO Guide and the PBGC
Guide.
In both cases, retirement benefits and survivor benefits are
distinguishable.
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provides life annuities to participants and survivor benefits only to
surviving spouses. Is the intention to provide for a separate
interest or for shared payments? What is the intention about
survivor benefits? Is the designee entitled to (A) half of the
participant's payments (without any interest in the associated
survivor benefits), (B) half of the participant's payments plus half
of the survivor benefits if the participant began to receive plan
payments, (C) half of the participant's payments plus half of the
survivor benefits, whether or not the participant began to receive
plan payments, or (D) half of the benefits 8 payable with respect to
the participant (this would mean half of the value of the sum of
the participant's retirement benefits and the survivor benefits)?'
Plans thus sometimes reject DROs with these provisions and ask
for more clarity.'
The DOL has stated that shared payments are generally
sought when the participant is already receiving his retirement
benefits,385 so that neither the form nor the timing of the payments
may be changed under the plan terms.3" QDROs with shared
payments may also be prepared before the participant is receiving
any plan payments when there may be uncertainty as to the
payment's starting date or whether the participant will ever be
entitled to any plan payments. QDROs thus may also but need
not provide alternate payees with a portion of the participant's
survivor benefits.37 Pre-retirement survivor benefits are generally
determined by post-retirement survivor benefits.' Thus, if post382. This would refer to half of the value of the sum of the participant's
retirement benefits and the survivor benefits.
383. See, e.g., Files, 428 F.3d 478; Guzman v. Commonwealth Edison, No. 99
C 582, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18869 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 2000); Samaroo v.
Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1999). The latter two found the alternate
payee was entitled to no survivor benefits, but the former held the alternate
payee was entitled to her own separate interest including a survivor interest.
See also Payne v. GM/UAW Pension Plan, No. 95-CV-73554-DT, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7966 (E.D. Minn. May 7, 1996). In that case, however, the former
spouse was held to be entitled to all the survivor benefits even though the
divorce only gave her 45% of the participant's pension.
384. See, e.g., Stahl v. Exxon Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 657 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(rejecting a draft QDRO for not specifying benefit distribution when order
gave alternate payee: "50% of total funds in account of annuity plan on
specified date").
385. Lifetime pension benefits are sometimes described as retirement
benefits. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 3-1, at 27.
386. Id. at Q 3-3, 29-31. Some DC plans, however, may permit changes in
the timing and form of non-annuity payments, such as a fixed number of
payments, after the start of such payments. Some DB plans, however, permit
changes in annuity selection after the annuity payments have begun if an
individual's benefit payments are suspended because the individual returns to
work. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20 Q-A-10(d) (2005).
387. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 3-1, at 28.
388. See ERISA § 205(e); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e), (defining the required spousal
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retirement survivor benefits are not sought, pre-retirement
benefits will not be available. There is often a rational basis for an
alternate payee not seeking survivor benefits; the shared
participant's monthly annuity payments, which the QDRO splits,
will be larger if no or only some survivor benefits are funded.
Alternate payees often bring claims for survivor benefits if the
participant dies before the pension payments begin. 389
D. QDROs May Be PerfectedAfter the Participant'sDeath
But May Not Increase a Plan'sActuarial Costs
QDROs are prohibited from "increasing the plan's actuarial
costs for benefits"3 ° (the "Actuarial Cost Increase Prohibition").
This prohibition may apply only to separate interests because
shared payments, which split payments between the participant
and the alternate payee, do not affect the actuarial costs for
benefits, which are the present values of the expected costs of
those benefits.3 9' There is no exception for de minimis increases.
Actuarial costs may only be an issue with respect to those benefits
whose present value is determined by actuarial techniques (that
is,. by those techniques which use the expected lifetime of the
recipient or recipients to determine the pension plan's expected
payout). Such benefits are annuities over the life or lives of one or
more individuals, the standard form of benefit for DB plans,39 and
are provided by those DC plans required to provide spousal
survivor annuities.393 Even in those cases, the prohibition is
relevant only if the choice of a particular annuity" is at issue in
the proposed QDRO.
Gary Shulman, the author of the well-regarded QDRO
treatise, the QDRO Handbook, argues that the Actuarial Cost
Increase Prohibition prevents an alternate payee who receives a
separate interest in the "benefits payable with respect to a
participant under the plan" from obtaining a benefit form whose
pre-retirement survivor benefits in terms of the required retirement survivor
benefits).
389. See, e.g., Sanzo v. NYSA-ILA Pension Fund, No. 04-300 (WGB), 2005

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37572 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2005).
390. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii) (2000).
391. Actuarial costs depend on the expected lifetime or lifetimes and the

interest rate or rates used to value the stream of payments. Actuarial costs
may and often differ from the actual costs in individual cases. For example,
an individual's benefit will cost less than its actuarial cost if the individual's
actual lifetime is less than the expected lifetime, and cost more if his or her
lifetime exceeds expectations.
392. ERISA § 3(23); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (2000).

393. ERISA § 205(b); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b) (2000).
394. Pension annuities basically take three forms: (1) single life annuities;

(2) joint and survivor annuities; and (3) term certain annuities (which may be
single life or joint and survivor with the added feature that there is a
guarantee of a fixed number of payments).
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In particular,
present value exceeds that of the interest.395
Mr.Shulman asserts that the Actuarial Cost Prohibition prevents
a participant's former spouse who is given fifty percent of the
participant's interest with respect to a DB plan from receiving a
single life annuity with a present value that exceeds fifty percent
of the participant's interest. For example, the former spouse may
not receive a life annuity with the same annual payments to which
the participant is entitled under a life annuity starting the same
date when the former spouse is far younger than the participant
and may expect to collect substantially more payments than the
spouse. However, the QDRO Provisions permitting QDROs to
provide separate interests already require that such interest must
take into account only the present value of the participant's
accrued benefits as of the date the payments must begin.3 This
means the separate interest must be the actuarial equivalent of
the accrued benefits.397 Thus, the Actuarial Cost Increase
Prohibition is not needed to prevent such a disparity and must
have a different function.
The prohibition on a benefit or option not otherwise provided
by the plan39 is distinct from the Actuarial Cost Increase
Prohibition.3" As stated in the Senate and House Reports9 0
accompanying REACT, the Actuarial Cost Increase Prohibition
does not prevent "the payment of benefits to which the participant
395. QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 314, at 6-4; see also Marker v. Northrop
Grumman Space & Missions Sys. Pension Plan, No. 04 C 7933, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75507 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2006) (noting that a former spouse was entitled
to pre-retirement survivor benefits under a posthumous QDRO even though
the original divorce order provided the spouse only with post-retirement
survivor benefits because the court held that pre-retirement benefits had the
same value as the post-retirement benefits). The court did not distinguish
between the prohibition on increased actuarial costs and the prohibition on
benefits not provided under the plan terms. The issue was not whether preretirement survivor benefits would be available, but whether they were
available retroactively when there was no longer any question about their
value. The actuarial costs of the provision of pre-retirement and postretirement survivor benefits exceeds the cost to provide only post-retirement
survivor benefits as is shown by the fact that the former spouse was litigating
for those benefits.
396. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E)(i)(II); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(II).
397. ERISA § 204(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3). Early retirement benefit
subsidies are not permitted for separate interests, thus, that common source of
ERISA
actuarial increases in benefits is explicitly prohibited.
§ 206(d)(3)(E)(i)(II); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(II) (2000).
398. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i) (2000).
As
399. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii) (2000).
discussed, infra, the immediately preceding provision prevents a QDRO from
overriding the right to survivor benefits of a different individual after the date
the participant begins collecting benefits if the participant does not have the
right to designate a different beneficiary.
400. H.R. REP. No. 98-655 Part 2, 98th Cong. 2d. Sess. at 19; S.REP. NO. 98575, 98th Cong. 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2566.
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would be entitled in the absence of the order." In particular, it
does not prevent alternate payees from obtaining the benefit
option with the greatest actuarial value, such as subsidized early
retirement benefits, which are not available with a QDRO that
provides a separate interest rather than shared payments." 1
The Actuarial Cost Increase Prohibition, instead, would
appear to prevent an alternate payee from using the feature of a
QDRO not generally available with other benefit designations
namely the ability to choose a retroactive effective date for a
QDRO,4 2 to increase the plan's actuarial costs by selecting a
benefit option that will be more costly for the plan. 3 This will
occur if the alternate payee may choose a survivor benefit instead
of sharing payments with the participant after he or she learns of
the participant's death.4" To prevent an alternate payee from
thereby "wreak[ing] actuarial havoc on administration of the
Plan,"4 0 alternate payees are thus subject to the same limitation
401. Such enhancements, which are called subsidies, are prevented when an
alternate obtains a separate interest of the participant's benefits. ERISA
§ 206(d)(3)(E)(i)(II); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(II) (2000). By contrast, there
is no similar prohibition if the alternate payee shares early retirement
benefits with a participant. See, e.g., D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, at
38, 94-95.
402. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.417-1(b)(3), which allows pension plans to permit
retroactive choices of distributions by participants. Thus, the Actuarial Cost
Increase Prohibition may not apply to plans to the extent the QDRO satisfies
such plan's permissible retroactive standards.
403. Most plans permit participants and their spouses to do this to some
extent because participants may choose their benefit form when they know
they may not have a long life expectancy. In such a case, it is prudent for the
participant to choose a joint and survivor annuity rather than a single life
annuity. See, e.g., Estate of Becker v. Kodak 120 F.3d 5 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting
that the Administrator's failure to disclosure lump sum benefit option as well
as annuity option to very sick participant was a breach of fiduciary duty).
404. The Actuarial Increase Cost Prohibition thus limits but does not
eliminate the ability of participants to make such "favorable" benefit
selections.
405. Samaroo, 193 F.3d at 190. The original divorce decree entitled the
former spouse to half of the participant's pension beginning when the
participant would begin receiving pension, but he died while still an active
employee. The court disregarded a nunc pro tunc order providing a former
spouse with pre-retirement survivor benefits which she prepared after she
learned of the participant's death-all prior draft QDROs had no such
provision. The court did not discuss whether the pension payment amount
specified in the prior draft QDROs was associated with a single life annuity for
the participant. If so, this would support the proposition that the parties did
not intend to provide her with either pre-retirement or post-retirement
survivor benefits. The court, however, focused on whether the plan could fix
its benefit liability at the time of the participant's death. This seems a
dubious focus because plans are liable for spousal survivor benefits even if the
plan does not learn of the participant's spouse until after his or her death.
Rather, the concern would seem to be whether the survivor benefits were
selected after the alternate payee knew of the participant's death, which

2007]

Who Is Entitled to Survivor Benefits from ERISA Plans?

991

as pension plan participants.
Pension plan participants may not generally change their
choice of joint and survivor annuities after the annuity payments
have begun to be made."° This argument, which asks whether
there is a postmortem change in the designation to determine
whether the postmortem DRO is a QDRO is also consistent with
the Section 1001 of the PPA of 2006 and the interim final rule
issued by the DOL pursuant to such statute. 40 7 That section
permits DROs to be revised to become a QDR0 4°8 and provides that
a DRO does not fail to be a QDRO solely because of its time of
issue. 4' The difficulty with such a DRO does not arise solely
because of the timing of the change to the DRO but because the
form of payment was changed after
the participant's death to
41 °
increase the plan's actuarial costs.
If a proposed QDRO provides an alternate payee with
enhanced lifetime retirement benefits in exchange for no survivor
benefits, the Actuarial Cost Increase Prohibition prevents the
surviving spouse from modifying a DRO to obtain survivor benefits
or a greater percentage of survivor benefits than was the case with
the earlier DRO and saying "Whoops, I made a mistake" after the
participant dies unexpectedly.411
substantially enhanced the value of those survivor benefits and thus the plan's
actuarial costs. Id.
406. See, e.g., Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832 (11th Dist. 2006)
(finding that spousal survivor benefits were available only to spouse to whom
participant was married when J & S payments began); McGowan v. NJR Serv.
Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a QDRO may not change
former spouse individual with rights to survivor benefits after J & S payments
had begun. Two attempts were rejected, one to replace the former spouse
with an earlier spouse and one to replace the former spouse with a spouse
acquired substantially after the participant began receiving pension benefits).
Some DB plans, however, permit changes in annuity selection after the
payments have begun if an individual's benefit payments are suspended
because the.individuals returns to work. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20 Q-A-10(d)
(2005).
407. 72 FR 10070 (March 7, 2007).
408. Id. § 1001(1)(A).
409. Id. § 1001(1)(B).
410. See also Comment Letter of New York City Bar Association 10 (May 7,
2007) (pertaining to Interim Rule Relating to Time and Order of Issuance of
Domestic Relations Orders), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/Glover
050707.pdf.
411. See, e.g., Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185; Sanzo, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37572.
In both cases the original QDRO entitled the former spouse to a share of each
specified retirement payment to the participant, but had no provision for any
survivor benefits. The participant died before receiving any pension payments
and no one was entitled to any survivor payments. Some alternate payees
may have been unaware of this trade-off, but if so, their quarrel is with their
divorce counsel rather than the plan: whether as in Samaroo, the payee had
selected a benefit designation without a share of pre-retirement survivor
benefits, or as in Sanzo, where the participant died a month after obtaining a
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On the other hand, if a proposed QDRO provides an alternate
payee with survivor benefits, the Actuarial Cost Increase
Prohibition does not prevent a modified and effective QDRO from
providing those same benefits, whether or not the participant dies
during the modification. 2 Permitting such changes in features of
the DRO other than its benefit options of the DRO will not
414
4
increase actuarial costs. "' Moreover, in Patton v. Denver Post,
the Fifth Circuit held that a former spouse who had obtained half
of the survivor benefits from one but not both of the participant's
pensions and clearly intended to obtain half of the survivor
benefits in each of the participant's pensions was entitled to
survivor benefits from both plans. In this case, despite due
diligence by the former spouse, 15 she did not learn of the existence
of one plan until after the death of the participant. Thus, the
court permitted her to obtain a QDRO after such death. 46 The
court, however, based its conclusion that there was no violation of
the Actuarial Increase Prohibition completely on its finding that
there was no violation of the distinct prohibition on QDROs
providing benefits not otherwise provided by the plan.4"7 The court
did not discuss what the Actuarial Increase Prohibition
prevented. 41' By contrast, the court below considered the Actuarial
QDRO for a share of a single life annuity.
412. See, e.g., Galenski v. Ford Motor Co. Pension Plan, 421 F. Supp. 2d
1015, 1018 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (stating that "[tihe fact that the parties spent
nearly four years putting together a document acceptable to Defendant as they
tried to agree on what, in essence, were clerical issues does not serve to
obviate the existence of a QDRO that conformed to the requirements of federal
law").
413. It may be argued that the modification increases the costs because,
without the modification, the DRO is not a QDRO and thus can cause the plan
to be liable for survivor benefits. However, this argument is wrong because,
under the same reasoning, a DRO could never be converted to a QDRO even if
the modification were completed before the participant's death.
414. Patton v. Denver Post, 326 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2003).
415. Id. at 1149. The participant's employer responded to a request by the
participant and his spouse for a list of the pension plans in which he
participated with a list that excluded the pension plan with the most assets.
416. Id. The court rejected the plan's incorrect claim that entitlements to
survivor benefits must be determined prior to a participant's death and noted
there was no rival claimant for the survivor benefits.
417. Id. at 1152. The court referred to the fact that the former wife could
have selected survivor benefits in the original divorce decree, QDRO. The
court presumed that retroactive changes to QDROs raised no issues.
418. Id. at 1152 (referring to Bailey, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231, at *9, in
which the court pointed out that there could be no violation of the Actuarial
Increase Prohibition if an annuity for one living individual was replaced by an
annuity for another living but older individual by a QDRO based on a DRO
issued long before the death of the participant). By contrast, in Patton, a
terminated annuity for a dead person was replaced by an annuity for a living
person. This obviously increases the actuarial costs of the plan at the time of
such change.
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Increase Prohibition but found it inapplicable under the special
facts by observing, "Nunc pro tunc orders may be entered by a
Colorado court to correct an error or omission in court records and
are deemed to have retroactive effect."419
The court below,
however, appears to have made the same argument as is being
made in this Article. The postmortem order was acceptable
because the alternate payee is not using the knowledge of the
death of the participant to select survivor benefits but is rather
perfecting the survivor benefit designation that she made prior to
the participant's death.
If the original DRO does not clearly designate the benefit
form of payment to which the alternate payee is entitled, the
application of the Actuarial Increase Prohibition is less obvious.
For example, the DRO may give a spouse a fraction of a
participant's pension but not specify the date payments will begin,
the form of payment, or the amount of payments. These omissions
would appear to prevent the DRO from being a QDRO.42 °
Moreover, such a DRO does not clearly establish whether the
payee was entitled to any survivor benefits, an annuity over the
payee's life, or a fraction of the participant annuity's payments.
The Actuarial Increase Prohibition prevents alternate payees from
retroactively selecting benefit options using the knowledge of the
death of one or more persons if that knowledge changes the
actuarial values of one or more of the alternate payee's benefit
options.
This goal may be best achieved by minimizing the ability of
alternate payees to make retroactive benefit selections.
In
particular, if benefit options were ambiguous before the perfection
of the QDRO, it is advisable to treat the alternate payee as having
chosen the ambiguous form with the least actuarial value. There
is nothing in the QDRO Provisions or their legislative history that
suggests that pension plans should be placed at risk in case of any
such ambiguity. The Actuarail Increase Prohibtion strongly
suggests a contrary conclusion. Moreover, the alternate payee's
counsel may avoid such ambiguity by good drafting.42
Nevertheless, Mr. Shulman, a respected QDRO commentator
and author of the QDRO Handbook disagrees with the above
approach and argues that ERISA permits and should permit

419. Patton v. Denver Post-Denver Guild Pension Plan, 179 F. Supp. 2d
1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2002).
420. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C)(iii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iii) (2000); see also
Stahl, 212 F. Supp. 2d 657 (rejecting a draft QDRO for not specifying benefit
distribution when order gave alternate payee: "50% of total funds in account of
annuity plan on specified date").
421. As with all terms of a marital dissolution or orders enforcing a
dissolution order, the participant's spouse will have to depend for his or her
rights from a DRO on the performance of his or her counsel.
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postmortem changes to DROs so that former spouses may obtain
survivor benefits even if they had not made such a selection before
the participant's death:
Are we to believe that the plan suffers a loss when these
beneficiaries [the beneficiaries of survivor benefits under the DRO
with the postmortem changes who did not have such benefits prior
the change] actually receive a plan benefit and that the plan incurs
a gain when a beneficiary is denied survivorship benefits? As we
argued earlier, companies should not be permitted to put their
pension plan in a better funding position on the backs of
disenfranchised former spouses who, through no fault of their own,
submitted a QDRO that did not meet the technical requirements of
the company-at that time. It is unconscionable public policy and
totally contrary to the entire spirit of ERISA. There is a painful
irony in a company's use of a survivorship right when ERISA and
REA[CT] were created to protect those same rights. 2
Mr. Shulman has similarly written that such postmortem
changes should be allowed "to secure a former spouse's property
rights to a pension that could suddenly disappear as a result of a
technicality or a family law attorney's inexperience in drafting
QDROs."4 3
ERISA does not permit alternate payees to be deprived of
survivor benefits because of technicalities; as discussed,
technicalities may be corrected retroactively. Actuarial values are
not determined by the experience of any particular individuals but
rather by the experiences of populations of large groups of similar
individuals. In particular, if pension plans are forced to give any
group of individuals, such as all alternate payees, the ability to
choose retroactively whether to obtain survivor benefits or other
benefits, which are not available to other plan participants, this
will increase the actuarial costs of the plan 4 and thereby reduce
the benefits of the other participants. It is also a questionable
policy to permit former spouses, who often have access to
professional counsel in making the benefit choices, to reverse their
benefit choices in those circumstances, but not provide similar
options to spouses who survive participants, and rarely have
professional advice with respect to their benefit choices. Moreover,
there is often little evidence that such cases result from poor legal
422. QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 314, at 7-27 to 7-28.
423. Gary Shulman, QDROs-the Ticking Time Bomb, 23 FAM. ADV. 26
(Spring 2001) (citing the argument of the dissent in Samaroo, supra, that
under the Full Faith and Credit Act federal courts must follow a state court's
decision to enter a nunc pro tunc order). Mr. Shulman does not explain why
the QDRO Provisions were needed if the Full Faith and Credit Act were
controlling.
424. As discussed, supra, it is irrelevant whether this will increase actuarial
costs by more than a de minimis amount. Any increase violates the Actuarial
Cost Increase Prohibition.
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advice rather than the fact that the participant died more quickly
than the former spouse expected as in Sanzo.
The Circuits have consistently held that QDROs may be
entered under certain circumstances after the participant's
death.425 If the terms of the QDRO were clearly established to the
pension plan before the participant's death alternate payees have
been permitted to perfect the QDRO after the participant's death if
third parties are not affected by such perfection.426 The QDRO
terms may also be established after the participant's death, such
as where the plan is discovered by the payee after the death of
participant4. 7 or the plan and payee were unaware of the death of
the participant while working on the QDRO."'
425. But see Shulman, supra note 423 (criticizing the Third Circuit's
unwillingness to always permit QDRO changes after the death of a
participant); Aaron Klein, Note, Divorce, Death, and Posthumous QDROs:
When Is it Too Late for a Divorcee to Claim Pension Benefits Under ERISA?,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1651 (March 2005) (contrasting the Third and Fourth
Circuit's unwillingness to permit QDRO changes after the death of a
participant with the willingness of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits,
although the cited Fourth Circuit case did not concern the time of the
participant's death and the cited Third Circuit case was very fact-driven); see
also Patton, 326 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2003) (the court contrasts its attitude
with what it describes inaccurately as the inflexible attitude of the Third
Circuit rejecting all postmortem QDROs).
426. Tise, 255 F.3d 66 (mother of participant's children was seeking a sum
for past due alimony payments from the participant's pension benefits for
several years, but the QDRO was not finalized until after participant's death);
Hogan v. Raytheon, Co., 302 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2002) (decree issued nine
months before death and order issued two days after death both spoke of fifty
percent of pension benefits, which thus included survivor benefit); IBM
Savings Plan v. Price, 349 F. Supp. 2d 854, (D. Vt. 2004) (participant died
after draft QDRO at employer's request had been presented to employer before
it was presented to court, which order was consistent with divorce decree and
gave the former spouse a portion of 401(k) plan); see also Files, 428 F.3d 478.
A divorce judgment presented to pension plan before the participant's death by
a former spouse was held to be a QDRO entitling the spouse to an immediate
one-half interest in participant's benefits. The judgment was held to be a
QDRO. See id. at 491 (stating in dicta that a QDRO may be presented at any
time including after the death of the participant). The court did not discuss
whether the separate interest of the divorce judgment was a benefit available
from the plan.
427. Patton, 326 F.3d 1148. The divorce judgment provided one half of the
survivor benefits of employer's pension plan to the former spouse. Nunc pro
tunc order did the same with an inadvertently omitted plan when it was clear
this was intention of parties. However, the court held the QDRO did not
increase benefits by presuming that the QDRO was valid rather than by
asking if the plan would have owed any survivor benefits if the order had not
been recognized.
428. See Nat'l City Corp. Non-Contributory Ret. Plan v. Ferrell, No.
1:03CV259, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36149 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 31, 2005). The
court stressed that the nunc pro tunc order did not change substance, but only
entered an order previously approved that all benefits go to former spouse.
See also Galenski, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1015. The court observed that the parties
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One district court, however, permitted a nunc pro tunc
modification of a QDRO after the participant's death on the
questionable basis that the original divorce judgment was
ambiguous. In Payne v. GM! UAW Pension Plan,4n the judgment
provided the alternate payee with "[forty-five percent] of
participant's [annuity] pension" whereas the original QDRO
restricted her to forty-five percent of the monthly pension
payments and contained an explicit statement she was entitled to
"no" survivor benefits.40 Moreover, the participant had insisted
throughout the twenty month divorce proceeding that his former
spouse would be entitled to no survivor benefits. The modified
QDRO which the court accepted deleted the word "no" from the
original QDRO and provided her with full survivor benefits not
merely forty-five percent of the survivor benefits."'
The Payne court also stated that the outcome may have
changed if the participant who had remarried the day of the
divorce had died a year rather than a month after the new
marriage so his new wife could claim the spousal survivor benefits.
A similar observation about the possible ineffectiveness of a
postmortem change on "another vested party" appeared in
432
Patton.
In fact in Kazel v.Kazel 3 such postmortem retroactive
change was not permitted when the participant's widow would
have been adversely affected by such change. In particular, 4 a

had been working on perfecting the "clerical elements" of a QDRO for several
years addressing unpaid child support obligations.
429. No. 95-CV-73554-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7966 (E.D. Mich. May 7,
1996). The decision also discusses a number of decisions where QDROs were
not allowed to be modified after the death of the participant.
430. See also Files, 428 F.3d 478 (focusing on a dispute about the
significance of an alternate payee's entitlement to "one-half of the Exxon
pension" in the original divorce). Did this give the payee half the payments
the participant was entitled to, namely during this lifetime, or an interest in
half of the participant's pension benefits which she could obtain over her
lifetime? There was no distinct QDRO taking a position on this until after the
participant's death. Id.
431. There was no discussion of why she was entitled to more than forty-five
percent of the survivor benefits. The smaller portion would appear to be more
consistent with the terms of the original judgment and the participant's firmly
expressed reluctance to provide the alternate payee with any survivor benefits
during the divorce proceedings.
432. Patton,326 F.3d at 1153.
433. 819 N.E.2d 1036 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004) in which the court denied a nunc
pro tunc order to modify a QDRO to provide a former spouse with survivor
benefits in addition to a fraction of the "monthly allowance" from the pension
plan. The court referred to (A) the failure of the original QDRO to distinguish
between retirement benefits and survivor benefits; (B) the lack of dissonance
between the divorce judgment and the original QDRO; and (C) the fact that in
the ten years since the divorce the participant had acquired a wife who was
otherwise entitled to the plan's survivor benefits.
434. Id. at 1037.
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former spouse can overcome the right of an actually surviving
spouse to receive a survivor annuity only if specifically awarded
such benefits by the matrimonial court. The difficulty as discussed
in the following section is not the Actuarial Cost Increase
Prohibition but rather the ability of the alternate payee to
adversely affect a plan interest which is not subject to the
participant's control because the interest has vested in another
person.
E.

The Applicability of the ERISA MaritalDissolution
Beneficiary Designationto Survivor Benefits

The QDRO Provisions permit a former spouse of a participant
to continue to be treated in a QDRO as a surviving spouse of the
participant after a divorce for purposes of ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1055. 3s The former spouse under this statute will then remain
entitled to pre-retirement survivor benefits and also a postretirement survivor benefits for a plan subject to the QJSA rules.

Moreover, such designations will prevent any future spouse from
becoming entitled to any survivor benefit under the Spousal
Survivor Provisions even one associated with the reduced life
annuity that the participant may retain under the QDRO.436
The QDRO Provisions permit a former spouse to obtain the
QDRO pertaining to a surviving spouse benefit only if this is done
before a new spouse becomes entitled to the survivor benefits
under the Spousal Survivor Provisions.
This entitlement is
generally established before either the participant or the spouse
begins to receive plan benefits. The Fourth Circuit, however, in
437
Hopkins v. AT&T Global Information,
issued a more limited

435. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(F); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(F) (2000). This includes
meeting the permissible plan requirement of being married for one year.
436. Id.; see also D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 3-5, at 33-36
(stating that the reduction in the participant's normal retirement benefit of a
single life annuity reflects the value of the survivor annuity provided to the
alternate payee). However, if the QDRO provides the former spouse with only
a fraction of the spousal survivor benefits, it appears that successive spouses
may obtain benefits under the Surviving Spouse Provisions to the extent the
QDRO does not apply to the surviving spouse benefits. Id.
437. 105 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 1997). The QDRO arose during the second
marriage because the former spouse obtained a QDRO to collect unpaid
alimony benefits from the pension payments which the participant was then
receiving. Similarly, former spouses were also not permitted to obtain
surviving spouse benefits under QDROs prepared after later spouses were
receiving survivor benefits. See also Rivers v. Cent. & Sw. Corp., 186 F.2d 681
(5th Cir. 1999) (applying Hopkins to reject an asserted QDRO claim by a
former spouse for surviving spouse benefits. in 1997 ten years after the death
of the participant. As in Bailey, the basis of the claim for half of the surviving
spouse benefits was her alleged community property interests in the pension
which the 1972 divorce had not addressed); Stahl, 212 F. Supp. 2d 657
(applying Hopkins to prevent a former spouse from becoming entitled to
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holding that a QDRO may designate a former spouse as the
surviving spouse of a participant even after the participant has a
new spouse. Under the court's holding the former spouse may
displace the new spouse as long as the designation is made before
the participant begins to receive his or her QJSA. However, in
this case the DRO was rejected because the participant had begun
to receive his QJSA. The court asserted that QDROs may not
govern benefits "vested in" persons other than the participant
because the participant may not affect the disposition of those
benefits and thus those benefits are not "payable with respect to a
participant." s The court then asserted that the survivor benefits
vest when the QJSA begins to be paid because REACT removed
the original ERISA survivor benefit requirement that (A) a spouse
be married to the participant at the time of the participant's death
as well as (B) surviving the participant to whom he or she had
been married when the participant began to be paid the pension
benefits. 9
The Hopkins court's vesting argument, however, may be
extended to prevent any former spouse from using a QDRO to
displace a new spouse who is qualified to receive the statutory
Vesting occurs before the
survivor benefits for spouses.
A spouse's
participant begins to receive the QJSA benefits.
survivor benefits vest immediately because REACT removed the
ability of a participant to make an effective unilateral designation
of another person to obtain those benefits."'
By contrast, an alternate payee may generally displace nonspouses of their beneficiary status before the participant begins to
receive annuity benefits, because the participant may unilaterally
divest such individuals of their status."1 However, an alternate
payee may not obtain a QDRO to displace an individual who
qualifies for non-statutory survivor benefits after the participant
begins to receive his benefits, which is when those benefits become
surviving spouse benefits under a QDRO, when such provision was not in the
QDROs drafted before the participant's death).
438. Hopkins, 105 F.3d at 156-57; see also Walsh v. Woods, 638 S.E.2d 85
(S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (the survivor interest obtained by a spouse when a
participant receiving a QJSA was considered her pension benefits). Thus,
when a divorce decree awarded each party his or her pension benefits, the
then spouse was thereby entitled to those survivor benefits. Moreover, a
QDRO could not permit the participant's second spouse to obtain those
survivor benefits from the first spouse because those benefits are not payable
with respect to the participant, and thus, not subject to a QDRO in favor of the
second spouse.
439. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-11(d)(3)(i), (ii), (iii) (1977) (providing preREACT spousal survivor requirements).
440. A one-year marriage requirement may be imposed by the plan. ERISA

§ 205(f); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(f) (2000).
441. The one exception is a non-spouse who is an alternate payee under an
earlier QDRO which would have thereby vested the non-spouse's benefits.
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vested.44 Again, such benefits will thereby no longer be "payable
with respect to a participant." Thus, the statutory beneficiary
designation in the QDRO Provisions,443 may not be used to obtain
the vested benefits of the non-participant.
F. Plan Proceduresfor Determining Whether a DRO Is a QDRO
and the Effective Date of an ERISA MaritalDissolution
Beneficiary Designation
The effective date of the benefit designation in a QDRO may
precede the date the QDRO is submitted to the pension plan. The
QDRO Provisions do not contain any time limit on the submission
to the pension plan of the DRO, the draft QDRO or the final
QDRO that constitutes the benefit designation."4 More generally,
the ERISA prohibition on the forfeiture of vested pension
benefits445 prevents plans from imposing any time limit on the
submission of benefit claims by participants and beneficiaries
pursuant to the terms of a pension plan.446 Thus, a classical DB
pension plan, that is, one which provides participants with single
life annuities unless they are married in which case a single joint
and survivor annuity is provided, would be liable to the
participant's surviving spouse for survivor benefits from the date
of the death of a participant. The participant's surviving spouse
may make a claim at the time of the participant's death or at any
time after the participant's death. Similarly, a former spouse who
retained the spousal survivor benefit designation by means of a
QDRO could submit his or benefit claim to the plan at any time,
except as discussed in the next section. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit held that a DRO, which may be modified to become a
QDRO, may not be defeated by a bankruptcy filing by the
participant before the conversion of the DRO into a QDRO or even
before the filing of a QDRO request with the pension plan."7
442. In re Marriage of Norfleet, 612 N.E.2d 939 (1993).
443. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(iii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(iii) (2000).
444. In fact, Section 1001(l)(B) of the PPA provides that a DRO shall not fail
to be a QDRO solely because of the time at which it is issued and the
Secretary of Labor is directed to issue regulations explaining the provision on
or before August 17, 2007. This provision was described in the Senate Finance
Committee report that accompanied a precursor to the PPA, National
Employee Savings and Trust Equity GuaranteeAct Report, 109 S.REP. No.
174, November 2, 2005. In particular, Section 702 of the precursor was
described as being directed at clarifying that post-divorce orders may be
QDROs.
445. ERISA § 203(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2000).
446. By contrast, welfare plans such as health care insurance plans can and
often do impose limits on when claims may be filed.
447. Gendreau v. Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997) (DRO giving
alternate payee an interest in the pension plan which becomes enforceable
when converted into a QDRO, and thus, that pension interest is not part of the
participant's bankruptcy estate). But see King v. King, 214 B.R. 69 (D. Conn.
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The QDRO Provisions explicitly provide that the benefit
designation of a QDRO may be retroactive with respect to a
pension plan to the date that a draft QDRO is presented to the
plan. 48 Plan administrators must sequester benefit payments that
are subject to a DRO for up to eighteen months while a
determination is being made whether a DRO "or modification
thereof' is a QDRO."' During the sequestration period the QDRO
may be modified in response to comments and suggestions by the
pension plan administrator who may thus make several
determinations during the eighteen-month period.5 9 The Ninth
Circuit stated in Tise4 1 that the "evident purpose of the [eighteen]month period was to provide a time in which any defect in the
original DRO could be cured." If the determination is made within
eighteen months of the date the first payment is required to be
made under the DRO, the administrator shall pay the person or
persons who are entitled to the segregated amounts such amounts
(including interest)." If the determination is not made within the
eighteen months, at the end of the eighteen months, the
segregated amounts are paid to the person or persons who would
have been entitled to the amounts if the DRO were determined not
to be a QDRO.58 A determination that is made after the eighteenmonth period only applies prospectively,4" thus the plan
administrator could then make payments to a person or persons
who would have been entitled to the amounts if the DRO were
determined not to be a QDRO until a contrary determination is
made.45 Moreover, the DOL has provided that a DRO received
after the date that the first payment is due under the DRO is not
effective against the plan starting for any payments prior to the
submission of the DRO.5 6

1997) (Anti-Alienation Prohibition preventing a DRO from having any effect
until it becomes a QDRO).
448. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (2000).
449. Id.

450. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 2-14, at 20-21. These changes
may be expected to focus on the description and timing of the alternate payee's
benefits because there would appear to be no reason why more than one
change should be needed to identify the parties and the pension plan.
451. Tise, 255 F.3d at 670. In such case, the court held that the QDRO
would prevent the participant from designating a beneficiary other than the
alternate payee during the time between the submission of the initial DRO
and its revision to a QDRO.
452. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H)(i), (ii); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3)(H)(i), (ii) (2000).
453. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H)(ii); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3)(H)(ii).
454. ERISA §§ 206(d)(3)(H)(iv); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3)(H)(iv).
455. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 2-13, at 20-21.
456. Id. The DOL did not discuss whether the QDRO gives the alternate
payee the right to recover from a party other than the plan the benefits paid
prior to the submission of the initial DRO.
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The QDRO Provisions require plans to establish written
procedures for determining within a reasonable period of time
whether a DRO is a QDRO.457 Under these procedures, the plan
must promptly notify the participant and each alternate payee
named in a proposed QDRO of the receipt of such document and
provide a copy of the plan's QDRO determination procedures."8
The DOL has stated that a defined contribution plan may charge
participants or potential payees for the reasonable expenses for
processing a QDRO application. 59 At least three circuits have held
that review of plan determinations of QDRO determinations is de
novo because such decisions are matters of statutory rather than
plan interpretation. ' ° Thus, it is not surprising that four other
circuits have permitted administrators to interplead without first
making an initial decision on the validity of a QDRO."' Moreover,

457. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(G); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G). These procedures are
distinct from the benefit claims procedures set forth in ERISA § 503; 29 U.S.C.
§ 1133. See Statement accompanying release of claims regulations, 65 Fed.
Reg. 70, 245, 255, n.39 (Nov. 21, 2000). Once the QDRO is validated, an

alternate payee has the same access to the benefit claims procedure as any
other beneficiary, if he or she believes he or she has not received her benefit
entitlement or wishes to determine his or her benefit entitlement. ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
Benefit claims under a
terminated plan, however, would be sought under (a) ERISA 4070(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1370(a) (2000) for a single-employer plan; or (b) ERISA 4301(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2000) for a multi-employer plan.
458. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 2-2, at 13.
459. Id. Q 2-6, at 16; D.O.L. ERRATA SHEET. In Employee Benefits Security
Administration Field Assistance Bulletin 2003-3, the D.O.L. Advisory Opinion
94-32A (which prohibited such charges) was superseded, and the DOL
permitted a defined contribution plan to charge a participant or beneficiary
the reasonable costs of reviewing a QDRO.
See also QUESTIONS AND
PROPOSED ANSWERS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR STAFF FOR THE 2006
ABA JOINT COMMITTEE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS TECHNICAL SESSION Q & A 5
(May 3, 2006) (similar principles may apply to defined benefit plans but there
is little guidance on determination of reasonable costs).
460. Dial v. NFL Player Supp. Disability Plan, 174 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir.
1999) (finding that a former spouse had a QDRO which entitled her to a
collectively bargained increase in pension benefits); Hogan, 302 F.3d 854
(holding that a QDRO completed after death participant's death was valid);
Files, 428 F.3d 478 (finding a QDRO completed after death participant's death
was valid).
461. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bigelow, 283 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding
that the order was a DRO and had sufficient specificity to be QDRO); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that an order had
sufficient specificity to be QDRO); Metro. Life Ins. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080
(7th Cir. 1994) (finding that an order had sufficient specificity to be QDRO).
Each of these courts assumed QDROs applied to life insurance plans despite
the restriction of QDROs to pension plans. See also Tise, 255 F.3d 661 (QDRO
could be perfected after participant's death); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bayona,
223 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the legal basis under ERISA for
interpleader).
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462
the Third Circuit concluded in Metropolitan Life v. Price
that
such interpleader is consistent with the exhaustion principles that
generally require claimants to complete the claims process before
being permitted to obtain access to the federal courts. On the other
hand, in the one case where the plan sought attorney fees, the
court provided only a small part of the fees requested because
most of the requested fees were attributable to the plan litigating
"vigorously" against one of the claimants.4" The court did not
mention the applicability of the DOL position at such time that
parties not be charged for an internal review of a QDRO,"
although the court applied the same principles by emphasizing
that compensable interpleader fees are generally modest so that
the fee award will not deplete the disputed fund.'
Prudent plan
fiduciaries in at least the three circuits with de novo review may
thus be well advised to interplead and thereby avoid incurring the
unreimbursable expense of a review of an alleged QDRO if it
appears that the participant and the alternate payee will
vigorously litigate the validity of the QDRO.' This practice would
reduce the plan's administrative expenses without harming the
parties because the inevitable court review of the QDRO's validity
will be de novo..7 and the review will occur more quickly. On the
other hand, for DB plans the applicability of the interpleader
procedure is unclear because benefits are often not distributable as
simple lump sums, thus they are much more difficult to deposit
with the court.68

462. 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21076 (3d Cir., Sept. 4, 2007). The court vacated
a contrary decision by the court below that denied interpleader.
The
underlying dispute pertained to whether the participant's designee and
surviving spouse was entitled to life insurance proceeds when the participant
was obligated under a divorce decree to name the children of the participant's
prior spouse.
463. Tise, 255 F.3d at 675-78.
464. At such time, D.O.L. Advisory Opinion 94-32A prohibiting such charges

was still in effect.
465. Id.
466. But see QUESTIONS AND PROPOSED ANSWERS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR STAFF FOR THE 2006 ABA JOINT COMMITTEE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

TECHNICAL SESSION Q & A 22 (May 3, 2006) (suspending claims processing
when there is a dispute between claimants does not appear consistent with
plan fiduciary's duty to act in interest of participants and beneficiaries
pursuant to plan documents, although it may be prudent to interplead to
protect the plan from liability in the event a court reverses the plan decision).
467. It could, however, be argued that even in cases of de novo review courts
may benefit from the analysis of a lower court.
468. However, theoretically successive payments may be deposited with the
court.
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G. How a Pension Plan May Avoid Having to Follow an ERISA
MaritalDissolutionBenefit Designationand How a Statutory
Designee May then Collect All His or Her Plan Benefits
ERISA discharges a plan of its obligation to the participant or
any alternate payee if it acts "in accordance with part [four] of this
subtitle [the fiduciary responsibility sections of ERISA] in
"treating a DRO as being a QDRO or taking action pursuant to the
If a plan fails to sequester plan
segregation procedures." 69
benefits during the statutory eighteen-month sequestration period,
it may be forced to pay benefits twice. 7 °
This exception does not affect a classical DB pension plan
which has not paid any survivor benefits with respect to a
participant who died with vested benefits. In such case, the plan
need have no concern about paying more than one person because
it has paid no persons. Thus, the pension plan would be liable for
survivor benefits provided by a QDRO from the date of the death
of the participant. It would be irrelevant whether the QDRO is
presented before the participant died or at any time after such
death.471
The statute provides that a pension plan may not be
discharged by simply following the segregation procedures
described, but it is unclear what additional fiduciary duties must
be fulfilled since there appears to have been no litigation on this
point. It is advisable to consider two duties. First is disclosure.
To what extent, does the plan have an affirmative duty to provide
any information, and if so, to provide the information in an
understandable form? Do these obligations differ depending on

469. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(I); see also Jayne E.
Zangelein & Susan J. Stabile, ERISA LITIGATION 898-900 (2d. ed. 2005).
470. See, e.g., N. Am. Coal Corp. v. Roth, 395 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2005),
rehearingen banc denied, No. 04-2213, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4531 (8th Cir.
Mar. 18, 2005), cert. denied, No. 04-10618, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7050 (Oct. 3,
2005) (using ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(3) to try to recover
benefits it had failed to sequester, but had inadvertently paid out to the wrong
party: the participant). The plan was not permitted to seek restitution from
the participant but was able to impose a constructive trust on the funds which
the participant had transferred to another party who had deposited the funds
in a credit union. The traditional tracing and res principles of constructive
trusts were applied, but the court did not consider whether the plan document
had any provisions for recovering overpayments. Id.
471. This analysis was presented in Patton v. Denver Post, 326 F.3d 1148,
1151 (10th Cir. 2003) (surviving spouse presented a QDRO for survivor
benefits after the death of the participant in a classical DB plan, which the
plan's fiduciaries had not thought any one was eligible for the surviving
spouse annuity benefits). But see Comment Letter of American Benefits
Council 2 (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
Jacobson05O7O7.pdf (pertaining to Interim Rule Relating to Time and Order of
Issuance of Domestic Relations Orders and argues to the contrary on policy
rather than legal grounds).
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whether the potential alternate payee is or is not a plan
beneficiary at the time of the initial submission, such as the
current spouse with surviving spouse benefits? Second, is the
processing of the QDRO request. To what extent, if any, do plan
fiduciaries have a duty to assist potential alternate payees prepare
QDROs, such as providing a sample QDRO?7 2 How do reasonable
QDRO review procedures compare with reasonable claims review
procedures? The latter have explicit deadlines and standards for
claims denials set by Department of Labor regulations," 3 but there
are no regulations setting forth any QDRO procedure rules. " '
There is no clear set of guidelines describing how a pension
plan fiduciary should react upon learning of a possible divorce or
separation agreement pertaining to a participant. If information
is being sought by a spouse about preparing a potential QDRO, the
DOL advises plans to provide plan information to help prepare a
QDRO." ' Spouses often approach plans for assistance in drafting
an initial DRO which the plan will accept as a QDRO. At such
time, a plan fiduciary would be obligated to permit a participant to
withdraw plan benefits if no spousal consent is required for such
withdrawal, such as for a DC plan not subject to the ERISA
funding requirements, even though such withdrawal may make
any subsequently obtained QDRO moot. The fiduciaries would
appear to be able to rely on the principle that fiduciaries may not
be held responsible for distributing benefits prior to having any
notice of a DRO, which may give rise to the QDRO and, which in
turn, may not have an earlier effective date than the date of the
DRO as far as the plan's liability is concerned. 76'
A spouse would be well-advised to approach a pension plan
with a DRO if the participant may otherwise withdraw pension
funds without the spouse's consent, while the QDRO is being
prepared. Such withdrawals may occur with a profit-sharing plan
if a DRO has not been submitted to start the statutory segregation
period. ' Furthermore, if a spouse has identified the pension plan
but is uncertain about what share, if any, the spouse will obtain in

472. To what extent do the generic samples in the D.O.L. QDRO Guide, the
IRS QDRO Guide, or the PBGC Guide suffice?
473. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(3). These procedures are distinct from the
benefit claims procedures set forth in ERISA § 503; 29 U.S.C. § 1133. See
Statement accompanying release of claims regulations. 65 Fed Reg. 70, 245,
70, 255 n.39 (Nov. 21, 2000).
474. See Comment Letter, supra note 471 (pertaining to Interim Rule
Relating to Time and Order of Issuance of Domestic Relations Order and

suggests that it is advisable to issue such regulations).
475. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 2-1, at 12-13, Q 2-7, at 16.
Some plans, however, take the position that no information need be provided
or funds need be segregated until the claimant has obtained a DRO.
476. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, Q 2-13, at 20-21.
477. See also QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 314, at 10-6.
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the participant's pension, the spouse may be well advised to seek a
temporary order from the court responsible for marital
dissolutions to prevent the plan from paying out the pension plan
benefits pending the qualification of the QDROs.478 Such an order
would be a DRO because it presumably is (A) issued pursuant to a
domestic relations order, and (B) pertains to the provision of child
support, alimony payments or marital property rights.479 It is not
a QDRO because it does not specify the payments or the manner to
determine the payments to an alternate payee."0 Thus, it would
appear to trigger the eighteen-month segregation period during
which benefit payments would be suspended and the order may be
modified to qualify as a QDRO.48 ' Prudent fiduciaries concerned
about paying the benefits twice would thus segregate the benefits.
There is even more ambiguity about the proper behavior of a
fiduciary of an ERISA pension plan who receives information
about a possible DRO from another person, such as (A) a
participant who wishes to designate a person other than his or her
apparent spouse to receive survivor benefits as discussed with
respect to the Spousal Protection Provisions, or (B) a notice to the
medical plan sponsored by the same employer that family coverage
The
is no longer required because of a marital dissolution.
employer in Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan48 seemed to take the
position that an eighteen-month hold is placed on the distribution
of the participant's plan assets until the divorce decree or a QDRO
is provided. In that case, it was not clear what further action, if
any, the plan fiduciaries take after receiving the divorce decree or
QDRO. As discussed in the earlier section pertaining to the
Spousal Survivor Provisions, this Article suggests a similar but
less extensive procedure when a plan is presented with news of a
marital dissolution or a proposed QDRO but is not provided with a
DRO by the proposed alternate payee. It would appear advisable
for a cautious fiduciary to sequester pension plan assets for a brief
period of time, such as thirty days, while the spouse has the
opportunity to show that the alleged DRO was not issued, has
been superseded or provides the spouse with plan rights obtained
Again, the paucity of litigation
under the divorce or separation.'
478. See, e.g., QDROs & FAMILY LAW, supra note 314, at 28-29 (providing
examples of provisions in DROs to protect pension plan benefits during such
consideration, such as limitations on the ability to borrow funds from the
participant's plan benefits). One may argue that the segregation procedures
prevent a borrowing from a participant's pension plan because borrowing is
equivalent to a plan withdrawal.
479. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(II); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(II) (2000).
480. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii) (2000).
481. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (2000).
482. Files, 428 F.3d at 481.
483. Plan fiduciaries may wish to modify the notice to ask about rights other
than survivor rights. On the other hand, the plan fiduciary may learn of the
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on this point suggests that a prudent fiduciary may not find it
necessary to provide the spouse with such notice. It does not
appear necessary to sequester plan payments for eighteen
months' unless a proposed QDRO is provided by a potential
alternate payee, so there are no questions about (A) whether the
payee is then prepared to assert his or rights under the DRO, (B)
when the plan has the right and responsibility to stop
sequestration, and (C) who is to be paid both sequestered funds
and post-sequestration payments.
The DOL QDRO Guide states that fiduciaries need not
determine the validity of a DRO under state law.' The Fifth and
Seventh Circuits found such disputes are to be addressed to the
state courts issuing the DROs." 8 In fact, the Seventh Circuit has
stated that "ERISA does not require or even permit a pension fund
to look beneath the surface" of a QDRO. 7 Thus, it would appear
that plans must defer to the state courts with respect to an alleged
state law deficiency in the DRO, such as whether local law permits
DROs to include attorneys' fees, or the participant understood the
order. On the other hand, the DOL QDRO Guide states that state
courts lack the jurisdiction to decide if a DRO is a QDRO." This
position is not shared by many state courts, which, as discussed
within this Article, prefer to resolve all issues pertaining to a
marital dissolution agreement. Moreover, if a state court issues a
nunc pro tunc DRO there is a separate and distinct question
whether the DRO is a QDRO.
Plan fiduciaries, however, are responsible for determining
whether the order that has been upheld by state courts is a DRO,
and if so whether the DRO meets the QDRO standards. It would
appear those plan fiduciaries must review such claims with the
same care that they are required to apply to any benefit claim by a
dissolution in a non-plan fiduciary role, such as when the participant changes
medical benefit coverage to reflect a change in marital status. However,
unless the participant is receiving pension payments or changing
beneficiaries, the plan is not in danger of paying the wrong person any plan
benefits. Thus, many plans may decide not to give notice until the participant
seeks payment or to change beneficiaries, which is often the motivation for the
participant informing the plan of the marital dissolution or separation
agreement.
484. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H); 2 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (2000).
485. D.O.L. QDRO GUIDE, supra note 320, at 16-17.
486. Blue v. UAL Corp., 160 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 1998); Matassarin v. Lynch,
174 F.3d 549 (5th Cir. 1999) (challenging the substantive provisions of the
QDROs, but the courts found that ERISA allocated such challenges to the
state courts); see also Marker v. Northrop Grumman Space & Missions Sys.

Pension Plan, No. 04 C 7933, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75507 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4,
2006) (it is irrelevant that DRO is not consistent with the agreement of
marital dissolution because the plan may only look at face of DRO).
487. Blue, 160 F.3d at 385.

488. D.O.L. QDRO Guide, supra note 320, Q 1-12, at 9.
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participant or beneficiary.
On the other hand, as discussed
previously in this Article, plan fiduciaries may instead interplead,
so that the parties may resolve their dispute before a court
without any further plan participation or expenditure of plan
resources.
Participants will continue to be entitled to plan benefits even
if the plan is discharged. The participant and any person who may
have received the pension benefits to which an alternate payee
was entitled may have an obligation to the alternate payee... in the
same manner as a person who wrongfully obtained a surviving
spouse's benefits. Such a situation is most likely to arise, when (A)
the participant acts contrary to the terms of the QDRO and
withdraws a considerable sum before the DRO is submitted by the
payee;49 ° (B) an alternate payee does not submit the QDRO to the
plan before benefits were distributed because the alternate payee
was not aware of the participant's plan benefits;491 (C) the QDRO
determination that the DRO is a QDRO takes more than eighteen
months to resolve and the plan distributes the funds in question as
though the QDRO were not effective as directed by ERISA;492 or
(D) the alternate payee did not quickly file a QDRO that was
issued considerably before the date the pension benefits first
become payable.493 There is sometimes no apparent reason why a
participant did not immediately seek to establish a right to
payments to which they asserted an immediate right.
For
example, a former spouse was found to have such a right at the
time of her July 18, 1998 divorce, but didn't seek any annuity or
lump sum plan benefits until three days after the February 21,
2001 death of the participant. 9 '

489. See S. REP. No. 98-575, 98th Cong. 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2568 (state law causes of action may exist if a plan pays the

participants benefits to which an alternate payee is entitled under a QDRO);
see also ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000) (general
provision for benefit claims), ERISA § 502(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000)
(general provision for ERISA relief when other provisions are not available);
Comment Letter of New York City Bar Association (May 7, 2007) 3, 11, 13,
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/Glover050707.pdf (pertaining to the
Interim Rule Relating to Time and Order of Issuance of Domestic Relations
Orders, and suggesting that it is advisable for the DOL clarify the rights of
alternate payees who do not have the right to recover benefits from a pension
plan).
490. There is no requirement of spousal consent for a withdrawal from a DC
plan not subject to the funding rules, such as a profit-sharing plan.
491. See, e.g., Patton, 326 F.3d 1148 (inadvertently omitting a plan which
made no distribution to another party).
492. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H); 2 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (2000).
493. See, e.g., Bailey, 100 F.3d 28 (few benefits may, however, have been lost
by the alternate payee when more than twenty-five years passed between the
divorce and the date pension payments began).
494. Files, 428 F.3d at 480-82.
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There appears to be only one case in which an alternate payee
sought to recover her benefits directly from the participant who
improperly received benefits which the QDRO allocated to her,
495
Like the only case
Hemphill v. Estate of James J. Ryskamp, Jr.
to
recover
spousal benefits
spouse
sought
a
surviving
in which
from the participant who improperly received those benefits,
Kopec,4" discussed within this Article, supra, there seemed to be
little question that if the plaintiffs allegations were upheld the
participant, who was again a plan fiduciary, would have breached
his fiduciary duties by withdrawing the alternate payee's benefits.
The results differed slightly. In both cases, a traditional ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) benefit claim against the
plan was permitted.497 In Kopec the Court dismissed the benefits
'
By
claim against the participant in his individual capacity. 98
In
such
a
claim.
did
not
make
the
plaintiff
contrast, in Hemphill,
both cases, breaches of fiduciary claims against the fiduciary were
permitted to go forward. In Kopec, the participant could be
personally liable and the alternate payee was held to have no
direct claim on the withdrawn funds which could be traced to the
participant's IRA, although the participant could be found
By contrast, in Hemphill, the plaintiff was
personally liable."
permitted to go forward with a constructive trust argument
against traced funds.0°
VII.THE

SUPREME COURT CONSISTENTLY HOLDS BENEFICIARY
DESIGNATIONS THAT SATISFY FEDERAL STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS PREEMPT CONTRARY STATE LAWS

In each decade starting with the 1950s before and after the
1974 enactment of ERISA, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that survivor benefits must be paid in accord with those
decedents' designations. Designations must satisfy the terms of
employee benefit plans subject to federal regulation, or, in the case
of a federal savings bond, in accord with the designated ownership

495. No. CV-F-05-1319 OWW/SMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47929 (E.D. Cal.
July 5, 2006). But see Nat'l City Corp. Non-Contributory Ret. Plan v. Ferrell,
No. 1:03CV259, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36149, at *24 n.5 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 31,
2005) (stating without any explanation that "[s]imilarly, had the Plan
previously made payments to Forrest's children [the plan's default designees],
Barbara's right to those payments would be unenforceable even though she
had a legally enforceable interest in them [under a DRO] prior to Forrest's

death").
496. 70 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
497. Hemphill, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47929, at *20-47; Kopec, 70 F. Supp.
2d at 221.
498. Kopec, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 220.
499. Id. at 219.
500. Hemphill, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47929, at *52-58.
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title of the bond. As in Guidry,5 °' and Shumate,"2 which applied to
the Anti-Alienation Prohibition, the Supreme Court is reluctant to
find that legal requirements about benefit payments, such as the
Plan Benefit Terms Mandate, have implicit exceptions. Moreover,
the Supreme Court in each case rejected both direct claims to the
payor for the survivor benefits,5"3 and indirect claims to the
recipients for the amount of the benefits they received."
The Supreme Court first decided in 1950 in Wissner v.
Wissner °5 that a soldier's parents and designated beneficiaries
were entitled to receive and retain all the proceeds from a life
insurance policy under the National Service Life Insurance Act of
1940, rather than his widow from whom he was estranged
throughout his military service even though he used community
property to pay the policy premiums. The court declared:
The controlling section of the Act provides that the insured "shall
have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the
insurance [within a designated class] ...and shall... at all times
have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries .. . ." 38
U.S.C. § 802(g). Thus Congress has spoken with force and clarity in
directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no
other. 5°
The cited statutory provision is similar to the ERISA provision
upon which the Plan Benefit Terms Mandate rests.
The three dissenters argued. 7 that there was an implicit
exception to such mandate in the eight community property states.
In such states, they asserted that the soldier may only decide upon
the disposition of his half of the insurance policy if the premiums
were paid with the compensation earned by the soldier during the
This results from the
marriage, as occurred in this case.
community property presumption that spouses have equal
ownership rights to the compensation earned by either during the
501. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 375-76.
502. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 764.
503. The payor was either an employee benefit plan (which may be the
insurer selected by the employer) or the Treasury Department for savings
bonds. However, in Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997), the claimants did not
challenge the decision below that they had no right for benefits from the
pension plan.
504. The savings bond case alluded to an exception in a case of fraud or
breach of trust in the original purchase rather than the original designation.
See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964) (individual used community
property to purchase a savings bond that was registered as owned jointly by
the individual and his brother). The case was remanded to determine among
other issues whether the wife had consented to such registration. See
generally id. If not, the court could find fraud which would void the
registration in whole or in part. See generally id.
505. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).

506. Id. at 659.
507. Id. at 661-64.
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marriage. °8
Consequently, the dissent argued the spouse is
entitled to half of the life insurance proceeds in this case.
The majority held that there was no implicit exemption from
the above beneficiary designation for the widow's community
property rights, and those state rights were preempted." ° The
majority also rejected the assertion that even if the U.S. military
was required to pay the designated beneficiaries, the soldier's
widow was entitled to obtain the proceeds from the designees
under the community property rules. In addition to the above
benefit mandate the majority pointed to the "flat conflict" of such
result with the statutory provision:
Payments to the named beneficiary "shall be exempt from the claims
of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by
or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or
51
after receipt by the beneficiary ....
,o
This provision differs from the Anti-Alienation Prohibition in
referring to benefit payments "either before and after receipt,"
rather than "benefits provided by the plan.".
The majority rejected three other arguments presented by the
dissent. The dissent argued that many decisions held that family
support claims were not preempted by anti-alienation language
such as that under consideration."' The majority responded that
family support was not at issue in this case and community
property claims rest on business relations between the spouses
rather than the moral obligations upon which family support
rested. 12 The dissent also argued that the function of the antialienation provision was to protect the government insurance fund
from attachments rather than from the beneficiaries.513 Finally,
the dissent stated that Congress could not have intended to permit
a soldier to "defraud" his wife by using community property to
purchase a life insurance policy whose benefits did not go to her.514
The majority responded to the final two arguments with its above
statement about the clarity of the statutory language.1
The Court concluded by describing the federal interest that is
served by the statute as follows:
Possession of government insurance, payable to the relative of his
choice, might well directly enhance the morale of the serviceman.
The exemption provision is his guarantee of the complete and full
performance of the contract to the exclusion of conflicting claims.
508. Id. at 661-62.
509. Id. at 659-60.
510. Id. at 659.
511. Id. at 663, n.2.
512. Id. at 659-60.
513. Id. at 664.
514. Id. at 663.
515. Id.
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The end is a legitimate one within the congressional powers 516
over
national defense, and the means are adapted to the chosen end.
The Supreme Court in Free v. Bland,1 7 decided in 1962
without dissent518 that a surviving spouse, rather than the
decedent's sole heir and son from an earlier marriage, was entitled
to full ownership of a savings bond that had been acquired with
community property and had been issued in the name of both
spouses with an "or" between the names. Under the relevant
federal regulations such designation"' provided that "[i]f either coowner dies without the bond having been presented and
surrendered for payment or authorized reissue, the survivor will
be recognized as the sole and absolute owner."
The Court
summarily dismissed the relevance of state family law with the
following description of conflict preemption, that is, the effect of
the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution, as follows,
"the relative importance to the State of its own law is not material
when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of
our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail. This
principle was made clear by Chief Justice Marshall when he stated
for the Court that any state law, however clearly within a State's
acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal
law, must yield.52°
In particular, the survivorship provision was a federal law, which
as held in Wissner, must prevail over any conflicting state law,
such as the community property provision at issue which
attempted to supersede the survivorship provision.521 Thus, the
decedent's son was not entitled to have the decedent's bond
interest transferred directly to him by the federal government as
of the date of the death of the decedent.
The Court held, as in Wissner, that the decedent's children
were also not entitled indirectly to the decedent's interest in the
bond, that is, they had no right to obtain the value of the inherited
bond from the surviving spouse. The Court, as in Wissner,
focused on the beneficiary designation resulting from the joint
title:
Notwithstanding this [survivorship] provision, the State awarded
full title to the co-owner but required him to account for half of the
value of the bonds to the decedent's estate. Viewed realistically, the
State has rendered applicable award of title meaningless. Making
the bonds security for the payment confirms the accuracy of this
view. If the State can frustrate the parties' attempt to use the
516. Id. at 660-61.
517. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
518. Two of the justices did not participate in the decision.
519. Id. at 668, n.4.
520. Id. at 667 (citations omitted).

521. Id. at 668.
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bonds' survivorship provision through the simple expedient of
requiring the survivor to reimburse the estate of the deceased coowner as a matter of law, the State has interfered directly with a
legitimate exercise of the power of the Federal Government to
borrow money.

522

The Court also distinguished the deference for beneficiary
designations for life insurance for members of the military in
Wissner from the more limited ones applicable to designations for
savings bonds.
There [in Wissner] the Congress made clear its intent to allow a
serviceman to select the beneficiary of his own government life
insurance policy regardless of state law, even when it was likely
that the husband intended to deprive his wife of a right to share in
his life insurance proceeds, a right guaranteed by state law. But the
regulations governing savings bonds do not go that far.523
In particular, savings bond designations will not be respected
where the circumstances of the purchase of the bond "manifest
fraud or breach of trust." 524
The Supreme Court next decided in 1981 in Ridgway,5 that a
soldier's second wife and designated beneficiary was entitled to
receive and retain all the proceeds from a life insurance policy
under the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act of 1965.526 The
Court also held that his first wife's minor children had no direct or
indirect rights to those proceeds even though the participant's
divorce judgment required him to designate them to receive those
survivor benefits. There was no issue of community property,
although the issue concerned a property award to the minor
children. The Supreme Court stated that the case was controlled
by Wissner. 7 and repeated the statement from that decision that
was similar to the Plan Benefit Term Mandate:
Here, as there, it appropriately may be said: "Congress has spoken
with force and clarity in directing
528 that the proceeds belong to the
named beneficiary and no other."
The Court also held that the same anti-attachment provision
considered in Wissner was again an "independent ground" for
preventing (A) a direct claim by the children on the insurer, and
(B) an indirect claim for a constructive trust against the proceeds
522. Id.
523. Id. at 670.
524. Id. at 671.
525. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
526. Id. at 50. This was a successor to the National Service Life Insurance
Act of 1940, which was at issue in Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
The successor did not rely on insurance provided by the federal government,
but the federal government heavily subsidized private insurance.
527. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 55.
528. Id.
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to which the second wife was entitled."m The Court also cited its
statements that Anti-Alienation provisions ensure that benefits
actually reach the beneficiary in a decision from 1979, Hisquierdo
v. Hisquierdo. ° The Court had found therein that a former spouse
could not attach unassignable retirement benefits under the
Railway Retirement Act."'
The three dissenters argued that the fraud and breach of
trust exception of Free v. Bland was applicable to the soldier who
had violated a divorce order by not designating his minor children
as his life insurance beneficiaries.532 The majority responded that
the Supreme Court had declared therein that this savings bond
exception was not applicable where the issue was the designation
rather than whose money was used to purchase the bonds.533 The
dissent argued that the second wife was being unjustly enriched
by receiving the children's entitlements and even though she may
not have behaved improperly she was not entitled as a gratuitous
recipient to keep the insurance proceeds to which the minor
children were entitled."4 The soldier in this case had voluntarily
waived his rights to choose a designee other than his minor
children by agreeing to the divorce decree after extensive
negotiations." 5 The majority conceded that the equities favored
the children, but stated that Congress had chosen not to apply
such equities when it wrote the law, which insulated the benefits
paid to his designated beneficiary "from attack or seizure by any
other claimant. "u
The dissenters tried to distinguish Wissner. They pointed to
the Court's observation that alimony or family support was not at
issue in Wissner unlike this case and the long history of exempting
family support orders from preemption by Anti-Alienation
provisions similar to the one at issue and spendthrift provisions in
general because of the special nature of the parental legal duty.537
The majority responded that Wissner applied to community
property rights, which often have elements of support, as may be
the case in the property settlement at issue,538 rather than alimony

529. Id. at 57-58.
530. 439 U.S. 572, 584 (1979).
531. Id. Beneficiary designation was not at issue because the employee
could not make beneficiary designations. Id. The issue was, rather, the right
of the former spouse to receive part of the employee's expected retirement
payments on the basis of an marital dissolution order which rested upon her
community property rights. Id.
532. 454 U.S. at 64-70.
533. Id. at 58.
534. Id. at 72.

535. Id. at 80.
536. Id. at 62-63.
537. Id. at 72-81.
538. Insurance is often required to be provided for minor children to insure
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or family support and the beneficiary designation resembles such a
property claim more than alimony or child support and is thus
subject to the same preemption."'
The Supreme Court in Boggs," ° held in 1997 in a manner
similar to its decision in Free v. Bland that the adult children of a
participant's spouse who predeceased him again could not use
their mother's community property rights to establish an
entitlement to any indirect interest from the amounts paid to him
or his designated beneficiaries. As in that case the Court held that
the community property rules were subject to conflict preemption.
There appeared to be no challenge of the decision below that the
plans had no direct liability to the children."
The participant's first wife died in 1979.542 This was after the
1974 enactment of ERISA but before the 1984 enactment of
REACT. In 1980, a Louisiana court ascribed to the first wife's
estate an interest of $ 21,194.29 in the undistributed interest of
The first
the participant's savings plan (the "Savings Plan").'
wife's will gave (A) the participant a life interest in her assets and
one third of the remainder, and (B) her children two thirds of the
The participant remarried within a year of the first
remainder.'
wife's death in 1980." In 1985, he retired and received (A) a lump
sum distribution of $ 151,628.94 from a savings plan, which he
rolled into an IRA-he made no withdrawals before his death in
1989; (B) AT&T shares from an ESOP, which he retained until his
death, and (C) the initial payments of a qualified joint and
survivor annuity with survivor rights in his second wife from a
Under the
distinct retirement plan (the "Retirement Plan").
participant's will, his widow, the second wife, received a life
interest in the AT&T shares and the widow appeared to be the sole
beneficiary of the IRA."7 The adult children after the participant's
death, sought the property they claimed to have been entitled to as
of the date of death of their mother, namely a portion of (A) the
annuity payments received by the participant during his life, (B)
the annuity payments being received by the participant's widow;

that the children will continue to obtain support if the provider of child
support dies. The participant was required to provide the minor children with
child support. However, in this case the purpose of the insurance is not
described.
539. Id. at 61-62.
540. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
541. Id. at 838.
542. Id. at 836.
543. Id. at 837.
544. Id. at 836-37.
545. Id. at 836.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 837.
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(C) the IRA account, and (D) the ESOP shares." There appeared
to be no claim that the original order was a QDRO or subject to the
REACT transition rules. 9
The children did not argue that they were entitled to any
payments from the Retirement Plan. The Court decided by a vote
of seven for the majority and two for the dissent that the children
were not entitled to receive from the widow, payment for any part
of the spousal survivor benefits paid to her from the Retirement
Plan in accord with the Spousal Survivor Provisions.55 ° The
dissent, however, argued that (A) to the extent that the widow had
received other assets from the estate she was liable to the children
to use them to compensate them for the value of the survivor
benefits that she received, and (B) ERISA was only concerned with
the uniformity of payments by ERISA plans and thus, would not
be violated if the widow was required to provide the children with
property other than the survivor benefits that she received. 5 ' The
majority rejected this argument, as the Court had done with the
prior three beneficiary designation decisions. In particular, the
majority observed that the statutory beneficiary designations of
the Spousal Survivor Provisions were designed to insure an
income stream to the surviving spouse."
The Court declared
without any mention of the Anti-Alienation Prohibition there was
Conflict Preemption because:
It would undermine the purpose of ERISA's mandated survivor's
annuity to allow Dorothy, the predeceasing spouse, by her
testamentary transfer to defeat in part Sandra's entitlement to the
annuity § 1055 guarantees her as the surviving spouse. This cannot
be. States are not free to change ERISA's structure and balance."
The Court also decided by a vote of seven-two that the heirs
were not entitled to an accounting from the pension plans of their
mother's nonexistent community property interest in the pension
plans."
The Court pointed to the burden such an accounting
would place on the pension plan, particularly if the accounting was
requested years after the death of the participant's spouse as in
this case or if the "couple had lived in several states," in which
case several states' different entitlements may have to be
548. Id.

549. The REACT transition rules were not applicable because the pension
plan had not honored the pre-REACT order before the enactment and did not
choose to honor it after the enactment. Section 303(d) of Pub. L. 98-397, 98
Stat.
550.
551.
552.
553.

1426, 1453 (1984).
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 842.
Id. at 862-74.
Id. at 843-44.
Id. at 844.

554. There was a similar 5-4 division with respect to whether an accounting
was preempted with respect to the distributions to the participant following
the death of the participant's first wife.
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considered."' Regardless of the size of the accounting burden if
there is no spousal entitlement to receive property of equal value
at the time of the spouse's death, there is no reason to impose any
burden on the ERISA plans.
The Court decided by a vote of five-four that the children were
not entitled to receive a portion of (A) the Savings Plan benefits
that the participant had received and rolled over into an IRA, (B)
the stock the participant had received from an ESOP, or (C) the
Retirement Plan annuity benefits which the participant received.
The majority as the Court had in the prior three beneficiary
designation decisions emphasized that under the Plan Terms
Benefit Mandate' the children were not plan beneficiaries. The
majority also stated that the enactment of REACT made
inapplicable the authorities for its prior 1980 decision, In re
Marriage of Campa," that there was no federal issue in a state
court decision that implied a nonparticipant spouse was a
beneficiary by virtue of her community property rights."8 As in
Wissner, the court "reinforced" its designation argument by
referring to the Anti-Alienation Prohibition," 9 but then stated:
As was true with survivors' annuities, it would be inimical to
ERISA's purposes to permit testamentary recipients to acquire a
competing interest in undistributed pension benefits, which are
intended to provide a stream of income to participants and their
beneficiaries.' °
The Court repeated its Free v. Bland statement that giving
full title to an individual but forcing the individual to account for
the value is to provide meaningless title, which like the above
quote does not depend upon the Anti-Alienation Prohibition. 2
The dissent responded by referring to the traditional concern
for uniform administration of pension plans which it asserted
would be achieved if decisions by plan fiduciaries to pay benefits to
555. Id. at 853.
556. Id. at 845-48.
557. 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
558. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 849-50. Thus, the Supreme Court explicitly
overruled decisions, which reached the same result as Campa, such as Stone v.
Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal.1978), aff/d, 632 F.2d 740 (1980), Savings &
Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago 717 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir.
1983), and Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 584 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
559. Id. at 851.
560. Id. at 852.
561. Id. at 853.
562. Unlike the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407, the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition does not refer to "money paid or payable." Thus, there was no
need for the Court to consider whether the pension distributions retained the
quality of money by remaining in readily "withdrawable form," as it had in
Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413 (1973), when it held
social security benefits on deposit in a bank account were not subject to
attachment by the local welfare board.
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participants and designated beneficiaries were not affected. The
dissent argued that this concern is not affected by decisions
whether the recipient is indirectly liable to account for the value of
those benefits to another person.'
As described, supra, the
majority referred to the ERISA aim that participants and
beneficiaries receive their intended stream of income.
The dissenters also argued that community property law did
not "frustrate the statutory purposes of ERISA" but focused
primarily on the applicability of its Anti-Assignment Prohibition.'
First, they argued, as the Wissner and Ridgway dissents had
argued, that there is no violation of the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition because community property establishes the spousal
ownership at the time the pension benefits are generated.'
Second, they argued that ERISA is not concerned with the
disposition of any survivor benefits (other than spousal benefits)
from pension plans. Thus, they argued that state law should
control the ultimate disposition of such proceeds as in this case.'
Third, they argued that (A) the probate order is not a domestic
relations order because it was not issued under a domestic
relations law and thus such orders are not alienations under the
QDRO Provisions; and (B) by permitting transfers of pension
benefits to former spouses when they are alive, Congress implied
that former spouses should not be deprived of such benefits if they
predecease participants."7
The majority responded that (A) the Court had to follow the
Congressional directions that the spousal survivor provisions and
the QDRO provisions protected the living, rather than the dead,
such as a spouse predeceasing the participant; and (B) ERISA's
goal is to protect the income stream of both participants and
beneficiaries, which means the benefits of both are protected from
direct and indirect claims, such as the ones at issue 68
The Supreme Court held in 2001 in Egelhoff 9 that ERISA
preempts state laws that attempt to override a participant's
designation of his or her spouse in an ERISA Pension Plan or an

563. Id. at 862-63. See also Wash. State Dep't of Social and Health Services
v. Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003) (emphasizing that the Social Security
protection for distributed social security benefits was confined to actions that
constituted "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process").
This phrase was held not to apply to a local social services department, which
while acting as the representative of foster children collecting SSI, applied the
SSI payments to reimburse the department for its expenses to support the
children.
564. Id. at 863-64.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 864-66.
567. Id. at 866-68.
568. Id. at 854.
569. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
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ERISA Insurance Plan upon the participant's divorce. Thus, as in
Boggs, 7 ' the adult children of the participant's first wife were not
entitled to obtain the benefits either directly from the plan or
indirectly from the participant's second wife and designated
beneficiary. The Court also devoted considerable attention to the
Plan Terms Benefit Mandate, but declined to use Conflict
Preemption but instead used the broader ERISA Explicit
Preemption."' However, the court stated:
And as we have noted, the statute at issue here directly conflicts
with ERISA's requirements that plans be administered, and benefits
be paid, in accordance with plan documents. 572
The majority concluded that the state statute was preempted
because it had two impermissible connections with ERISA plans.
First,
the administrators must pay benefits to the beneficiaries
chosen by state law, rather than to those identified in the
plan documents. The statute thus implicates an area of core
ERISA concern. In particular, it runs counter to ERISA's
commands that a plan shall "specify the basis on which
payments are made to and from the plan," § 1102(b)(4), and
that the fiduciary shall administer the plan "in accordance
with the documents and instruments governing the plan,"
§ 1104(a)(1)(D), making payments to a "beneficiary" who is
designated
573 by a participant, or by the terms of [the] plan."
§ 1002(8).
Second, it
interferes
administration because:

with

nationally

uniform

plan

Plan administrators cannot make payments simply by
identifying the beneficiary specified by the plan documents.
Instead they must familiarize themselves with state statutes
so that they can determine whether the named beneficiary's
status has been "revoked" by operation of law. And in this
context the burden is exacerbated by the choice-of-law
problems that may confront an administrator when the
employer is located in one State, the plan participant lives in
another, and the participant's former spouse lives in a third.
In such a situation, administrators might find that plan
payments are subject to conflicting legal obligations.

570. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
571. Two of the justices in a concurring opinion observed that the court
found that state law was connected with ERISA because it conflicted with
ERISA and thus the Court was applying Conflict Preemption. Egelhoff, 532
U.S. at 152-53.
572. Id. at 150.
573. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
574. Id. at 148-49 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

2007]

Who Is Entitled to Survivor Benefits from ERISA Plans?

1019

The Court rejected the argument that the state law did not
impose an undue burden on plan administrators because
administrators could avoid liability to a second claimant either by
refusing to make payments until the benefit dispute is resolved or
by following plan designations unless they had notice of a marital
dissolution." ' However, the Court noted that (A) a plan would
thereby transfer to the beneficiaries the cost of delay and
uncertainty by delaying payment until the dispute is resolved, and
(B) a plan making payments in accord with the beneficiary
designation would expose the administrators to the risk that a
claim may be made that the administrators had actual knowledge
of the marital dissolution. Furthermore,
[ulnder the text of ERISA, the fiduciary "shall" administer the plan
"in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan," 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). The Washington statute conflicts
with this command because under this statute, the only way the
fiduciary can administer the plan according
to its terms is to change
57 6
the very terms he is supposed to follow.
The majority also rejected the two dissenters' assertion5 77 that
the plan was ambiguous because it failed to specify what happens
to a spousal designation in the case of a divorce. The dissenters
had asserted that state law presented a needed rule of
interpretation, which may best reflect the employee's likely
intention.
The majority responded that the divorce of the
participant and the spouse creates no ambiguity in the
participant's identification of the designee as the participant's
spouse."' Furthermore, the need to rely on state law to determine
if there had been a revocation of the designation and the new
designee would result in the very non-uniform beneficiary
designations which ERISA preemption is designed to avoid."9
The two dissenters asserted that family law may not be
preempted unless the state statute does substantial damage to
"clear and substantial federal interests"58 ° as described in
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo. In particular, plan administrators
must resort to state law to determine who is a spouse or who is a
child, so why may they not do the same to determine whether a

575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

149.
151, n.4.
154-57.
148, n.2.
148-49.
157-60.

581. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). However, immediately after that reference the
Court referred to four instances where such damage was found and concluded
there was also such damage when a spouse attempted to use community
property law to obtain a portion of the participant's expected railroad pension.
Id.

1020

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:919

participant wishes to continue to have a spouse as a beneficiary. If
the plan sponsor wishes to avoid resort to state law, it can simply
provide that state law is irrelevant in such determinations. In
fact, in Mackey the Court permitted a far more significant burden
to be imposed upon plans by allowing levies on welfare plan
benefits. 2 The dissenters also argued8 that Washington's law
"furthers ERISA's ultimate objective--developing a fair system for
protecting employee benefits." In particular, they asserted that
the revocation rule is consistent with the general rule of the
Uniform Probate Code and prevents the former spouse from
receiving an unexpected windfall as in this case where the divorce
settlement, in which the participant retained all of his pension
benefits. As a result of the majority's decision the former spouse
thus received a windfall of 80,000 dollars six months after the
divorce.' Finally, the dissent asserted that under the Court's
reasoning slayer statutes, which in many states prevent designees
who kill participants from being entitled to plan benefits would be
preempted because they differ from state to state in fact differ
from state to state.8 5
The majority response was that "this [state] statute governs
the payment of benefits,
a central
matter
of plan
administration," and is thus preempted as described within this
Article.
VIII.THE APPLICATION
ERISA BENEFICIARY

OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO AMBIGUOUS
DESIGNATIONS OTHER THAN STATUTORY
DESIGNATIONS

In 1989, the Supreme Court set forth the ERISA standards
for courts to review plan denials of benefit claims.587 The decision
was based in part on a proposition the Court had set forth earlier:
"We have held that courts are to develop a 'federal common law of
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.'" 8 In 1993,

582. Id. at 158. However, as discussed, supra, Guidry, Great-West Life, and
Sereboff suggest that Mackey may no longer be applicable. Moreover, the
Mackey Court disregarded the burden imposed on the plan by the
garnishments.

583. Id. at 158.
584. Id. at 159. This is similar to the waiver argument made by the
dissenters in Ridgway where it was also disregarded.
585. Id. at 160. The dissent is correct about the prevalence and the
differences among slayer statutes. However, that issue was not before the
Court, which declined to decide it at this time.
586. Id. at 148.
587. Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). See generally
Kathleen Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ErisaBenefit Claim Cases,

50 AM. U.L. REv. 1083 (June 2001).
588. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 111 (quoting dicta in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
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the Supreme Court held in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,5 9 that the
ERISA § 502(a)(3) explicit limit on relief to equitable relief implied
that monetary damages are not available against non-fiduciaries
who participated in a fiduciary breach. The Court justified the
decision in part by stating:
The authority of courts to develop a "federal common law" under
ERISA, see Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110, is not the authority to revise
the text of the statute.5 90
Courts must therefore limit federal common law to cases
where it is necessary to "fill true gaps in the statute - when the
creation of a subsidiary or collateral rule is necessary to carry out
an explicit congressional directive."59"'
The cases addressing the substantial compliance of plan
designation forms are an excellent example of the kind of ERISA
gaps federal common law addresses and how it addresses such
gaps without violating the Explicit ERISA Preemption. 9 ' The
Fourth Circuit in 1994 in Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Adams, 93 considered a claim by the participant's second wife to
approximately 300,000 dollars in proceeds of an employer life
insurance policy. There was an issue because the change of
beneficiary designation form that the participant had submitted
and confirmed with the plan did not have the designee listed in the
correct place and the employer failed to make the correction as
instructed by the participant and to add requisite salary
information. The plan insurer interpleaded when the participant's
son, the prior designee under the plan, refused to relinquish any
plan benefit claim.
The Court correctly found that ERISA
preempted the local state substantial compliance doctrine, namely
that a designation which "substantially complies" with a plan's
terms is effective.594 The Court explicitly disagreed with the Tenth
Circuit which had held in Peckham v. Gem State Mutual of Utah,595
that there was no such preemption because that court found that
the state law would not substantially modify the plan. The
Phoenix court observed that this is not the ERISA preemption
standard5" because the ERISA Explicit Preemption preempts any

589. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
590. Id. at 259.
591. See Jeffery A. Brauch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 541, 545 (1998) (defending the stated proposition).
592. See generally Meridith Bogart, Note, State Doctrines of Substantial
Compliance:A Call for ERISA Preemption and Uniform Federal Common Law
Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 447 (2003).
593. 30 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 1994).
594. Id. at 558-62.
595. 964 F.2d 1043, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 1992).
596. The Ninth Circuit joined the Tenth Circuit in finding no preemption in
Bank of America Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 2000).
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law that "relates to ERISA plans." The Supreme Court applied the
same analysis in Egelhoff to reject a similar claim of nonpreemption based on the assertion that the state law did not
modify but clarified plan terms.597 The Court correctly identified
the existence of an ERISA gap but characterized it incorrectly:
[ERISA] contains no provision expressly governing the change of
beneficiaries pursuant to a given policy. ERISA is silent on the
matter of which party shall be deemed beneficiary among disputing
claimants.5 9
The applicability of common law is not related to the
existence of a dispute between beneficiaries. The rights of the
participant's widow are determined by the plan terms under the
ERISA rather than by whether another party chooses to claim
those same benefits.599 However, the Court focused on the correct
ERISA gap. With the exception of the two statutory designations,
for spousal survivor benefits and QDROs, ERISA does not set forth
the conditions a beneficiary designation must fulfill to satisfy the
requirement that an ERISA plan be established and maintained
pursuant to a written document.' 0 The Court was not presented
with the actual plan, although it was asked to interpret the plan's
designation procedures, when the plan fiduciaries declined to
interpret the terms of their plan and interpleaded.60 The Court
observed that the Peckham court was correct that substantial
compliance does not modify the plan terms and so the Mertens test
of no statutory change by federal common law is fulfilled:
Application of the doctrine in the instant context will not
compromise any of the rights of or impose any additional obligations
on plan administrators or sponsors. The doctrine does not conflict

597. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
598. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins., 30 F.3d at 562.
599. Furthermore, a release of the plan by the other claimant is of dubious
effectiveness. See generally Albert Feuer, When Are Releases of Claims for
ERISA Plan Benefits Effective?, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 773 (2005).

600. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
601. Plan terms often give plan administrators considerable discretion in the
design and interpretation of beneficiary designation forms. Thus, these
questions are mooted in the more common situation where the plan decides
the validity of a beneficiary designation under the arbitrary and capricious
standards of many plans. See, e.g., Alliant Techsystem v. Marks, 465 F.3d 864
(8th Cir. 2006) (using such a stated standard to defer to the Plan's holding
that a beneficiary designation could be effective even if the participant left
blank the relation of the beneficiary to him). However, there was a remand to

consider whether the participant had sufficient capacity to execute the
designation or whether he was under undue influence, although the court did
not discuss how to make either determination. Id.; see also O'Shea, Jr. v. First
Manhattan Co. Thrift Plan & Trust 55 F.3d 109,114 (2d Cir. 1995) (similar
result when the participant failed to sign the designation because he was not
given the signature page).
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with ERISA's statutory provisions because ERISA is silent on the
matter.0 2
The Court then explained that federal common law should be
consistent across the circuits and draw on the recognized state
common law of substantial compliance." 3 The Court found that the
lower court thus correctly rejected the unduly demanding law of
substantial compliance of South Carolina, the state in which the
lower court was located. In particular, the Court agreed with the
local court that there is substantial compliance if the following
prevailing compliance standards are satisfied:
[Tihe insured: (1) evidences his or her intent to make the change
and (2) attempts to effectuate the change by undertaking positive
action which is for all practical purposes similar to the6 action
required by the change of beneficiary provisions of the policy. 4
The Sixth Circuit in Tinsley v. GM, MetropolitanLife, reached
a similar conclusion about the need to apply federal common law
when a claim was made that the participant was under undue
influence when he made the designation at issue."' The gap the
court correctly focused on was the lack of any ERISA provision
regarding the validity of a plan designation.6'
The court used
court decisions and an American Jurisprudence article to
determine the general principles of the prevailing federal common
law that it directed the lower court to apply on remand. On the
other hand, the Sixth Circuit, in a 1991 unreported decision, held
there was no difference between federal common law of
substantial compliance and the applicable local law without any
consideration of the federal rules.6 7
The Seventh Circuit in Metropolitan Life v. Johnson 6 cited
and applied Phoenix. In that case the participant received a letter
from the plan accepting the beneficiary change even though the
beneficiary designation form checked off the wrong employer
insurance plan, referred to his divorced wife as a separated wife
and used his mother's address as his address. The Court referred
to Egelhoff for the proposition that the local law regarding
substantial compliance was preempted. The Court repeated the
similar but incorrect Phoenix description of the ERISA gap:60O
"ERISA is silent as to the resolution of disputes between putative
beneficiaries of a life insurance policy." Again, the gap is whether
602. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins., 30 F.3d at 563.
603. Id. at 564.
604. Id.
605. 227 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2000).
606. Id. at 704.
607. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Weatherford, 924 F.2d 1057 (1991) (substantial
compliance generally requires delivery of the beneficiary change form).
608. 297 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2002).
609. Id. at 567.
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a beneficiary designation complies with the requirement that a
plan be established and maintained pursuant to written plan
documents. The Court adopted the same prevailing common-law
rule as Phoenix and also concluded that the designation was
effective.
The Second Circuit's district courts consistently applied the
Phoenix substantial compliance rules. The Phoenix principles
were applied in 1995 in Connecticut General Life Insurance v.
Mitchell to accept an unsigned beneficiary designation change.61°
The Court had a substantial compliance issue because earlier in
the same year the Second Circuit held that NY EPTL 13-3.2(e)
which requires pension plan designations to be signed, is
By contrast, the Phoenix principles were
preempted by ERISA.'
applied in 2003 in American International Life Assurance
Company v. Vasquez"1 ' to determine that merely obtaining a
change of beneficiary form is not sufficient to establish substantial
compliance. 13 In that case, the beneficiary designation was
destroyed with the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. In
particular, the court held that $500,000 of life insurance be split
between the participant's second wife from whom he was
separated at the time of his death, and his daughter from an
earlier marriage."' Finally, in 2007, the court required a factual
inquiry to determine whether an undated beneficiary designation
change that was supposedly sent by an attorney no longer
representing the participant, which benefitted the spouse of a
person who the participant had accused of misappropriating his
funds.615
There were similar holdings in Sixth Circuit district courts.
The Phoenix principles were applied in 2002 in Life Insurance Co.
of North America v. Leeson,616 to reject a claim for life insurance
610. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11222 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1995).
611. O'Shea, Jr. v. First Manhattan Co. Thrift Plan & Trust 55 F.3d 109,114
(2d Cir. 1995) (lack of signature did not render designation ineffective).
612. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2675 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2003).
613. See also Prudential v. Schmid, 337 F. Supp. 2d 325 (2004) (applying the
Phoenix principles to find that there was no beneficiary change). The plan
responded to a request by a participant's request for beneficiary and a change
of beneficiary form so he could choose his new wife as the beneficiary with
correspondence that she was the beneficiary and a change in beneficiary form.
Id. The court found that the participant had not substantially complied with
the change of beneficiary requirements. The second wife did not bring a
fiduciary breach action. Id.
614. There was ambiguity about whether the daughter was named on all

ERISA policies but the participant was found to have intended benefit both his
daughter and separated wife. Moreover, while he expressed interest in
changing his beneficiary to his mother, there was no evidence that he went
beyond obtaining change in beneficiary forms. Id.
615. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Einhorn, 497 F. Supp. 2d 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
616. No. C2-00-1394, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18530 (S.D. Ohio March 18,
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benefits by the participant's widow because the participant never
submitted the designation form in question to the plan. Thus, the
second requirement was not satisfied. Tinsley but not Phoenix was
cited in 2006 in Basto v. Millwrights' Local 1102 Supplemental
Pension Fund.61
The Basto court held that a beneficiary
designation was effective even though the designee was described
as the participant's wife when they were not married and she had
refused to marry him. The court asked questions similar to those
in Phoenix after declaring that the clarity of the plan terms made
it unnecessary to resort to federal common law.
Did the
participant comply with the terms of the plan and was the
participant's intent expressed clearly? The Court found both
questions were answered affirmatively; thus, the designee was
entitled to the survivor benefits of 45,000 dollars.1 8
IX. THE LOWER COURTS WRONGFULLY TREAT DIVORCE DECREE
DIRECTIVES IN WHICH PARTICIPANTS NAME OR MAINTAIN PERSONS
AS PLAN BENEFICIARIES AS QDROs THAT OVERRIDE LIFE
INSURANCE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS

The ERISA Explicit Exemption preempts DROs, which
attempt to determine who receives ERISA life insurance plan
benefits, in the same manner that the state law that attempted to
determine who was entitled to the benefits of an ERISA life
insurance plan following the participant's divorce was preempted
in Egelhoff."'
Such DROs may not be QDROs, which, as
discussed, may only pertain to ERISA pension benefits. 620 Thus,
DROs may not be incorporated into life insurance plans unless
such plans provide for such incorporation. Therefore, persons may
not rely on such orders to obtain the life insurance proceeds either
directly from the plan or indirectly from the designees under such
plan. 21
On the other hand, many courts have held that state domestic
relations orders may determine who is entitled to benefits from
ERISA life insurance plans because they find that such orders
may be QDROs. Six of the seven circuits that have considered the
issue have adopted this position.2 These principles are so widely
2002).
617. No. 2:04-CV-258, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16280 (W.D. Mich. March 24,
2006).
618. Id. at *21-27.
619. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
620. See also Comment Letter of New York City Bar Association (May 7,
2007) 2, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pd/Glover050707.pdf (pertaining
to the Interim Rule Relating to Time and Order of Issuance of Domestic
Relations Orders).
621. ERISA §§ 402(a), 404(a)(1)(D); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a), 1104(a)(1)(D).
622. Barrs v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 287 F.3d 202 (1st Cir. 2002); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Bigelow, 283 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2002); Metro. Life v. Pettit, 164
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accepted that in 2007 a district court considered whether an
attorney committed malpractice by not serving such an order
before the participant violated such order by naming his new wife
rather than his infant son as the beneficiary of the life
insurance.623 The reasoning of those cases finding life insurance
QDROs, which rests on two of the earliest decisions, does not
withstand close scrutiny.
The Eleventh Circuit in 1991 in Brown v. Connecticut General
Life Insurance,found such orders were preempted." 4 The majority
held that the participant's designee, his widow, was entitled to the
134,000 dollars in proceeds from his employer's life insurance
plan.625 The court rejected a claim by the participant's former wife,
which was based on a provision in the judgment of divorce that the
participant would 626 "keep the Plaintiff [Katharine Mary Ann
Brown] as beneficiary on the life insurance now in effect on his life
for as long as she remains unmarried." The controversy concerned
the effect of the participant's subsequent employment change on
the above commitment. The circuit court of appeals found the
former spouse's claim was preempted under the ERISA Explicit
Preemption. The majority did not discuss the dissent's argument
that the divorce judgment constituted a QDRO and thus not
preempted.
The Tenth Circuit reached a different result in the same year
in Carland v. Metropolitan Life."7 In that case, the participant's
former wife was found entitled to the entire 51,000 dollars in
proceeds from his employer's life insurance plan upon his death in
1987. The court rejected a claim from the widow based on her
being the designee under the plan's explicit terms. Under the
terms of the property settlement agreement incorporated into the
1964 divorce decree the participant was required to irrevocably
designate his former spouse as the sole beneficiary of the "current
F.3d 857 (4th Cir. 1998); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415 (6th Cir.
1997); Metro. Life Ins. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 1994); Carland v.
Metro. Life, 935 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit recently
observed in dicta that "every Court of Appeals" that had addressed that
question held that QDROs applied to life insurance plans and referenced these
cases. Metro. Life v. Price, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21076 (3d Cir. Sept. 4,
2007). But see Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 934 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1991)
(finding that ERISA preempted such an order).
623. See Mattingly v. Hoge III, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5221 (W.D. Ky. Jan.
23, 2007) (the decision was premised on the life insurance plan agreement that
the order was a QDRO). No malpractice was found in part because even if
notified in advance the order did not require the plan to pay benefits to any
specified individual or individuals. Id.
624. 934 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1991).
625. Id.
626. Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. CV89-H-1430-S, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20975, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 17, 1990).
627. 935 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1991).
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value" of the named life insurance minus 1,000 dollars.
Metropolitan paid the new wife the entire proceeds.62
The court engaged in a two-step analysis. First, it held that
divorce decrees with respect to any ERISA plan fit within the
QDRO exclusion of ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7), from
the ERISA Explicit Preemption. In particular, the court stated,629
"[b]ecause the reference in the preemption clause to section
1056(d)(3)(B)(i) does not restrict application of the statutory
preemption exception to pension benefit plans, however, we
interpret the exception to apply to all qualifying domestic relation
orders whether they involve a pension or welfare benefit plan."
Second, it discussed the effect of the decree. The Court asserted
that the order "satisfied the [QDRO] statutory requirements" for a
beneficiary designation pursuant to plan terms. Thus, the plan
fiduciaries were required to follow such designation.o
The Court's assertion that a DRO for life insurance benefits
satisfied the statutory requirements, which can only refer to all
631
the requirements of the QDRO statutory beneficiary designation
highlights the fatal flaw of the Court's argument. It is not
consistent with the actual language of ERISA. Orders described in
ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) become
beneficiary designations only if they comply with the other
sections of paragraph ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).
In particular, Section (J) establishes that an alternate payee as
defined in Section (K) is a plan beneficiary for all purposes, i.e., is
entitled to plan benefit payments. The benefits to which the
alternate payees are entitled are set forth in Section (A).
However, that section provides that each pension plan "shall
provide for the payment of benefits in accordance with the
applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations order."
There is no comparable designation provision for non-pension
plans. Finally, Section (L) explicitly limits paragraph (d)(3) to
plans covered in ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Those
plans are a subset of pension plans and thus exclude non-pension
plans. Therefore, there can be no life insurance QDROs.
The Seventh Circuit reached the same result three years later
in Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Wheaton.632 In that case, the
participant's children from a dissolved marriage were found

628. See generally id. (describing how in 1974 the participant named his new
wife as the beneficiary of all the life insurance proceeds, but in response to the
claim by the former wife, the new wife paid the former wife the $13,000, which
was the claimed "current value" of the policy at the time of the divorce).
629. Id. at 1119-20.
630. Id. at 1121-22.
631. It does not qualify for the only other ERISA statutory beneficiary
designation, the Surviving Spouse Provisions.
632. 42 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 1994).
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entitled to the entire 60,000 dollars in proceeds from his
employer's life insurance plan upon his death. The court rejected
the widow's claim, which was based on her being the designee
under the plan's explicit terms. The divorce decree included a
stipulation that the participant would maintain his existing life
insurance on his children as long as any were below the age of
majority, but the participant named his new wife as the sole
beneficiary of his employer's life insurance and died before the
children reached such age.
The court first suggested that the beneficiary designations of
a welfare plan may not be subject to the ERISA Explicit
Preemption." Egelhoff dispatched that argument by holding that
the ERISA Explicit Preemption preempted a state law that
attempted to determine who was entitled to life insurance
proceeds. The court also made unsupported assertions 4 that
QDROs are not restricted to pension plans in the definition of
ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). This assertion has been
refuted, supra. Finally, the court described its interpretation as a
"literal reading" of ERISA
in the course of making a policy
argument that there was no reason for Congress to provide an
exclusion from plan designations for pension plans but not for
welfare plans.
The Sixth Circuit reached the same result three years later in
Metropolitan Life Insurance v.
Marsh."6 In that case, the
participant's children from a dissolved marriage were found
entitled to two thirds of the 60,000 dollars in proceeds from his
employer's life insurance plan upon his death. The court rejected
the widow's claim, which was based on her being the sole designee
under the plan's explicit terms at the time of his 1995 death.
Under the 1978 divorce decree which incorporated a property
settlement the participant agreed to designate his minor children
as the beneficiaries of two thirds of his employer's life insurance.
The Court found that the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate applied to
welfare plans. However, it agreed with Wheaton and Carlandthat
the QDRO provisions applied to welfare plans and it quoted the
Carlandstatutory analysis and the Wheaton assertions.
The Fourth Circuit reached the same result one year later in
MetropolitanLife Insurance v. Pettit.63 In that case, however, the
633. Id. at 1082.
634. Id.
635. Id. at 1083-84.
636. 119 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Aetna Life Ins. v. Montgomery,
286 F. Supp. 2d 832 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Marsh for the proposition that
QDROs may apply to life insurance plans, but concluding that a waiver by the
participant's spouse of any interest in the participant's life insurance plan did
not fulfill the conditions of a QDRO).
637. Id. at 421-22.
638. 164 F.3d 857 (4th Cir. 1998).
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participant's widow was held to be entitled to all the proceeds from
the employer's life insurance plan because the prior spouse did not
have a QDRO to establish her benefit entitlement. Under the
property settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce
decree the participant was required to maintain 200,000 dollars of
life insurance in favor of his former spouse, but there was no
mention of the employer provided life insurance in the agreement.
As in Marsh there was a holding that beneficiary designations
relate to ERISA plans and thus absent an exclusion the court
order is preempted. The Court, however, found that QDROs
provide such exclusion for welfare plans, as well as pension
plans.639 The Court cited the conclusions in Carlandand Marsh 640
and Wheaton for its "literal reading" of ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7).
The Second Circuit reached the same result four years later
in MetropolitanLife Insurance v. Bigelow." In the 1983 settlement
agreement associated with the participant's marital dissolution,
the participant agreed to maintain his children as the irrevocable
beneficiaries of the life insurance plan and retirement plan
provided by his employer. However, before his 1999 death he had
designated his father as the sole beneficiary of his survivor
benefits under both those plans. As in Pettit, the court held that
beneficiary designations relate to ERISA plans and thus absent
exclusion the court order is preempted. However, the court held
that QDROs provide such exclusion for pension and welfare
plans.64 The court cited ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7),
and its agreement with the analysis in Carland, Wheaton, Marsh,
and Pettit.63
The First Circuit reached the same conclusion the same year
in Barrs v. Lockheed Martin Corp., although it observed a literal
interpretation of ERISA raised some questions about this
conclusion.644 In the 1989 separation agreement adopted by court
decree, participant agreed to make his wife the irrevocable
The
beneficiary of all his existing life insurance policies.
participant's employer was acquired by another company and the
participant named his new wife as the beneficiary on the new
policy. Following the participant's 1994 death the former wife
learned that she had been displaced and the original life insurance
policy no longer existed. Thus, she could not make a benefit claim
against the former insurer, but instead sought relief based on the
asserted breach by the original insurer of its disclosure obligations
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.

Id. at 863.
Id.
283 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 440.
Id.

644. 287 F.3d 202 (1st Cir. 2002).
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to her. The court dismissed these claims. In discussing the
fiduciary obligations of the insurer to inform the former wife of the
beneficiary and insurance changes the court declared that (A) it
agreed with the holdings of Carland, Wheaton, Marsh, and Pettit,
and (B) the QDRO exclusion from the ERISA Explicit Exemption
was not limited to pension plans. 5 Almost immediately after this
string citation, the court stated 6 that "taken literally" the
provisions requiring disclosure of QDROs to alternate payees,
ERISA § 206(d)(3)(G), 29, U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G), are not
applicable to welfare plans because of ERISA § 206(d)(3)(L), 29,
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(L). Rather than ask why any provisions of
Paragraph (d)(3) apply to welfare plans in such situations, the
court simply deferred to the cited circuit decisions. None of those
decisions mentioned Section (L), although Wheaton advocated a
literal interpretation of statutory language rather than a flexible
interpretation. 64 However, although the court accepted, arguendo,
the applicability of those QDRO disclosure requirements to
welfare plans, it found no fiduciary breach.
District courts in circuits other than the First, Second,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have also treated
domestic relations orders that attempt to determine who is
entitled to the proceeds of ERISA life insurance plans as QDROs
which determine entitlements to the insurance proceeds. For
example, this was done in the Fifth Circuit in Metropolitan
Insurance Co. v. Valdepena, which relied on a string citation of the
six circuits reaching such conclusion.'
Despite the contrary
holding in Brown v. Connecticut General Life Insurance,49 Pettit
was cited by a district court in the Eleventh Circuit, Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Williams, that held that the former spouse
was entitled to life insurance proceeds rather than the designee on
the basis of what it held to be a QDRO.65 °
Finally, none of the life insurance DROs satisfy the QDRO
definition of ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i),
even considered in isolation. Under Section (A), QDROs are
beneficiary designations determining which beneficiaries and
benefits the plan will pay. Thus, Section (B) requires that a
QDRO create, recognize or assign the "right to receive" all or a
portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant. In
particular, if the plan does not pay the person designated on the

645. Id. at 209, n.6.
646. Id. at 209.
647. 42 F.3d 1080, 1084 (1997).
648. No. SA-05-CA-140-XR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8010 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6,
2006).
649. 934 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1991).
650. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
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face of the order, the person may obtain relief from the plan. 5'
This is in fact the case with a classical QDRO applicable to the
pension benefits most similar to life insurance proceeds, survivor
benefits of a pension plan, which declares that a specified person
has a right to those survivor benefits. 5 ' This is not the case with
an order that a participant designate or refrain from designating a
specified person as his survivor beneficiary, as is done with the life
insurance DROs. The specified person has no right from the face
of the order to obtain relief from the plan if the plan refuses to pay
him or her the life insurance proceeds the order does not designate
them as the beneficiary.
The court in Unicare v. Chantal Phanor"' responded to
similar arguments that a life insurance DRO was not a QDRO
with the assertion 54 that the courts could grant equitable relief by
imposing a constructive trust on the proceeds so the specified
person would receive the life insurance in the same manner as
they would with respect to life insurance that is not part of an
ERISA plan but is subject to a similar state domestic relations
order. However, as the Supreme Court held in both Boggs v.
Boggs655 and Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,6"6 parties who are not entitled to
benefits directly from ERISA plans are not entitled to those
benefits indirectly from the recipients. Thus, such equitable relief
would not be available.
X.

THE LOWER COURTS WRONGFULLY OVERRIDE BENEFICIARY
DESIGNATIONS BECAUSE THE PARTICIPANT BREACHED AN
"AGREEMENT" TO CHANGE THE DESIGNATION

OF A LIFE INSURANCE PLAN

Several courts have held that benefit designation
commitments in divorce decrees pertaining to ERISA life
insurance plans are benefit designations even though such

651. See ERISA § 206(d)(3)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(I) (2000) (explaining
that ERISA may, however, excuse violations when the plan fiduciaries
satisfied their fiduciary obligations).
652. See, e.g., Section E of IRS Notice 97-11; 1997-1 C.B. 379 (providing
sample QDROs which were prepared pursuant to Congressional instructions
in Section 1457(a)(2) of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, P.L.
104-188).
653. No. 05-11355-JLT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6136 (D. Mass. Jan. 30,
2007). In that case the wife of a participant received the life insurance
proceeds of an employer life insurance plan rather than the girlfriend who he
designated as his beneficiary contrary to a court order that he not change
beneficiaries of any employer beneficiaries during the course of the proceeding.
Although, the order satisfied almost none of the specific QDRO requirements
the court found it to be a QDRO. Id.
654. Id. at *22.
655. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
656. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
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commitments are not part of the plans. Thus, the plans are being
directed to violate what the Supreme Court described in 2001 in
Egelhoff57 as a core ERISA mandate, the Plan Terms Benefit
Mandate, that is, the ERISA requirement that plan benefits be
determined by the plan terms.
The earliest decision in 1991, Central States Health & Welfare
Fund v. Boyd, found that a former wife of a participant was
entitled to 16,000 dollars in proceeds from an employer life
insurance plan. The court denied the claim of the widow (his
designee) because under the property settlement agreement that
was incorporated into the participant's divorce decree he agreed to
designate his former wife as the irrevocable beneficiary of such life
insurance. The court engaged in a three-step analysis. First, it
asserted that ERISA does not address whether a participant may
waive his right to designate a beneficiary."'0 In short, there was an
ERISA gap. Second, federal common law needed to be consulted,
which meant the prevailing state common law had to be consulted,
as long as that law "comport[ed] with the policy behind ERISA."
The prevailing state common law was that if a divorce decree
requires that an irrevocable life insurance beneficiary designation
be made, the designee is entitled to the proceeds.66 ° Third, the
policy was consistent with ERISA because the purpose of the
requirement that plan terms be determined by written terms is to
avoid undue burdens on plan administrators to search for and
review such court decrees."'
The court's argument rests on a fallacious presumption. 662
There was no ambiguity, or ERISA gap, for federal common law to
resolve. The plan designation was unambiguous. The plan terms
did not reference waivers. Thus, waivers did not affect plan
benefit designations. ERISA permits DROs to be beneficiary
designations only if the orders are QDROs (or otherwise
referenced in the plan terms). The waivers at issue are part of
DROs, which are not QDROs to the extent of such part. Therefore,
the court was trying to use federal common law to give effect to
orders that ERISA preempts, rather than using federal common
law appropriately to interpret ERISA plan terms that are
ambiguous." Thus, the Supreme Court direction in Mertens that
657. 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001).
658. 762 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
659. Id. at 1265.
660. Id. at 1265-66.
661. Id. at 1267.
662. Lewis v. Bice, No. 96-D-1739-N, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21560 (M.D.
Ala. July 30, 1997) (applying virtually the same analysis as in Boyd, while
criticizing the contrary position as relying on too "literal a reading" of ERISA).
663. See, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 562-64 (4th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that federal common law does permit prevailing state
law, even if preempted, to be used to establish federal common law, but only if
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Federal common law may not be used to revise ERISA is
applicable and determinative. In particular, ERISA requires that
plan benefits be determined only by plan terms. Finally, in 1981,
the Supreme Court held in Ridgway, that a federal statute with a
similar Benefit Plan Terms Mandate preempted a similar state
divorce decree provision pertaining to a life insurance
designation. '
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar decision four years later
in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Crysler," when it remanded
a case to determine under state law principles whether a former
wife was entitled to 45,000 dollars in proceeds from an employer
life insurance plan. The participant agreed to designate his
former wife as the irrevocable beneficiary of such life insurance as
long as he had an alimony obligation to his former wife, but his
widow as the designee at his death when he still had the alimony
obligation.
The Court declared that the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition didn't apply to welfare plans, and thus didn't preempt
state court orders pertaining to welfare plans.' The Court further
declared that the Eighth Circuit had previously held that the
ERISA Explicit Exemption does not entirely preempt the effect of
divorce decrees on a welfare plan's beneficiaries. 7
It then
concluded that ERISA is silent on how to resolve a dispute
between benefit claimants. Thus federal common law applies,
which in this case reduces to state law determinations because
once the plan interests have been protected by interpleader
traditional state law principles may be applied.'
However, the
Supreme Court in Egelhoff resolved a beneficiary dispute by
holding that state law with respect to life insurance beneficiary
designations was preempted because it attempted to override plan
terms. Thus, the divorce decree would be preempted in this case
and the widow (the participant's designee) would be entitled to all
the insurance proceeds.
The Sixth Circuit reached a somewhat different decision five
years later in Central States Pension Fund v. Howell, 9 when it
remanded a case to determine under state law principles whether
a wife was entitled to impose a constructive trust on the 30,000
dollars in proceeds from an employer life insurance plan that had
been paid to the participant's children whom he had designated as
that law does not modify the terms of an ERISA plan but instead helps
interpret those terms such as with the substantial compliance doctrine
discussed, supra).
664. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
665. 66 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1995).
666. Id. at 947-48.
667. Id. at 948-49. The reference was to Lyman Lumber, 877 F.2d 692,
discussed infra.
668. Id. at 949-50.
669. 227 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2000).
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plan beneficiaries. The participant had disregarded an order not
to dispose of any of his property during the pendency of a divorce.
He also died during the pendency. The Court agreed that the
order was not a QDRO, although in accord with Metropolitan Life
67 °
Insurance v. Marsh,
it presumed that QDROs were applicable to
welfare plans. The court then concluded that under the Benefit
Plan Terms Mandate the proceeds were payable to the designated
beneficiaries. However, the court concluded that a constructive
trust could be imposed against the proceeds after- their
distribution if the equities required it. The court relied on two
Supreme Court decisions, neither of which dealt with beneficiary
designations or considered the Benefit Plan Terms Mandate.
First, in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency,671 the Supreme Court
had permitted the garnishment of welfare benefits. In Guidry v.
Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund,7 ' the Court had
characterized a constructive trust remedy different from the
garnishment one under consideration as preempted by the AntiAlienation Prohibition. The court, however, observed that the
Tenth Circuit held that ERISA did not prohibit a constructive
trust of the kind under consideration to be imposed on the Guidry
pension proceeds after their distribution.67 Thus, the court argued
a constructive trust was permitted to be imposed in this case. 174
However, the court failed to consider Boggs, 7 ' in which the
Supreme Court rejected the availability of constructive trust to
effectuate an indirect benefit claim. 6
A district court reached a similar result five years later in
Irwin v. Principal Life Insurance Co., when it imposed a
constructive trust in favor of the participant's spouse against the
participant's father (and designee) who received $172,000 in
proceeds from an employer life insurance plan. 7 7 " The decision

670. 119 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 1997).
671. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
672. 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
673. Guidry, 39 F.3d 1078 (finding that state law prevented the imposition of
a constructive trust).
674. See also Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1998)

(making similar constructive trust arguments to try to distinguish Boggs but
overruled by Egelhoff).
675. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
676. See id. (Supreme Court rejecting not only rejected a constructive trust
or a claim for a payment from funds other than the pension benefits, but even
the request for an accounting from the plan of what the parties entitled to

benefits had received from the plan).
677. No. 04-4052-JAR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34077 (D.C. Kan. Dec. 16,
2005). But see In the Matter of Margaret M. Tomeck, 872 N.E.2d 236 (2007)
(holding that the anti-assignment provisions of the Social Security Act
discussed supra, did not prohibit a local social services department from
attributing the social security payments to a disabled individual to the
individual's spouse in order to determine the spouse's apparent liability for
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was based on the fact that the participant had disregarded a
temporary restraining order not to dispose of assets during the
pendency of a divorce action.
The participant changed
beneficiaries and died during the pendency of the action. The
court first applied Egelhoff to hold that the father was entitled to
the life insurance proceeds unless the QDRO exclusion from the
Explicit Preemption applied." ' As in Central States Pension Fund
v. Howell, the court first checked whether the order was a QDRO
and found that it lacked the requisite specificity after determining
679
that QDROs applied to welfare plans by citing Carland.
However, the court disregarded the Egelhoff rejection of
constructive trusts, as that decision's title shows, and merely cited
Howell for the principle that under the doctrine of undue
enrichment a constructive trust should be imposed against the
father's proceeds.' °
XI. THE LOWER COURTS DISREGARD THE ANTI-ALIENATION
PROHIBITION AND WRONGFULLY OVERRIDE BENEFICIARY
DESIGNATIONS WHEN THE DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY "WAIVED"
SURVIVOR BENEFITS FROM PENSION PLANS

The Anti-Alienation Prohibition prohibits the alienation or
assignment of pension plan benefits. Benefits of both participants
and beneficiaries are protected.68 ' There is no exception if the
participant obtains consideration for the alienation, as generally
occurs with respect to marital dissolutions. The Supreme Court
held in 1990 in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension
Fund," that there are no equitable exceptions to this
prohibition.'
Thus, an agreement by a designated beneficiary to
waive his or her rights to pension benefits, which is not part of a
QDRO may not thereby give any other party the right to receive a
designee's benefits either directly from the plan or indirectly from
the designees.'
On the other hand, three circuits 85 and several state courts'

payments that the department had made on behalf of the individual).
678. Id. at *21-34.
679. Id. at *34-42.
680. Id. at *42-49.
681. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1) (2005).
682. 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
683. Id. at 369-70.
684. Waivers by beneficiaries are usually part of QDROs because QDROs
generally make alternate payees beneficiaries. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i)(I), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2000).
685. Lyman Lumber Co. v. John Hill, 877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1989); Fox
Valley Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990); Altobelli v. IBM
Corp., 77 F.3d 78 (4th Cir. 1996).
686. See, e.g., Strong v. Omaha Construction Co. Pension Plan, 701 N.W.2d
320 (2005); Silber v. Silber, 99 N.Y.2d 395 (2003); Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d

1036

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:919

have held before and after Guidry that beneficiaries had
effectively waived their entitlements to ERISA pension plan
benefits. A consistent pattern is repeated. The divorce decree
provides that the participant's spouse has no interest in the
participant's pension plan benefits. The participant's pre-divorce
benefit designation of his former spouse is unchanged at his or her
death. The courts apply "federal common law" to determine
whether the decree, or the agreement incorporated in the decree,
alienates the beneficiary of her plan interest. The Eighth Circuit,
allows such waivers in theory, but held that all three that were
presented to the Circuit lacked the requisite specificity. 7 Under
this reasoning, QDROs would only be applicable to those DROs
that result from courts resolving domestic relations disputes
Such voluntary
rather than ratifying voluntary agreements.
This
agreements would not have to meet QDRO standards.
contradicts the QDRO provisions, which contain no such
distinction.
The Eighth Circuit in 1989 in Lyman Lumber v. John Hill,'
was the first to find that such waivers could be effective, although
in that case the waiver was found to be ineffective. The divorce
decree stated 9 that the participant ""shall have as his own, free of
any interest of [Colleen, his spouse], his interest in the profitsharing plan of his employer."" The participant died eighteen
months later without changing his primary beneficiary, Colleen, or
his contingent beneficiaries, his parents and brother. The Court
first incorrectly asserted that none of ERISA's explicit provisions
addressed the issue. Like the court did in Central States Health &
Welfare Fund v.Boyd,6" it did not consider the Plan Terms Benefit
The court then
Mandate and thus its reasoning is flawed.
appealed to federal common law and engaged in circular
reasoning. The Court considered how state courts had decided the
effectiveness of state decrees in non-ERISA cases in which such
provisions of the decree were not preempted.691 The court then
asserted that a divorce decree could divest a beneficiary of her
ERISA rights if the divestiture were sufficiently specific.69
Reference was made to a number of non-ERISA holdings and the
lower court decision in Fox Valley Pension Fund. However, the
721 (2003).
687. Hill v. AT&T Corp., 125 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 1997).
688. 877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir 1989).
689. Id. at 693.
690. 762 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
691. Lyman Lumber, 877 F.2d at 693. There is a reference to the lower court
decision in Fox Valley Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990);
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.Cooper, 666 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D. Idaho
1987) (involving a similar issue pertaining to employer life insurance but

never mentioning the relevance of ERISA or the Explicit ERISA Preemption).
692. Lyman Lumber, 877 F.2d at 693.
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court found the wavier ineffective because the language
established the participant's ownership in the pension benefits but
not the divestiture.693
The Seventh Circuit, the next year in Fox Valley Pension
Fund v. Brown,694 was the first to find that such a waiver was
effective even though the participant continued to live together
with his former spouse (his designee) after the divorce. The
divorce decree provided:
The parties each waive any interest or claim in and to any
retirement, pension, profit-sharing and/or annuity plans resulting
695
from the employment of the other party.
The participant died nine months after the issue of such
decree without having changed his primary beneficiary, Laurine,
his former wife, or his contingent beneficiary, his mother. All
parties agreed that the decree was not a QDRO.6" The court
asserted that a beneficiary's waiver was not an assignment or
alienation of benefits.697 The court asserted that ERISA permits
beneficiary waivers and pointed to spousal survivor consents. 96
However, waivers not satisfying those statutory conditions are not
effective.6' Thus, the presence of such an ERISA explicit waiver
provision implies other waivers are not permitted. The court then
asserted that Congress only intended to protect participants from
the alienation of benefits.700 The Supreme Court held that the
Anti-Alienation Prohibition applied to beneficiaries in Boggs.
The court then asserted that the spouse could have protected her
survivor benefits with a QDRO or a post-divorce designation.7 "2
While true, ERISA does not require such actions, thus the
designation remains effective. The Court distinguished this case
from Lyman because both parties "signed a voluntary property
settlement agreement that included an explicit mutual waiver of
any rights each might have had in the other's pension plan."7 3
However, Treasury Regulation § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) 7 °4 provides
693. Id. at 693-94.
694. 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990).
695. Id. at 277.
696. Id. at 278-79.
697. Id. at 279.
698. Id. at 279; ERISA 205(c)(1)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1)(A)(i).
699. See, e.g., Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1992).
700. Id. at 279.
701. 520 U.S. 833, 851, 862 (1997).
702. Fox Valley Pension Fund, 897 F.2d at 279-80.
703. Id. at 280.
704. Under Reorganization Plan Number 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47, 713
(1978) and 29 C.F.R. § 2570.200 a-2, the IRS has the responsibility for
establishing the regulations with respect to the prohibition on the assignment
or alienation of pension benefits. ERISA § 206(d); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000).
Those regulations are associated with the similar prohibition in I.R.C.
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that an assignment or alienation includes:
Any direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable or
irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or
beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan in,or to,
all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become
payable to the participant or beneficiary. 0 5
In particular, this case reduces to the question, did the
participant's mother acquire an interest against the plan
enforceable against the plan for the survivor benefit that would
have been otherwise payable to the former wife. If so, the decree
was an assignment pursuant to the above definition."
The court then asserted since ERISA was silent about the
ability to waive a pension interest without a QDRO, it had to look
to "federal common law." In particular, the court found that
several state courts held that property settlement agreements
incorporated into divorce are effective waivers of life insurance
benefits if the agreements specifically include a provision
terminating the spouse's interest."7 In particular, the Court found
such a termination of the spouse's pension benefits in the decree.
By contrast, the dissent by Judge Easterbrook in Fox Valley
cited both the Anti-Alienation Prohibition, which by its own
statutory terms applies to beneficiaries, and the Plan Terms
Benefit Mandate. °8 Thus, Judge Easterbrook drew attention to the
same flaw that had been present in the federal common law
discussion in Lyman: There was no ERISA gap for federal common
law to fill. Moreover, his dissent concludes 7" in a manner similar
to the Supreme Court explicit deferral to Congressional decisions
in Ridgway and Boggs:
But whether to have rules (flaws and all) or more flexible standards
(with high costs of administration and erratic application) is a
decision already made by legislation.710

§ 401(a)(13)(B).
Deference is given to authoritative and reasonable
interpretations of law by the implementing agency. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def.Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
705. Id.
706. See, e.g., McGowan, 423 F.3d 241 (holding that the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition voided a "waiver" by a participant's former wife of her interest in
the participant's pension which he was then being paid. The waiver was part
of a transaction by which the participant's current wife would be able to obtain
the interest). But cf Shaver v. Siemens Corp., No. 2:02 cv 1424, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23578, at *26-27 (W.D. Pa. March 29, 2007) (holding that ERISA
permits waivers in unspecified other circumstances, such as in that case
where employees gave up claims against the plan).

707.
708.
709.
710.

Id. at 280-82.
Id. at 282-84.
Id. at 284.
Id.
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Judge Ripple in a separate dissent emphasized... that the
court decision would be "a significant impediment to achieving the
congressional goal of efficient and certain administration of
employee benefit plans."
The Sixth Circuit in McMillan v. Parrott,2 rejected much of
the Lyman and Fox Valley approach but suggested that under
certain circumstances federal common law may be applicable to
commitments to make benefit designations. 7 3 The settlement
incorporated into the divorce decree contained a provision in which
each party relinquished "any and all" claims he or she might have
For four years after the divorce the
against the other.7 "
participant stayed on good social terms with his former wife, who
he retained as the pension plan beneficiary. The participant died
twenty-four hours after another marriage and it was agreed that
the new spouse was entitled to the Spousal Survivor interest of
half of the participant's account, but the court held the former
spouse was entitled to the other half of the account. The court
explicitly disregarded the Anti-Alienation Prohibition because it
could simply apply the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate,"5 which
would fulfill "the intent of Congress that ERISA plans be uniform
71 6
in their interpretation and simple in their application."
However, the court stated in dicta that the result would be the
same under federal common law because the "waiver" did not refer
to the former spouse's interest in the specific plan.1 7
In 1996, the Fourth Circuit, in Altobelli v. IBM & Prudential
Insurance Co., 718 joined the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in holding
that a beneficiary could effectively waive her pension benefits in a
divorce decree. The decree provided that the participant and his
spouse, who were both IBM employees, each agreed with respect to
the other's property:
All of the following property is hereafter the sole and exclusive
property of the Husband, and the Wife hereby waives and transfers
to the Husband any interest that she may have in the property:

711. Id..
712. 913 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1990).

The Sixth Circuit updated these

arguments in Metro. Life v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1996), in which an
ERISA life insurance plan benefits were under consideration following a
divorce.
713. See also Cent. States Pension Fund v. Howell, 227 F.3d 672 (6th Cir.
2000) (invoking the common law to determine the effect of a commitment by

the participant to make a benefit designation under both ERISA and nonplans).
714. McMillan, 913 F.2d at 311.
715. Id. at 311-12.

716. Id. at 312.
717. Id. It is not clear why the Court made a reference to federal common
law which would have no relevance if there was no ERISA gap. Id.
718. 77 F.3d 78 (4th Cir. 1996).
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(g) Husband's IBM pension and other deferred compensation plans,
if any. 19

The participant's pension plan beneficiary designation of his
former wife was unchanged when he died eight years after the
divorce. The issue was whether his estate or his former spouse
was entitled to the pension plan survivor benefits.
As in the other cases, the Altobelli Court began with the
assertion that ERISA does not address the effectiveness of waivers
in divorce decrees. The Court referred to the Fox Valley analysis
of the inapplicability of the Anti-Alienation Prohibition to pension
plan beneficiaries. In addition, the court cited Guidry not for the
principle that there are no implicit exceptions to the AntiAlienation Prohibition but for the principle that beneficiary
waivers promote the purpose of the prohibition, namely to "protect
a stream of income for pensioners" although the decision never
considered such waivers and the pensioner's income stream is not
at issue in this case.72 ° The Court also responded to the Plan
Terms Benefit Mandate by asserting that requiring plans to
review waivers in divorce decrees is no more burdensome than
requiring plans to review potential QDROs which are also
"documents outside the plans themselves.""1 However, ERISA
provides that QDROs are beneficiary designations pursuant to the
plan terms. There is no similar ERISA provision requiring that
waivers in divorce decrees be treated as beneficiary designations.
Moreover, Egelhoff2" rejected a similar argument when the
Supreme Court preempted a state law terminating spousal
beneficiary designations on divorce.
The dissent responded by pointing to the clarity of the
language of the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate, so that there is no
need to analyze the purpose of ERISA to determine the Mandate's
meaning or relevance.723 Moreover, the asserted lack of ERISA
guidelines about the required terms of such waivers has led to the
very conflicting decisions about the effectiveness of waivers that
Plan Terms Benefit Mandate is designed to avoid. 2
In Silber v. Silber,725 the highest court in New York considered
a QDRO which entitled the participant's former spouse to a
719. Id. at 80.
720. Id. at 81.
721. Id.
722. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
723. Altobelli, 77 F.3d at 82.
724. Id. at 83. But see Mohammed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911, 915 (8th Cir. 1995)
(claiming no conflict by disregarding the different requirements for specific
references to the plan benefits, such as those in Lyman Lumber, are required
for an effective waiver).
725. 99 N.Y.2d 395 (2003).
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separate interest in his pension but also contained the following
"waiver:"
All ownership and interest in the balance of the accumulations in all
contracts issued
by the Pension Plan [TIAA-CREF] will belong to
26
Participant.
However, in the six months following this execution, the
Participant passed away but did not change his designation of the
former spouse for the cited contracts.7 7 The court disregarded the
Anti-Alienation Prohibition on the basis that if QDROs are exempt
from such prohibition waivers must also be exempt,7 8 without
citing any similar statutory basis for such exemption although it
cited the three circuit decisions discussed above. The waiver,
unlike the separate interest given to the former spouse under the
QDRO portion of the order, may not qualify as a QDRO because
QDROs provide benefits to specified individuals other than the
participant, called alternate payees, 729 but the waiver fails to have
such a designation. The Court referred to pre-Egelhoff decisions,
which disregarded such mandate and concluded:
Strict application of ERISA requirements, while likely serving the
ends of uniformity, may not serve the ends of fairness when it comes
to effectuating the clear intent of parties to an agreement. 730
Similarly, in Strong v. Omaha Construction Co. Pension
Plan, the highest court in Nebraska considered a divorce decree
that awarded each party ownership of his "retirement plans."
However, in the two years following such divorce the former wife
remained the beneficiary. The court made no mention of the AntiAlienation Prohibition, although it cited the circuit cases described
above. Most of its discussion was devoted to a similar discussion
of why the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate did not prevent resort to
federal common law.
In Keen v. Weaver, 2 the highest court in Texas considered a
divorce decree that awarded the participant's pension plan to the
participant. However, in the thirteen years following such divorce
even though the participant married another woman, his first wife
remained his primary beneficiary and his mother his contingent
beneficiary. The court cited Lyman, Fox Valley and Altobelli for
the proposition that the Anti-Alienation Prohibition was
M
T

726. Id.
727. See id. (explaining that there was no question that the participant's
widow was entitled to the fifty percent spousal survivor's benefits). The issue
was, was she entitled to the other fifty percent of the benefits. Id.
728. Silber, 99 N.Y.2d at 402.
729. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C)(i),(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i),(ii) (2000).
730. Silber, 99 N.Y.2d at 403-04.
731. 701 N.W.2d 320 (Neb. 2005).
732. 121 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. 2003).

1042

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:919

inapplicable. The Court asserted that provisions other than the
Plan Terms Benefit Mandate required plan fiduciaries to look
beyond beneficiary designations. QDROs were mentioned, even
though ERISA requires that QDROs be treated as beneficiary
designations pursuant to plan terms.733 In addition, waivers of
spousal survivor benefits were mentioned, even though ERISA
requires that such waivers be treated as performed pursuant to
plan terms. 34 The Court pointed to no ERISA provision requiring
that waivers in divorce decrees be treated similarly. The Court
also mentioned Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency,735 which as
discussed, did not consider a beneficiary designation, the Plan
Terms Benefit Mandate. Reference was also made to Circuit
decisions discussed. Thus, again no convincing basis is presented
for resorting to federal common law.
The dissent written by Judge Hecht like that by Judge
Easterbrook in Fox Valley Pension Fund observed that the Plan
Terms Benefit Mandate clearly voided the waiver that was part of
a state court order.3
Moreover, he asserted that the Supreme
Court decision in Egelhoff, which preempted a state law trying to
alter the payment of plan benefits, cannot be disregarded by
characterizing state law as federal common law.737
In
exasperation, Judge Hecht wrote:
The obvious weakness in this position is that the Court is unable to
supply any reason, real or imagined, why ERISA would explicitly
require plans to be administered according to their terms, preempt
state law to assure that end, and then reincorporate state law into
federal common law so that plans are not administered according to
their terms, thereby making the express statutory language simply
illusory.3
Judge Hecht observed that the Supreme Court decision in
Egelhoff, which held that ERISA expressly "governs the payment
of benefits, a central matter of plan administration" undermines
the premise that ERISA is silent on the permissibility of benefit
waivers.739 ""Finally, Judge Hecht asks how the court justifies
making a voluntary wavier incorporated in a divorce decree
enforceable but not a judgment that a spouse is entitled to the
same pension plan proceeds.74 °
733. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2000).
734. ERISA § 205(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (2000).
735. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
736. Keen, 121 S.W.3d at 728-29.
737. Id. at 729-30.
738. Id. at 730.
739. Id. at 731.
740. See generally id. (explaining that the latter would not be a QDRO
because it does not meet the QDRO standards, while the former with the

same language would be a QDRO because it is a "waiver" which need not
meet the QDRO standards). Id.
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However, in Kennedy v. DuPont Savings and Investment
Plan, the Fifth Circuit held that the Anti-Alienation Prohibition
prohibited waivers by beneficiaries of pension benefits.7 4' The
court relied on 42 Boggs 3 and McGowan," to reject the holding of
the Fourth Circuit in Altobelli and of the Seventh Circuit in Fox
Valley, that waivers did not constitute the alienation of benefits.
The Court also distinguished the pension benefit waivers that it
had previously upheld in Stobnicki v. Textron, Inc.,7 5 and Rhoades
v. Casey." The court observed that those cases did not involve
marital dissolutions, which are at issue in Kennedy. 4 ' ERISA §
206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3), provides that DROs that are not
QDROs are preempted. Thus, the part of DROs, which are not
QDROs, but waivers, are preempted.7"
XII. THE LOWER COURTS DISREGARD THE PLAN TERMS BENEFIT
MANDATE AND WRONGFULLY OVERRIDE BENEFICIARY
DESIGNATIONS WHEN THE DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY "WAIVED"
SURVIVOR BENEFITS FROM LIFE INSURANCE PLANS

The Supreme Court has consistently stressed the importance
of the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate.
In 1985, it held in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell. 9 that plan
administrators have a fiduciary duty to provide participants and
beneficiaries "with the benefits authorized by the plan."' 5 °
In 1995, the Supreme Court stressed the importance in
Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen75' of the ERISA requirement that
participants and beneficiaries be able to determine their benefits
from the written plan documents. In 1997, in Boggs, it explicitly
held that individuals whose ERISA benefit claim is not based on
the plan terms may not obtain the benefits directly from the plan

741. 497 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2007) (The DRO constituted a QDRO for certain
pension plans and the issue was the effectiveness of a waiver of rights relating
to "any retirement plan" associated with the participant's employment).
742. Id. at 429-30.
743. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
744. 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition voided a "waiver" by a participant's former wife of her interest in
the participant's pension which he was then being paid. The waiver was part
of a transaction by which the participant's current wife would be able to obtain
the interest).
745. 868 F.2d 1460, 1465 (5th Cir. 1989).
746. 196 F.3d 592, 598 (5th Cir. 1999).
747. 497 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2007).
748. Id. at 429-31; see also Albert Feuer, "When Are Releases of Claims for
ERISA Plan Benefits Effective?" 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 773, 840-43 (2005)
(arguing that Stobnicki and Rhoades are not currently viable).
749. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
750. Id. at 142-43.
751. 514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995).

1044

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:919

or indirectly from the participant or beneficiary." 2 Finally in 2001,
in Egelhoff it stressed how ERISA expressly "governs the payment
of benefits, a central matter of plan administration. " "' Moreover,
the court declared that a divorce created no ambiguity in the
participant's designation of his spouse as his beneficiary even if
she is described therein as his spouse."u Thus, an agreement by a
designated beneficiary to waive his or her rights to life insurance
benefits, which is not a plan document or a designation pursuant
to plan terms, may not thereby give any other party the right to
receive a designee's benefits either directly from the plan or
indirectly from the designee.
Nevertheless five of six circuits"u and several state courts'
have held before and after Egelhoff that beneficiaries had
effectively waived their entitlements to ERISA pension plan
benefits. The same fact pattern that occurred with pension benefit
waivers recurs as do many of the same arguments, and in fact
many of the pension waiver decisions are cited. Thus, the analysis
will be shorter in this section.
The Fifth Circuit in 1994 in Brandon v. Travelers Insurance
Co.,757 was the first to find that such a waiver was effective even
though the participant's spouse was unrepresented in the divorce
and the participant designated her as his beneficiary during the
divorce proceedings.
The divorce decree provided that the
participant's spouse was "divested of all rights, title, interest, and
claim in and to such property.., or other benefit program existing
by reason of Petitioner's past, present, or future employment. " "
The participant died eighteen months after the issue of such
decree without having changed his primary beneficiary, his former
wife, or his contingent beneficiary, his brother. The court first
held that ERISA preempted the Texas law terminating a spousal
M

752. 520 U.S. 833, 852 (1997).
753. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
754. Id. at 149 n.2.
755. Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321 (5th Cir. 1994);
Mohammed, 53 F.3d 911; Altobelli, 77 F.3d 78 (holding waivers permissible);
Melton v. Melton, 324 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit rejected
waivers with respect to direct payments from the plan. Unicare Life v. Craig,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 20687 (6th Cir. Sep. 22, 2005) (permiting a constructive
trust in divorces); see, e.g., Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v.
Howell, 227 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2000) (providing for constructive trusts in
divorce agreements). By contrast, asserted waivers in a will have been
rejected. Khrishna v. Colgate Palmolive, 7 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993).
756. See, e.g., Metrop. Life v. Flinkstrom, 303 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D. Mass.
2004) (noting an effective waiver); Moore v. Moore, 266 Mich. App. 96, 102
(Mich. 2005) (stating that the court was not bound to follow Sixth Circuit
precedent); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. v. Timbo, 67 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423
(D.N.J. 1999) (finding decedent's second wife did waive benefits).
757. 18 F.3d 1321 (5th Cir. 1994).
758. Id. at 1323.
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designation on divorce." 9 The Court then had to decide. ° whether
ERISA "resolve[d] the question of how beneficiaries are
designated" and decided to rely on the "long and venerable history
of Federal respect for state domestic relations law. The court
followed the Lyman and Fox Valley Pension Fund analysis that
ERISA provided no answer and thus a voluntary and knowing
waiver was permitted, rather than the McMillan analysis that
asserted that the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate was unambiguous.
The Eighth Circuit in 1995 in Mohammed v. Kerr,76 1 also
found such a waiver was effective against the former wife. In that
case the divorce decree only provided that each party was awarded
"full right, title, interest and equity in... life insurance
policies."762 The only alternative to the federal common law of
Lyman and Brandon the court considered was state law because
neither party sought relief based on a specific ERISA section. The
court seemed less concerned about the nuances of the agreement
than the fact that:
Once Kerr was diagnosed with the disease [Alzheimer's Disease],
Mohamed could not get away fast enough, and she never looked
back. We do not believe it is putting too fine a point on it to say 7that
she abandoned him to his illness, which yielded the same result.

w

This Article addressed the Fourth Circuit Altobelli decision in
1996, supra.
The Fifth Circuit in 2000 cited Brandon in Manning v.
Hayes,7
but presented a more extensive defense of the
applicability of federal common law to (A) waivers by beneficiaries
of ERISA life insurance benefits, and (B) the resolution of
competing benefit claims. However, the court held that the
divorce decree did not have a sufficiently specific reference to the
ERISA life insurance plan for the decree to constitute an effective
waiver by his wife who remained the designee until the
participant's death from pancreatic cancer one month after the
divorce. In addition to its reference to its holding in Brandon, the
court attempted to dismiss the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate as
follows:
Section 1104 defines the fiduciary duties owed by the plan
administrator to plan participants and beneficiaries. That section
does not either expressly or implicitly purport to establish any
methodology for determining the beneficiary of an ERISA plan or for
resolving competing claims to insurance proceeds. Thus, considered
in isolation, § 1104(d) is a very thin reed upon which to find
759. Id. at 1325.
760. Id. at 1326.
761. 53 F.3d 911, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1995).

762. Id.
763. Id. at 916.
764. 212 F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 2000).
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complete conflict preemption with respect to competing claims to life
7651
insurance proceeds.
The Supreme Court in Egelhoff, however, described that "thin
reed" as follows:
The statute [attempting to determine pension and life insurance
beneficiaries following a divorce which the Court is holding to be
preempted] thus implicates an area of core ERISA concern. In
particular, it runs counter to ERISA's commands that a plan shall
"specify the basis on which payments are made to and from the
plan," § 1102(b)(4), and that the fiduciary shall administer the plan
"in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan," § 1104(a)(1)(D), making payments to a "beneficiary" who is
"designated by a participant, or by the terms of [the] plan."
§ 1002(8)."
The Court did not do much better in its attempt to dismiss
Boggs because the decision was concerned only with pension
benefits and community property rights. 6 ' The court apparently
missed the Boggs explanation of why the claimants had no right to
obtain the benefits indirectly from either the participant or his
designee:
If state law is not pre-empted, the diversion of retirement benefits
will occur regardless of whether the interest in the pension plan is
enforced against the plan or the recipient of the pension benefit..
This was not a reference to either the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition or the Spousal Survivor Provisions but to the "thin
reed" of the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate.
The Seventh Circuit in 2003 in Melton v. Melton decided that
waivers were available under federal common law. 69 The divorce
agreement included
a blanket revocation of the respective
interests of the two parties in all financial and property rights
arising "by reason of their marital relation" and "any asset
assigned to a party by this agreement" including "annuities, life
insurance policies," and other financial instruments.
The
participant died six months after the divorce without changing his
designation of his former spouse. The child of an earlier marriage
claimed she was entitled to the proceeds because she claimed that
the former wife had waived her plan interest, and the participant
was obligated under the earlier divorce of her mother to name her
as the beneficiary.
First the court applied Egelhoff to find
correctly that the daughter's constructive trust claim under the
first divorce agreement, which arose under Illinois law was

765.
766.
767.
768.
769.

Id. at 872 (emphasis added).
532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (emphasis added).
Manning, 212 F.3d at 872-73.
520 U.S. 833, 853 (1997).
324 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2003).
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preempted.77 ° The court then observed it had "noted in Fox Valley
that ERISA is silent on the issue of what constitutes a valid
waiver of interest and we therefore turned to federal common law
and Illinois state law to fill the gap." It did not consider whether
Egelhoff precluded waivers by designees, when the waivers were
not prepared pursuant to plan terms. The Court then reviewed
the waiver to determine whether it was explicit, voluntary and
knowing. It held that the waiver was ineffective because of a lack
of an express reference to the employee group term life insurance
plan. 7T
Finally, the Fifth Circuit attempted to deal with the impact of
Egelhoff in Guardian Life v. Finch,77' and it was no more
successful than it had been with Manning. The voluntary
agreement incorporated into the divorce decree provided that the
participant would be entitled to his insurance policies and the
former spouse would be divested of her interest in those policies.
The participant died six months later intestate in an aircraft
accident without having changed the designee of his employer life
insurance policy (his former spouse). The sole issue for appeal was
whether Egelhoff required the Fifth Circuit to change its federal
common law approach. The court concluded that the approach
was still valid. Under that approach the former spouse's waiver
was effective and thus his intestate heirs were entitled to the
proceeds of the life insurance.
The court first observed that the Supreme Court did not
address the applicability of federal common law to ERISA Plans,
but rather whether ERISA preempts state statutes which attempt
to change ERISA Plan beneficiaries following divorce.773 Second,
the court asserted that the Supreme Court never held that federal
common law would threaten uniformity and it may promote such
uniformity. Third, the court asserted that the Supreme Court
suggested that a common law approach may be appropriate in
slayer cases where a designee slays the participant. Finally, the
Court cited a number of post-Egelhoff decisions that adhered to
the federal common law analysis of beneficiary waivers.
The court's approach is flawed. The Supreme Court implicitly
addressed and rejected the applicability of federal common law to
determining whether beneficiary waivers in divorce agreements
are effective. The Supreme Court, unlike the court in Manning v.
Hayes,7 did not merely state that the state statute was related to
ERISA and thus preempted by the ERISA Explicit Exemption.

770.
771.
772.
773.
774.

Id. at 945.
Id. at 945-46.
395 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 242.
212 F.3d 866, 870 (5th Cir. 2000).
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775
that the
First, as discussed, the Supreme Court held in Egelhoff,
Plan Terms Benefit Mandate is part of an area of a core ERISA
concern. Thus, ERISA is far from silent in determining who is to
be paid life insurance proceeds. Rather, ERISA "commands" that
payment be made to the designee under the plan terms.77
Furthermore, the Supreme Court also held that there was no
ambiguity about a participant designation of a spouse if the
designation was silent about the effect of a divorce of the
participant and the spouse. Therefore, federal common law is not
needed to bridge any ERISA gap. In fact, under the Plan Terms
Benefit Mandate and the Mertens command that federal common
law may not revise ERISA pension plans are prohibited from
considering any non-plan documents, such as the beneficiary
waivers at issue, which the plan terms do not reference.

XIII.THE LOWER COURTS WRONGFULLY OVERRIDE BENEFICIARY
DESIGNATIONS WHEN THE DESIGNEE KILLED THE PARTICIPANT

The lower courts have regularly revoked ERISA beneficiary
designations when the person designated to receive a participant's
survivor benefits kills the participant. The Supreme Court in 2001
in dicta in Egelhoff,777 declined to address the implications of its
holding for such cases. The Court described "slayer" statutes,
which override designations in such cases, as having been 7 .
"adopted in almost every state," and as "more or less uniform," but
not before the Court. The Court had also expressly declined to
address the same issue in 1981 in Ridgway, 79 when it held that
state court orders directing a participant to designate a specified
beneficiary for life insurance provided to servicemen pursuant to a
federal statute were preempted. However, the Egelhoff dissent
correctly observed that under the reasoning of the Court's holding
that ERISA preempted state laws that revoked spousal
designations upon divorce, state slayer laws are similarly
preempted by the ERISA Explicit Exemption.
The courts often assert ERISA does not preempt state slayer
laws and use state slayer laws to override beneficiary
designations, which, because the killer is often the participant's
spouse, are often the ERISA Marital Survivor Beneficiary
Designation. As discussed above, this reasoning is faulty because
under the principles set forth in Egelhoff such state laws "relate to
ERISA plans" and are thus preempted by the ERISA Explicit
Preemption.'78
775.
776.
777.
778.
779.
780.

532 U.S. 141 (2001).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 152.
Id.
454 U.S. 46, 60, n.9 (1981).
Id.
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The lower courts also assert that federal common law includes
the state slayer law principles which they then apply to ERISA
plans. This reasoning is also flawed because, as the Supreme
Court stated in Mertens, federal common law is "not the authority
to revise the text of' ERISA. Congress and the ERISA regulations
carefully delineated conditions under which the ERISA Marital
Survivor Beneficiary Designation is established and may be
changed. Neither the law nor the regulations mention a slayer
exception.
Congress and the ERISA regulations carefully
delineate conditions under state court orders constitute beneficiary
designations, namely when such orders are QDROs. Neither the
law nor the regulations mention a slayer exception. Under certain
limited circumstances criminal laws, which may include provisions
for restitution as well as for punishment,"' may affect beneficiary
designations. However, none of the slayer overrides are based on
criminal law provisions that pertain to beneficiary designations.
The Plan Terms Benefit Mandate, requiring that plan benefits be
determined by plan terms, includes no reference to slayer
principles. Thus, there is no gap in ERISA with respect to slayer
principles for federal law to fill and thus the principles are
inapplicable.
The Supreme Court stated:
One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers "to
establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a
set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and
disbursement of benefits."782
In the slayer area there would be a particular need for
Congress to carefully delineate the terms by which beneficiary
designation would be modified because of the substantial
variances among the various state slayer laws.7" There are
inconsistencies with respect to (A) the kind of killings which
revoke ERISA plan designations; (B) the kind of proof needed to
781. See, e.g., Robert Dieter, Restitution in Criminal Cases, 30 COL. LAWYER

125 (Oct 2001); Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 ("MVRA"), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227. Generally applicable criminal laws are excluded
from the Explicit ERISA Exemption.
ERISA § 514(b)(4); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(4) (2000); see also United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.
2007) (the United States awarded entitlements of a pension plan participant
who stole from his employer and was required to make restitution under the

MVRA).
782. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).
783. Id. at 159-60 (dissent observing the difference in the standards of proof
applicable to the requisite killing criteria); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d 424,
430-32 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); see also Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule:
Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489 (1986) (proposing a model
statute to help courts determine beneficiary designation to supplement
confusion caused by variations in state slayer statutes).
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establish such killings; (C) the effect of criminal and civil trial
verdicts; and (D) the designation that supersedes the revoked
designation of the killer. The lack of such consensus implies that
any attempt to fashion federal common law set of slayer principles
would generate a set of inconsistent rules, as is occurring with
different court decisions in this area.78
The Supreme Court holding in 1886 in New York Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v.Armstrong75 is often cited for the common law
statement, "[i]t would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the
country, if on[e] could recover insurance money payable on the
death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken."7' The Court
did not consider a federal statute or which beneficiary was entitled
to receive the insurance proceeds. The Court decided an unrelated
issue, whether there was an insurance contractwhen "insurance"
was purchased with the intent to immediately murder the insured.
The policy was purchased on December 12, 1887 and the insured
was murdered on January 25, 1878.77 The Court held that under
these circumstances there was no insurance contract and thus no
one, including the surviving spouse who had no apparent
role in
7
the murder, was entitled to any insurance proceeds, 1
The New York Court of Appeals holding in 1889 in Riggs v.
Palmer is often cited for the common law maxim, "No one shall be
permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his
own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to
acquire property by his own crime."789 Such maxim is described as
having been applied by the Court of Appeals of New York in
Armstrong9 0 The court was again not considering the significance
of a federal statute, but rather the applicability of New York State
common law to the New York State's testamentary statute, which
generally required adherence to the terms of a valid will, such as
in this case. In particular, was a sixteen-year-old who murdered
his grandfather entitled to the residue of the grandfather's
testator's estate, subject to the support of his mother 9 1 as
provided in the grandfather's will? The court decided that the
grandson was not entitled to the residue and thereby modified the
784. But cf David S. Lebolt, supra note 14 (proposing a federal common law
approach which appeals to prevailing national standards, such as the various

Restatements of law, rather than the principles of the diverse and preempted
state laws). The difficulty with this approach is that it fails to recognize the
lack of consensus among the different states about application of the
aspirational Restatement principles. Id.
785. 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886).
786. Id.
787. Id. at 592.

788. Id. at 598.
789. 22 N.E.2d 188, 190 (1889).

790. Id.
791. Id. at 188.
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will's beneficiary designation.7 9
The court held that it did not
have to follow the "letter of the law" that the terms of a valid will
are binding because:
It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the
intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute
as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter
of the statute is not within the statute, unless it be within the
intention of the makers.793
The dissent questioned the application of this rule and
whether the court's decision was consistent with the legislature's
intention." Would the decedent and the legislature have wished
the court to change the disposition of his assets in the manner that
the court chose? Would the legislature have wished the court to
change the testamentary disposition in the slayer situation but not
in other circumstances in which clear manifestations of testators'
preferred disposition of his assets were disregarded because the
formalities of a will revocation or execution were not observed?
Neither the majority nor the dissent discussed a 1884 case in
which the same court applied equitable principles to modify a will
beneficiary designation indirectly. In In the Matter of the Probate
79
of the Will of Mary O'Hara,
the Court had upheld simple
bequests to three professional advisors of the decedent, but
imposed a constructive trust in favor of the decedent's distributees
because
Equity acts in such case not because of a trust declared by the
testator, but because of the fraud of the legatee. For him not to carry
out the promise by which alone he procured the devise and bequest,
is to perpetrate a fraud upon the devisor which equity will not
endure. "
In that case, the bequests were made to permit the decedent
to avoid the rule against perpetuities with respect to a desired
perpetual gift of income to charities. This intention was set forth
in a letter, showing that the advisors solicited the bequests for this
purpose. The trust was imposed in favor of the distributees rather
than the charities because the court would not permit the testator
to avoid the rule against perpetuities in this manner. By contrast,
in 1897 the Court 797 imposed a constructive trust in favor of the
792. The Court apparently allocated the grandson's residuary share in
accord with the rules of intestacy subject to the support of the killer's mother.
By contrast, in In re Estate Covert, 2761 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 2001), the court was
able to avoid intestacy and use the residuary clause of a testator's will to
provide the killer's share to the killer's parents.
793. 22 N.E.2d 188, 189 (1889).
794. Id. at 191-93.
795. 95 N.Y. 403 (1884).
796. Id. at 413.
797. A more complete discussion of the conditions under which such "secret
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charities, twenty colleges, when the purpose of the specific
bequests was to avoid the limitation on testamentary transfers to
charities."' There was a vigorous debate whether a release by the
surviving spouse and children made such a disposition permissible
under the law.
By contrast, the Supreme Court has held repeatedly, supra,
that equitable principles may not be used to modify plan
beneficiary designations pursuant to federal statutes.
ERISA
prohibits both direct modifications, as in Riggs v.Palmer, which
determine who initially receives the benefits and
indirect
modifications, as with constructive trusts, which determine who
may keep or use the plan benefits.
In 1989, the first ERISA slayer decision was issued in the
Eastern District of New York in Mendez-Bellido v.Trustees ofATU
Pension Fund.7 " The participant's surviving spouse was found not
entitled to the statutory survivor benefits from a pension plan
because she had pled guilty to second-degree manslaughter, which
is a reckless but unintentional killing." °
The court lacked
sufficient information to decide who was entitled to the proceeds." 1
The court extended the Riggs v. Palmer principles to pension
plans; those principles had been previously applied only to
insurance plans and wills.0 ' The court did not discuss the fact
that the court was overruling a designation set forth by Congress
for spousal survivor benefits that had nothing to do with the
intention of the participant."°
The Mendez-Bellido court held that the New York common
law was not preempted by ERISA because the uniformity of state
slayer laws prevented the creation of a patchwork scheme of

trusts" are imposed may be found in Eric W. Penzer and Frank T. Santoro,
"Use of the "Secret Trust" Doctrine to Effectuate a Decedent's Intent," NYSBA
Trusts and Estates Newsletter, 3 (Spring 2007). See also In the Matter of
Voice, 238 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1963) (discussing the distinction between
representations by the beneficiaries and those by the fiduciaries named under
the will).

798. The Trustees of Amherst College v. Thomas G. Ritch, 45 N.E. 876
(1897).

See also Sharp v. Kosmalski, N.E.2d 721 (1976), (holding that a

constructive trust was imposed on a well-educated woman who obtained a
widower's property by breaching a trusting relation). The court listed the
following traditional four requirements for the imposition of a constructive
trust: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in
reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment. Id. at 721, 723.
799. 709 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).

800. Id. at 330.
801. Id. at 333-34.
802. Id. at 330.
803. 482 U.S. 1 (1987); see also Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not
Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOwA L. REv. 489, 534-38 (1986) (discussing the
application of the slayer principles when the person slain does not control the
disposition of the property).
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regulation mentioned by the Supreme Court in Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne.8 " However, the ERISA Explicit Exemption
applies to any state laws that relate to ERISA plans. There is no
exemption for uniform state statutes, such as all state statutes
which require adherence to state court orders which are
preempted. Moreover, the state slayer laws differ dramatically.
For example, in Colorado, Connecticut and Illinois, the beneficiary
designation at issue would not have been revoked because in those
states manslaughter, unlike murder, does not affect the
Those state legislatures thought it
participant's designation.
inappropriate to deprive a designee of survivor benefits of survivor
benefits if the designee killed the participant without the intent to
kill the participant. The court made no apparent attempt to seek
a consensus on slayer principles needed to establish federal
common law.
Next, the court claimed federal law is in accord with the
result" and cited Prudential Insurance v. Tull,8" in which the
Fourth Circuit upheld a judgment awarding life insurance
proceeds under the federal Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act
of 1965 ("SGLIA"), to the participant's stepchildren in accord with
his default designation. In Tull, the participant's widow, who was
his designee, had murdered the participant on their wedding
night. The court therein based its decision on the equitable
principle, "No person should be permitted to profit from his own
wrong." 7' The court did not consider the effect of the Supreme
In
Court decision Ridgway,8 ' although the court cited it. °9
Ridgway, the Supreme Court declined to apply equitable
principles against a serviceman who disregarded a court order to
name his children the beneficiary of his servicemen's life insurance
policies. Moreover, Tull was not considering whether to revoke a
statutory spousal beneficiary designation as in Mendez-Bellido.
Four years later, in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v.
Cole,819 the Southern District of New York cited Mendez-Bellido for
the principle that the New York slayer law was applicable to an
ERISA life insurance plan."

804. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
805. Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 332.
806. 690 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1982).
807. Id. at 849.
808. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
809. 690 F.2d at 849, n.2.
810. 821 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
811. Id. at 198. In this case the ERISA Marital Survivor Beneficiary
Designation was not an issue because the plan was not a pension plan. The
ERISA Explicit Exemption remained an issue, as did the existence of an
ERISA gap. If there is no gap, federal common law is inapplicable.
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In 1991 the Eastern District of Louisiana in New Orleans
Electrical Pension Fund v. DeRocha1 2 issued the second ERISA
slayer decision. The participant's surviving spouse was found not
entitled to the statutory survivor benefits from a pension plan
because she had pled guilty to manslaughter, for which she was
given five years probation. The participant's divorced spouse who
had continued as the participant's explicit designee was held to be
entitled to the survivor benefit. The court cited with approval
Mendez-Bellido and its reference to the federal common law that
prevents "a beneficiary convicted of murdering the insured...
from receiving the insurance proceeds," although as in that case
the designee had not been convicted of murder."' The Court
applied a local statute applying to insurance, which it claimed was
needed to apply guidance where ERISA was silent. " Rather than
concluding that the absence of any reference to slayer principles in
the ERISA Marital Survivor Beneficiary Designation meant they
were inapplicable, the court concluded the absence established an
implicit exception. The equity of applying the slayer principles in
this case is quite questionable. Not only did the manslaughter
plea show a lack of intent to kill, but the limitation of the spouse's
criminal punishment to probation suggests that her conduct was
not very blameworthy.
A year later in 1992 the same court cited DeRocha and
Mendez-Bellido in support of the same conclusion in New Orleans
Electrical Pension Fund v. Newman."' 5 That case also did not
involve a murder but apparently a more blameworthy widow and
designee.
She was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for
manslaughter and admitted in a probate filing she was an
"unworthy heir." The participant's estate was provided with the
survivor benefits from the pension plan because there did not
appear to be a contingent beneficiary. The court made misleading
references to the case law. In Ridgway,"6 the Supreme Court did
not hold that state slayer laws do not conflict with federal law, let
alone whether they are preempted by ERISA.1 ' In Guidry v. Sheet
Metal Workers National Pension Fund,"8 the Supreme Court did
not find that the Anti-Alienation Prohibition is inapplicable to
beneficiaries or that the Anti-Alienation Prohibition is only
available to blameless individuals." 9 The Supreme Court rather
812. 779 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1991).
813. Id. at 850.
814. Id. at 850, n.6.
815. 784 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. La. 1992).
816. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
817. New OrleansElec. PensionFund, 784 F. Supp. at 1236.
818. 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
819. But see Charles T. Caliendo, Removing the "NaturalDistaste"from the
Mouth of the Supreme Court with a Criminal FraudAmendment to ERISA"s
Anti-alienation Rule, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 667, 716-18 (1994) (supporting the
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held that there are no equitable exceptions to the Anti-Alienation
Prohibition, even if an individual has engaged in criminal conduct.
Moreover, in Boggs,8 0 the Supreme Court later held that the AntiAlienation Prohibition applies to beneficiaries. Thus, the prior
Supreme Court case law does not show that the Louisiana state
law was not preempted by either (A) the ERISA Explicit
Preemption, or (B) the Anti-Alienation Prohibition.2 1
In 1998, in Addison v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, the
Western District of Virginia became the first federal court to
consider in detail the applicability of slayer principles to ERISA
The children of the
life insurance plans and murderers. 2'
and convicted
designee
her
sole
participant and her spouse,
proceeds.
life
insurance
to
the
be
entitled
held
to
murderer, were
Virginia
the
preempted
if
ERISA
unclear
that
it
was
stating
After
state law, 23 the court turned to federal common law because the
court asserted that "no specific statutory provision in ERISA
8 24
addresses this question (the applicability of slayer principles)".
The court stated that federal courts have "consistently held that,
as a matter of federal law, a beneficiary convicted of murdering
the insured is precluded from recovering the insurance
proceeds."82 This was followed by a string cite including Newman,
DeRocha and several non-ERISA cases and a reference to the
Supreme Court 19th century decision in Armstrong12 ' The Tull
case is cited for its quote from a 1950 case that "[n]o person should
be permitted to profit from his own wrong."27 The court did not
consider Ridgway, in which the Supreme Court permitted the
participant to benefit from his wrong of not naming his children as
the beneficiary of his life insurance policy under the law at issue in
Tull. The court dismissed the fact that insurance is controlled by
ERISA rather than the SGLIA as "a distinction without a
difference." 28 There was no consideration of why ERISA does not
include any limitations on benefits designations other than the

Newman court analysis).
820. 520 U.S. 833, 865 (1997).
821. As discussed, supra, an agreement by the designee to waive such
benefits may violate the Anti-Alienation Prohibition.
822. 5 F. Supp. 2d 392, 395 (W.D. Va. 1998). The similar earlier decision of
the S. Dist. of N.Y. in Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Cole, 821 F. Supp. 193, 198,
n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) was supported with a very brief reference to MendezBellido.
823. The statute in question, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401-15 (West 2006), was
part of the Virginia property and conveyance law. It was not a criminal law
that was exempt from the ERISA Explicit Preemption.
824. Addison, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
825. Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 332-33.
826. Id.
827. Addison, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
828. Id.
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two statutory beneficiary designations and the criminal law
exclusion from the Explicit ERISA Preemption.
There were three post-Egelhoff decisions from district courts
in the Fifth Circuit. In 2002 in H.E.B. Investment and Retirement
Plan v. Harris,sn the participant's widow and sole designee of the
participant's pension survivor benefits who pleaded guilty to the
"manslaughter/murder" of the participant was found not entitled
to those benefits. Instead, the children of the participant and
spouse were found entitled to those benefits. The court described
Egelhoff as "hinting" that slayer laws were not preempted.m° It
referred to the pre-Egelhoff decision, Manning v. Hayes,"
discussed above, for the incorrect proposition that federal common
law must be used to resolve competing benefit claims. Newman
and DeRocha and the Supreme Court Armstrong decisions were
cited in support of the incorporation of slayer principles in federal
common law. A similar holding based on similar reasoning was
reached in 2005 in Connecticut General v. Riner, which cited
both H.E.B. Investment and Retirement Plan v. Harris and
Addison v. Metropolitan Life Insurance. Similarly, in 2006 in
Unum Insurance v. Locke, Jr., Newman and DeRocha were cited
in support of the proposition that the insurance exclusion from the
Explicit ERISA Preemption for life insurance was applicable. 4 By
contrast, in 2005 in Clifton v. Anthony," the court did not consider
the applicability of ERISA when the participant's widow and sole
designee of his employer life insurance proceeds was found not
entitled to such benefits because she was convicted of murdering
the participant.
Three cases illustrate the unnecessary issues that are created
rather than resolved by treating slayer principles as part of federal
common law applicable to ERISA plans.
In 2005, the Ohio
Supreme Court in Ahmed v. Ahmed, 6 held that the participant's
husband and primary beneficiary was not entitled to the proceeds
829. 217 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761-62 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
830. Id. at 761.
831. 212 F.3d 866, 870 (5th Cir. 2000).
832. 351 F. Supp. 2d 492 (W.D. Va. 2005), affd., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Estate of Riner, No. 05-1084, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15707 (4th Cir., July 29,
2005). The participant's husband and designee of the proceeds of the
participant's life insurance was not entitled to the proceeds when convicted of
murdering the participant. The participant's son from an earlier marriage
was the contingent beneficiary.
833. No. 2:06 CV 0861, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59222 (W.D. La. Aug. 21,
2006). The participant's stepfather and designee of the proceeds of the
participant's ERISA life insurance would not be entitled to the proceeds if
convicted of murdering the participant.
834. See id. at n.18 (providing a refutation of this assertion).

835. No. 9:03-CV-295, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28920 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 16,
2005).
836. 817 N.E.2d 424 (2004).
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of the participant's ERISA life insurance because he had murdered
her. 7 The husband did not challenge this determination. The
issue was who was entitled to the proceeds. Under Ohio law, the
contingent beneficiary, who was one of the two children of the
participant and the spouse, would be entitled to the proceeds.
The Ahmed v.Ahmed court correctly concluded that the state
slayer law was preempted under the Egelhoff v. Egelhoff
principles."8 The court, however, then stated:
Since ERISA preempts R.C. 2105.19, the determination of who is a
beneficiary of the life insurance policy is a question of federal law
that must be determined using federal common law. Tinsley v. Gen.
Motors Corp. (6th Cir.2000), 227 F.3d 700, 704; Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Pressley (6th Cir. 1996), 82 F.3d 126, 129. 9
However, these cases show that federal common law is
inapplicable.
In Pressley, the court concluded that ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29
U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(D) establishes a clear mandate that plan
administrators follow plan documents to determine the designated
beneficiary and cited McMillan v. Parrott. ° Thus, the Pressley
court held there was no need to look to federal common law to
decide that a state divorce decree did not determine the designee
of an ERISA life insurance plan.
In Tinsley, discussed supra, the court decided it was
necessary to use federal common law to determine whether a plan
designation had been obtained by undue influence or had been
forged, because there was no similar clear federal mandate how to
make such determinations. The Tinsley court observed that by
contrast, there was no need to invoke federal common law in
Pressley or Parrott, because there was no question about the
validity of the designation document in those cases. 41 Similarly in
Ahmed v. Ahmed there was no question about the validity of the
designation document, thus there is no need to use federal
common law to look beyond designation documents to determine
the designated beneficiary.
The Ahmed court then used "federal common law" to resolve
the ambiguity it had created. First, it asserted that Armstrong
prevented the murderer from collecting the insurance proceeds,
Second, the court
which the designee was not contesting. 2
decided not to attempt to ascertain the participant's intent, but
837. He was sentenced to death for the murder. Id. at 427.
838. Id. at 430-31. The court emphasized how the variance of slayer laws
causes the slayer laws to be preempted. However, as discussed, supra, such
variance is not necessary for federal preemption.
839. Id. at 432.
840. 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990).
841. Id.

842. Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d at 432.
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rather to let the plain language of the insurance contract control
after it had disregarded such plain language to create the issue.
The court concluded that the contingent beneficiary was not
entitled to the proceeds because the primary beneficiary was still
alive. Nor, it asserted. is the clause for "no surviving beneficiary"
triggered because named beneficiaries survive. Thus, the court
3
concluded that the proceeds must go to the participant's estate.4
A similar unnecessary ambiguity was created and resolved by
the Seventh Circuit in 1999 in PrudentialInsurance v. Athmer, in
a non-ERISA case, which thus involved different considerations.'
In that case the participant's spouse and designee under the
SGLIA had murdered the participant, as in Ahmed v. Ahmed, and
also did not challenge the revocation of his beneficiary
designation."
However, the Seventh Circuit held that the
contingent beneficiary was therein entitled to the proceeds, which
it found was the majority slayer approach, although that rule was
subject to many caveats.846 In 2005 in Atwater v. Nortel Networks,
Inc.,84 the court considered whether plan fiduciaries who are
obligated to distribute the survivor benefits as soon as
administratively or reasonably practicable may distribute part of
such benefits to the designated beneficiary after learning the
designee has been indicted for murder but before his murder
conviction. The court applied the North Carolina slayer statute
which it held was not preempted,8 to find that the participant's
estate was entitled to the survivor benefits and the plan had
improperly paid the designee. Further proceedings were Ineeded to
determine if the estate was collaterally estopped from objecting or
had waived its objections to the distributions and thus would not
be entitled to those amounts from the plan. The court observed
that among the questions would be raised in such cases are the
following. May the fiduciaries pay the benefits at any time prior
the conclusion of the criminal case? Is a "not guilty" criminal
verdict sufficient to allow the designee to be paid? Is it advisable
for the fiduciaries to interplead?
There were two holdings that the slayer principles were
applicable to ERISA plans in theory but not under the particular
facts. In 2003 in Ruark v. Boiler Maker-Blacksmith National
Pension Trust,"9 the court held that the slayer rules were
applicable either under federal common law as discussed in

843. Id. at 434.
844. 178 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1999).
845. As in Ahmed, the murder must have been particularly heinous because
the person was sentenced to life plus five years.
846. Athemer, 178 F.3d at 476-77 (7th Cir. 1999).
847. 388 F. Supp. 2d 610 (D.N.C. 2005).
848. Id. at 614-15.
849. No. AMD 02-2440, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24695 (D. Md. June 9, 2003).
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Addison v. Metropolitan Life Insurance or because state law was
not preempted as discussed in H.E.B. Investment & Retirement
Plan v. Harris. However, under both approaches the designee's
homicide by motor vehicle of the participant (who was the
designee's father) lacked sufficient intent to revoke the
participant's designation.
Similarly, in 2006 in Hagedorn v.
MetLife,85 ° the court held that the slayer rules were applicable
either under Washington state law, although the court noted
arguments in favor of preemption, or federal common law as
discussed in Armstrong. However, under both approaches there
was no revocation because there was no showing that the designee
wrongfully caused the death.

XIV. THE VIEWS OF OTHER COMMENTATORS
For more than fifty years, the Supreme Court has consistently
rejected attempts by former spouses and others to override
beneficiary designations, which otherwise comply with a variety of
federal laws, including but not limited to ERISA. These decisions
began with Wissner v. Wissner85 in 1950 and concluded with
852
Egelhoff.
In 1984, Congress amended ERISA to clarify the
narrow circumstances under which DROs are not preempted but
may become ERISA plan designations known as QDROs. Former
spouses of participants may not otherwise obtain or give up ERISA
benefit entitlements upon a marital dissolution, unless the plan
terms provide that such dissolution results in a beneficiary
change.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that ERISA
preempts any state law, including a state court order, which
attempts to affect the rights of beneficiaries under the terms of an
ERISA plan. 3 The Supreme Court has also repeatedly held that
federal common law may not be used to generate equitable
exceptions to fundamental ERISA mandates such as the AntiAlienation Prohibition.854 The Supreme Court has similarly held
repeatedly that equitable principles are applied very sparingly in
ERISA, even with respect to the concept of equitable relief.""r
850. No. C05-1083Z, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27147 (W.D. Wash., Apr. 27,
2006).
851. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
852. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
853. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1985);
Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995); Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833 (1997); Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
854. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Natural Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365
(1990); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248 (1993).
855. Pilot Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1995); Great-West Life v. Knudsen,
534 U.S. 204 (2002); Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Med. Servs., 26 S. Ct. 1869
(2006).
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Thus, there is little basis for the courts to use federal common law
to generate equitable exceptions to the fundamental mandate that
ERISA plan terms determine who is entitled to receive and keep
ERISA plan benefits.
A number of commentators, like a number of the dissenters to
the Supreme Court decisions, have suggested, in a very thoughtful
manner, that it is advisable to (1) provide current or former
spouses with greater or lesser rights in the course of marital
dissolutions, and (2) better integrate the ERISA benefit
designation rules with the state rules with respect to non-ERISA
property transfers. This Article does not take a position on the
advisability of those suggestions. Rather it argues that these
suggestions are not consistent with the current terms of ERISA.
ERISA achieves the equitable goals set forth in the Congressional
Findings and Declaration of Policy of ERISA"58 by imposing
standards for the establishment and maintenance of ERISA plans
rather than setting forth broad equitable principles for the
governance of such plans. The courts lack the authority to
implement these suggestions by any resort to federal common law
because these issues do not concern gaps in the law. Such
suggestions are best directed at Congress, which is best able to
decide if there is a national consensus on these issues and, if so, to
identify and implement the consensus on these issues. Moreover,
Congress has the ability to change these rules in a manner that
will be consistent with the uniform administration that has been a
goal of ERISA from the date of its adoption so that employers will
be encouraged to establish and maintain employee benefit plans.
Many of the suggestions deserve very serious consideration by
Congress. For example, David S. Lebolt suggested that the
Restatements of Law and Uniform Codes may be used as the basis
for a uniform federal common law directed at marital dissolution,
substantial compliance, slayer statutes, and undue influence that
will include ERISA plan benefits in his Article.857 Similarly,
Professor T. P. Gallanis suggested a number of statutory reforms
in the area of survivorship, antilapse, revocation on divorce,
revocation by homicide, and the elective share to better integrate
the disposition of survivor benefits in his Article.858 Finally, Keron
A. Wright and Jeffrey Gorris suggested that the Anti-Alienation
rules be revised to permit ex-spouses to waive ERISA benefits in
favor of new spouses when the plan terms prohibit such benefit
changes in their respective well-written comments.859
856. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
857. Lebolt, supra note 14.
858. T.P. Gallanis, Symposium, Public Policy for Retirement Security in the
21st Century: Reform of Qualified Retirement Plans: ERISA and the Law of
Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185 (2004).
859. Keron A. Wright & Jeffrey Gorris, Comment, "Stuck on You". The
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XV. CONCLUSION

Entitlements to survivor benefits from ERISA plans are
determined solely by designations pursuant to the terms of those
plans. With respect to pension plans under ERISA, ERISA
requires that there be only two statutory beneficiary designations,
(A) provisions relating to QDROs and (B) provisions requiring that
a participant's spouse be entitled to certain survivor benefits.
Neither statutory designation applies to ERISA plans that are not
pension plans, such as life insurance and disability plans.
Plan designations made by participants are not superseded by
(A) an agreement by a participant marital dissolution to choose a
designee; (B) an agreement by a former or separated spouse of a
participant to relinquish ERISA plan benefits; or (C) any state law
or federal common law principle that deprives the designated
beneficiary of entitlement to ERISA plan benefits because the
beneficiary has killed the participant.
ERISA voids both (A) a benefit claim against an ERISA plan
not based on a designation made pursuant to the terms of the
plan, and (B) a benefit claim against the recipients of plan benefits
where the claim is not based on a designation made pursuant to
the terms of the plan. Such designations made pursuant to the
terms of an ERISA plan may not be superseded by state law,
agreements that are not part of the ERISA plan, or federal
common law principles.

Inability of an Ex-Spouse to Waive Rights Under an ERISA Pension Plan, 45
WASHBURN L.J. 687 (2006); Jeffrey Gorris, Comment, Waivers of ERISA Plan
Benefits: Preventing Judicial Interpretations of a Complex Statute from
Frustratingthe Statute's Simple Purpose, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 717 (2007).

